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The thesis explores how and why farmers were dispossessed of their land for the creation of 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and similar land-based development projects in contemporary 
neoliberal India. This qualitative research is carried out through a case study of a 
pharmaceutical SEZ in Polepally, a cluster of villages 80 kilometres from Hyderabad, in the 
State of Andhra Pradesh (AP). The major purpose of the thesis is to identify the causes of 
dispossession for capitalist forms of industrialisation. The study analyses the crucial role played 
by political leaders in AP, especially Yeduguri Sandinti Rajasekhara Reddy (YSR, who was 
Chief Minister from 2004 to 2009), in granting land to private corporations for the 
establishment of a pharmaceutical SEZ in Polepally and other development projects. Through 
an analysis of the processes by which the state acquired land and subsequently transferred it to 
private capital for the development of SEZ-type projects, the thesis demonstrates how it was 
the collusive state-business deals struck by YSR for personal and political gains that caused 
the dispossession of farmers.  
  
Theoretically, this research refines and builds on David Harvey’s (2003) formulation of 
‘Accumulation by Dispossession’ (ABD) which attributes dispossession to the imperatives of 
global financial and credit agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank. From the perspective 
of ABD, dispossession through SEZ-type development models (which mainly occurs in 
developing societies) is an outcome of the institutional design of global neoliberalism, which 
has a tendency to circumvent crises associated with the overaccumulation of capital in the 
world economy. The thesis argues that dispossession for capital accumulation can instead be 
attributed to subnational political and economic factors in the context of India’s political 
economic transformation since the 1990s.  
  
The thesis reinterprets Harvey’s notion of dispossession for capital accumulation from a 
‘bottom-up’ perspective. It finds that the development projects conceived and executed during 
YSR’s tenure catered principally to the intertwined interests of the political and business 
classes. The collusive state-business deals were responsible for the dispossession of the farmers 
and other people from their basic means of subsistence. Consequentially, the dispossessed 
citizenry became restive and protested against the SEZ-type development models. This created 
tensions between the competing imperatives of the market economy on the one hand, and 
political democracy or development and welfare on the other. The AP government’s response 
and its management of political dissent was an essential feature of the process of dispossession 
for capital accumulation. The thesis demonstrates how YSR’s reliance on the strategies of 
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balancing the ‘economics of the market’ and the ‘politics of democracy’ legitimised 
dispossession in the case of the Polepally SEZ.  
  
Through its analysis of the political-economic dynamics of subnational politics in AP, the thesis 
finds that the synergy between the state and the capital, propelled by the business aspirations 
of people close to the ruling political dynasty, caused the dispossession of the farmers from 
their basic means of subsistence. The findings provide a better understanding of how 
subnational-level leaders can use the ideology of development to promote their own interests 
in a democracy. In AP, the state-business nexus nurtured by the personal business interests of 
the political elite resulted in ‘development deadlock’, which benefitted only the political-
business elite. The impetus for embracing SEZ-type development projects stemmed from 
attempts by the centralising leaders to cater to the economic and political interests of state-level 
leaders while retaining their electoral majorities, rather than actualising the development goals 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This dissertation seeks to identify the process by which farmers were dispossessed of their land 
to make way for large-scale development projects, specifically Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs), in the South Indian State of Andhra Pradesh (AP).1 David Harvey’s theory of 
‘Accumulation by Dispossession’ (ABD) is one of the most conventional means of 
understanding dispossession. According to ABD, dispossession is required so that surplus 
capital, which has lain idle since the 1970s in the global economy, can be profitably redeployed. 
When capital lies dormant or its circulation is constrained, it leads to a crisis. For Harvey 
(2003), the surplus capital in the developed nations is bereft of profitable sites of investments. 
This is because it encounters certain constraints for its reinvestment. These constraints could 
be of land, labour, market, raw materials, resources, technology and of political or social 
democracy.  
  
Harvey argues that ABD becomes the strategy to overcome the barriers capital encounters for 
its further expansion from time to time. ABD solves the problems of overaccumulation through 
a spatial and temporal fix of the capital. It is imposed by the global monetary institutions like 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank on developing nations through 
their ability to lend financial assistance to the latter on a conditional basis. Following Karl 
Marx, Harvey defined capital as a process wherein investment, production, exchange and 
distribution, on a continuous basis, are organised by the capitalist in ways to seek profits 
continuously (Harvey 2011). The main motto of capitalism is capital accumulation. For this to 
happen, capital needs to be reinvested for its further expansion. As the capital encounters 
barriers for its reinvestment, a recourse to ABD is the option left to circumvent the capital 
crises.  
  
This study acknowledges Harvey’s theoretical formulation: that dispossession of the people 
(particularly farmers) from their basic means of subsistence for capitalist forms of production 
is taking place in developing societies such as India. But it tries to refine one key proposition 
                                                          
1 When we capitalise ‘State’, as here, the thesis refers to ‘the state’ in a geographical sense: as a constituent 
political unit of India (e.g. the ‘State of Andhra Pradesh’). When the term ‘state’ is not capitalised, it refers to the 
state in a juridical sense (e.g. the Indian state).  
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of his theory, which treats dispossession in developing societies as a consequence or outcome 
of the global capitalist designs. Harvey explains dispossession for capital accumulation from a 
top-down perspective and treats it as a project driven by the global financial agencies. The 
thesis provides for an understanding of Harvey’s notion of ABD from a bottom-up perspective. 
It explores the political-economic dynamics associated with state-business transactions at the 
provincial level (Andhra Pradesh, AP) in India, in order to build upon Harvey’s perspective on 
dispossession for capital accumulation. This is done through a close study of the establishment 
of a pharmaceutical SEZ located in Polepally (hereafter referred to as the Polepally SEZ), a 
cluster of villages 80 km away from the State capital, Hyderabad.2  
 
The main purpose of this study is to make sense of the agency responsible for dispossession, 
through a detailed narration of the events pertaining to the dispossession of Polepally farmers 
from their land for the establishment of a pharmaceutical SEZ. The story of land dispossession 
associated with the Polepally SEZ is detailed from the inception of the SEZ as a Green 
Industrial Park in 2001, to its operationalisation in the form of a pharmaceutical SEZ in 2009. 
The study relies on the empirical evidence of the Polepally case and the Yeduguri Sandinti 
Rajasekhara Reddy (YSR)-led Congress government’s grant of land to the private corporations 
for SEZ-type development projects between 2004 and 2009.3 Based on these empirics, the 
study explores whether it was the global neoliberal capitalist imperative (a top-down 
perspective) or the collusive state-business deals struck by the centralising Chief Ministers 
(CMs) for personal political and business interests (a bottom-up perspective) which caused 
dispossession. The thesis is an advancement of Harvey’s notion of dispossession for capital 
accumulation from a bottom-up perspective. The thesis provides a theoretical vantage point in 
the form of the subnational-level political-economic factors, in the changed political-economic 
context of India, to improve on Harvey’s theory of ABD.  
 
                                                          
2 Andhra Pradesh was divided into the States of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh in June 2014 owing to a regional 
agitation for the grant of separate Statehood for Telangana. The movement was led, mainly, by K. Chandrashekara 
Rao of the Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) Party with support of all the major political parties. Hyderabad is 
now the capital city of the newly formed State of Telangana as well.  
3 Yeduguri Sandinti Rajasekhara Reddy or YS Rajasekhara Reddy, popularly known as YSR, was the Chief 
Minister (CM) of AP from 2004 until his death in a helicopter crash on 2 September 2009. He was a popular CM 
from the Congress Party, known for his government’s adoption of pro-poor and pro-farmer measures in an 
increasingly market-friendly policy arena. He was also the first CM to complete a five-year term in office and to 
win a second term.  
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In federal parliamentary democracies such as India, it is important to explore the state’s ability 
to manage external and internal challenges when transitioning from a planned development 
model to market-oriented development. In India, subnational entities and the centralising 
leaders (the State CMs) and parties that control them have played an increasingly important 
role since the 1990s (Rudolph and Rudolph 2001; Manor 2015). This change occurred due to 
India’s transformation from a ‘command economy to a federal market economy’ (Rudolph and 
Rudolph 2001, p. 1541). It was accompanied by devolution of political authority (Manor 2010) 
to the regional and local levels. In this context, subnational units encountered a multitude of 
competing claims and demands from above and below. They faced regulatory pressures from 
above, in the form of market forces and the central government. From below, they invariably 
have had to grapple with different social demands that emerged in the wake of a formal 
democracy ridden with diversities in terms of caste, class, income, gender and religion. This 
thesis focuses on the SEZ model of development embraced by AP in the context of broader 
changes in India’s policy regime since the 1990s. The following sections of the chapter detail 
the aims, problem, the case, questions, significance, theory, data sources and methods of the 
research. The last section provides an outline of the subsequent chapters.  
1.1 Aims  
The overall aim of the research is to analyse and understand India’s contemporary development 
model through description and explanation of the SEZ-type industrial policy implementation 
in AP, with specific reference to the case of Polepally. Since the 1980s, a pro-business growth 
model with a key role for private capital has been adopted by the central government in New 
Delhi and subsequently adopted by the States (Kohli 2012). AP has embraced this development 
model more vigorously than other Indian States since the mid-1990s (Anil Kumar 2009; 
Bardhan 2003). This thesis aims to map and explain the political-economic processes 
pertaining to Polepally between 2001 and 2009, including the transfer of land from agriculture 
to the corporate pharmaceutical industry, the collective responses by those directly affected, 
the perspectives and experiences of other stakeholders and, more importantly, the political 
management of the dissent.  
  
This case study provides an understanding of state-capital relations through a critical appraisal 
of Harvey’s (2003) formulation of ABD unleashed through SEZs and other development 
projects in a federal democracy. Harvey argues that ABD is mainly an economic process driven 
by the global finance and credit institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. The study claims 
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that dispossession for capital accumulation is as much political as economic. It demonstrates 
how political-economic factors at the subnational (in this case, AP) can cause dispossession for 
capital accumulation. The thesis aims to show that India’s changed political-economic 
conditions enabled the State governments and their leaders to design and execute policies to 
serve the intertwined interests of the political-economic elite. 
  
Deepak Nayyar sees a conflict between a market economy and a political democracy in the 
context of India’s embrace of economic reforms. One of the reasons for this conflict is 
attributed to the retreat of the state in social sector expenditure and welfare programmes. A 
market for the assets previously in the realm of public sector has been created through the 
mechanism of privatisation. The market economy provides economic autonomy for individuals 
but hurts the interests of the poor. These people who are excluded by the markets are the 
numerous poor citizens and included by the markets are the rich, who constitute a minority of 
the Indian population. The poor now have a greater voice in the polity in terms of votes and 
political mobilisation and the rich dominate the economy. India’s shift from a state-led 
capitalism to a market-driven capitalism is characterised by a situation wherein ‘the people 
who are excluded by the economics of markets are included by the politics of democracy’ 
(Nayyar 1998, p. 3129).  
  
The thesis claims that the state-business linkages for mutual benefits in AP during YSR’s 
tenure as CM caused dispossession of the farmers and numerous poor people. The 
dispossession for market leads to the widening of the gulf between the market economy and 
political democracy. Following Nayyar, it can be stated that in a democracy the election and 
legitimacy of a government depends entirely on the will of the majority, who are not rich. In 
this context, the study aims to explain how the YSR government mediated and reconciled the 
differences between the demands emanated from a political democracy and the interests of a 
market economy. In short, the study illustrates how senior politicians in AP attempted to strike 
a balance between welfare and development. Welfare here is understood as the demands made 
by the poor and marginalised on the state for subsidised food, health, education, shelter and so 
on. Development, in main, means large-scale industrialisation, urbanisation, infrastructure 
development, mining and real estate with the active involvement of private capital. Welfare is 
the responsibility of political democracy and development takes place within the market 
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economy. Thus, welfare and development, or political democracy and market economy, are 
antithetical to each other. 
  
Both the market and the empowered polity make claims on the state to restore their autonomy. 
Nayyar (1998) argues that the state is reluctant to reconcile the hostility between the interests 
of the capitalist classes (representing development) and the subaltern sections (claimants of 
welfare). In this thesis, however, I argue that the AP government under the leadership of YSR, 
intervened to reconcile the interests of the two. This intervention, however, was unable to 
bridge the gap between the market economy and political democracy as it was mainly aimed 
to further and secure the regime’s own interests.  
  
The thesis demonstrates that development policies of YSR were incapable of achieving their 
set targets. The development goals through industrial and infrastructure projects were not 
realised in AP and several of them were mired in legal controversies. This also in the long run 
can affect the revenues of the government and incapacitate it to cater to the welfare needs of 
the poor on a sustainable basis. This would result in turning the dispossessed into dangerous 
classes and lose faith in the development ideology of the state. Consequently, the thesis 
attempts to show that balancing welfare and development for short term electoral and personal 
business interests would render the political and economic system ineffective, corrupt and 
unworthy.  
  
The study details the state-business deals, particularly those that involved the displacement of 
farmers from their land in order for SEZs, industrial corridors, mining and real-estate ventures 
to be started during YSR’s term as chief minister (2004-2009). The main goal is to understand 
the role of subnational leaders with centralising tendencies in ABD. The thesis seeks to 
understand dispossession from a bottom-up rather than from a top-down perspective. It thereby 
illustrates how dispossession in Polepally can be attributed to subnational-level political 
economic dynamics rather than the structure of global capitalism.  
1.2 Research problem  
The integration of the developing economies into global capitalism in the past two or three 
decades has changed of the ways in which states and markets, and consequently states and 
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societies, interact. India and its subnational units also underwent this transformative 
phenomenon of changed state-society relations as it adopted market-led growth strategies. 
India’s political leadership encountered, in this changed scenario, the demands of the 
competing groups representing market forces and political democracy as well.  
  
India’s federal structure allows the central government in India to formulate certain 
development policies. But States play a key role in executing them. For instance, the central 
government of India in 2005 enacted a law pertaining to the SEZ model of export-oriented 
industrialisation. The State governments intended to attract private investments and increased 
employment opportunities began to enable these. Several politically sensitive issues pertaining 
to SEZ governance, such as land acquisition, resettlement and rehabilitation of the displaced, 
tax and other incentives to attract private investments, ecological and environmental matters, 
and labour-related aspects become the responsibility of State governments (Jenkins 2013).  
  
One of the States that responded pro-actively to the SEZ model of development was AP. The 
government of AP formally adopted the SEZ Policy in 2002 (Seethalakshmi 2009, p. 17). The 
State’s SEZ policy forms an integral part of a market-based growth strategy premised on a 
liberal trading and regulatory environment. The market-oriented development model gained 
increased support within the State’s political elite during the 1990s. This was particularly true 
during Chandrababu Naidu’s chief-ministership of the government led by the Telugu Desam 
Party (TDP) from 1995 to 2004 (Mooij 2005). The emergence of SEZs has entailed the creation 
of delineated and business friendly spaces mainly for private forms of entrepreneurial activities. 
According to Burman (2006, p. 5) SEZ policy provides the concerned government with scope 
to ‘regulate, or more importantly, not regulate the operation of companies within SEZs’.  
  
SEZ Policy pronouncements often emphasise export-orientation, infrastructure and regional 
development but it is not the case across AP and India that SEZs are established always for 
these purposes. Rather, SEZs are often associated principally with real estate development and 
urbanisation (Ananthanarayanan 2008; Banerjee-Guha 2008; Bach 2011; Mukhopadhyay 
2009). There is an ongoing debate on the meaning and implications of this type of political 




This dissertation seeks to explicate the tensions between the neoliberal trajectory of 
development, as exemplified by the SEZ policy and the case of Polepally, and collective 
responses to this development program. A key problem is to explain how and to what extent 
political democracy in this State has enabled and constrained the implementation of the SEZ 
program. For this purpose, the thesis focuses on the tensions between the market-led 
development strategies, as represented by SEZ-type industrialisation, and political democracy, 
as reflected in the claims of the contending groups over the SEZ induced dispossession for 
private capital accumulation.  
  
The study explicates the circumstances of the creation of Polepally SEZ and its subsequent 
implementation and development. The case study under investigation is a pharma sector SEZ, 
which has been a sunrise industry in India. According to policy plans, the pharma sector creates 
employment opportunities, earns foreign exchange, brings in technology and fosters export-led 
growth. However, this industry also incurs heavy social and environmental costs (Vijay 2009).  
  
Policy documents and developmental plans describe SEZs as ‘engines for economic growth’ 
(Ministry of Commerce and Industry, GoI, n.d.). State government of AP and international 
development agencies projected SEZs as ‘engines of industrial growth and vehicles of social 
mobility’ (Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation [APIIC] 2009, Government of 
Andhra Pradesh [GoAP] 1999, and World Bank 2004 as cited by Cross 2009, p. 354). The 
extent to which this has been achieved in AP will be ascertained through analysis of the 
Polepally SEZ experience. At the outset, it would seem unlikely that broad development targets 
have been realised through SEZs in India. Large sections of the agrarian and poor population 
have contested the loss of land, livelihood and associated environmental destruction 
(Shrivastava 2008a, p. 12; Srinivasulu 2014; Banerjee-Guha, 2008, p. 51).  
  
Contrasting discourses on SEZ-policy claims to development underlie different perspectives, 
which provide a vantage point for understanding the SEZ phenomenon. An important aspect 
of the dissertation will be investigation of the extent to which such dissent is reflected in the 
political and economic discourse on the SEZ policy in AP and India. This thesis investigates 
debates and tensions surrounding the Polepally SEZ and the factors that influenced the adoption 
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and implementation of the SEZ policy in AP. The main problem of this research is to trace the 
agency responsible for dispossession in Polepally and AP.  
  
1.3 The Polepally case  
The Polepally pharmaceutical SEZ (Polepally SEZ) on National Highway 7 is about 80 
kilometres from Hyderabad and 52 kilometres from the Rajiv Gandhi International Airport 
located in Shamshabad. This SEZ was developed by the Andhra Pradesh Industrial 
Infrastructure Corporation (APIIC) as a sector specific SEZ for manufacturing pharma 
products. Originally, a Green Industrial Park (GIP) was planned in Polepally and two other 
surrounding villages by the then TDP government in 2002. This park was ‘aimed at promoting 
green business technologies by encouraging non-polluting companies to set up their bases’ 
(The Hindu Business Line 9 December 2005).  
  
The APIIC acquired about 1,000 acres of land from the farmers in Polepally, Gundlagadda 
Thanda and Mudireddypally in the Jadcherla Mandal4 of Mahabubnagar District to establish a 
GIP. The land acquired by the government comprised of two categories – assigned land and 
Patta land. The assigned lands refer to the government lands granted to the landless poor as 
part of land distribution policies of the government. The assignees are prohibited legally from 
selling the lands to private persons. The Patta land (title deed) refers to the ownership of land 
secured through inheritance or purchase. ‘Patta’ gives a legal entitlement to the owners of land 
whereby they can sell or transfer their land to others. 
  
About 352 households (families) who depended on farming as their main source of livelihood 
were displaced for the GIP. A majority of these households owned less than 5 acres of land. 
Almost all assignees owned less than 2.5 acres of land. Thus the majority of the farmers were 
small or marginal landholders. The 2010-2011 Indian Agriculture Census (Government of 
India [GoI] 2014) provides a five-fold classification of farmers based on the amount of 
operational land they hold. An operational holding is defined as the land possessed by the 
farmer/s for cultivation, either individually or jointly, irrespective of the title, legal form, size 
or location. This is also the definition accepted by the government of AP. The farmers are 
                                                          
4 A Mandal is an intermediary administrative unit between village and the District in the State of Andhra Pradesh 
comprised of 20-25 villages.  
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classified as marginal, small, semi-medium, medium and large, based on the operational land 
holdings criteria. According to the criterion of owning the operational holdings of land: the 
marginal farmers are those who own less than 1 hectare (about 2.5 acres), the small farmers 
own between 1 and 2 hectares (2.5-5 acres); the semi-medium farmers own 2-4 hectares (5-10 
acres); the medium farmers own 4-10 hectares (10-25 acres) and the big farmers own 10-20 
hectares and above (25-40 acres and above). Following this category of land classification, the 
majority of the farmers in Polepally whose lands were acquired for the GIP were either 
marginal or small farmers.  
  
The AP government acquired the land in Polepally using the 1894 colonial Land Acquisition 
Act (LAA). As per the provisions of the LAA, the government paid compensation to those 
displaced from their lands. While the compensation to farmers for parting with assigned land 
was ₹18000 (about $US278), it was ₹50,000 (about $US770) per acre for Patta land (Sainath 
2008b). According to Government Order Manuscript (G.O.Ms.) No. 1307 dated 23 December 
1993 issued by the Revenue Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh (GoAP), the 
compensation to the assignees displaced by irrigation and power projects or industrial projects 
shall be on par with the Patta landholders. However, the government violated this order in the 
case of Polepally (Srinivasulu 2014, p. 83).  
  
With the passage of the SEZ Act in 2005, the government of AP abandoned the idea of 
establishing a GIP and instead planned for a pharmaceutical SEZ. The APIIC later allocated 
land to private pharmaceutical firms – Aurobindo and Hetero, at a much higher cost than it paid 
to compensate the farmers. According to the then Vice Chairman and the Managing Director 
of APIIC, B.P. Acharya, ‘the SEZ would come up on 300 acres and be a part of the Green 
Industrial Park proposed over 960 acres at Jedcherla’ (The Hindu Business Line 19 September 
2006). When this came to the notice of the people who gave their land on the promise of 
employment in the GIP, they organised protests through peaceful and democratic means. The 
majority of the people who gave their land belonged to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
(Asher 2008; Reddy 2008).5  
  
                                                          
5 Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) are protected under the Constitution of India through various 
safeguards. SCs and STs, inter alia, are the historically disadvantaged socio-economic groups in India.  
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Over a period, the protests by the displaced farmers gained momentum. They were supported 
by political parties and leaders, civil rights activists, human rights activists and scholars. In 
2007, the displaced farmers resisted the construction activities by gathering at the Aurobindo 
and Hetero pharma sites. The SEZ Vyathirekha Aikya Sanghatana (‘Anti-SEZ United 
Alliance’) was formed to protest setting up of pharma SEZ units in Polepally. This alliance 
demanded denotification of the SEZ and restoration of the land to the farmers from whom it 
was acquired (Srinivasulu 2014).  
  
Farmers in Polepally adopted various measures to gain back their land from the government. 
They adopted democratic means to express their dissent. They contested the State Assembly 
by-election to the Jadcherla constituency in 2008 (Times of India 28 May 2008) and also the 
May 2009 Parliamentary elections to the Mahabubnagar Lok Sabha Constituency (Reddy 
2009).6 These electoral battles were ‘a mark of protest against the existing political parties and 
their policies in relation to corporate interests and SEZs’ (Rawat, Bharath Bhushan and 
Surepally 2011, p. 38). Not taking into consideration these electoral and various other efforts 
by the displaced for the resumption of their lands, the YSR government using extra-economic 
means processed the establishment of the SEZ in Polepally. The SEZ began to operate at the 
end of 2009, without taking into consideration the farmers’ claims pertaining to dispossession 
of land, the non-transparent nature of the land acquisition process, the loss of livelihood and 
the like. 
  
1.4 Research questions  
The YSR government in AP, notwithstanding the fact of meeting the avowed policy claims and 
popular dissent, prioritised SEZ model of development as evident from its topping the list of 
SEZ projects in the country. As of April 2012, AP heads the list of both functional and notified 
SEZs in India. 110 SEZs have received formal approval and 76 SEZs have been notified as of 
April 2012 and 34 SEZs have become fully operational (Ministry of Commerce and Industries 
(GoI), n.d.).  
  
                                                          
6 The Lok Sabha is the lower house of the Indian Parliament. It is also the ‘popularly elected house’ constituted 
every five years through popular elections.  
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In the context of the YSR government’s zealous pursuit of SEZ-type development projects, one 
broad question and a few related sub-questions are raised. These empirically related questions 
are answered here not so much with the intention of contesting dominant theories of 
dispossession rooted in structural dimensions of capital flows. But answering these questions 
would point toward a theory of understanding the SEZ model of development in the liberalising 
landscape of federal democratic republics like India from a bottom-up perspective.  
  
The central question is: what political and economic factors drove the ruling political elite in 
the State of AP to embrace SEZ-type development programmes and how was this programme 
implemented in Polepally SEZ? The SEZ policy is considered as an important export-oriented 
policy initiative in liberalising India. SEZs confine capitalist pursuits to specific spaces while 
guaranteeing a space for governments to overcome legal, bureaucratic and political hurdles to 
the neoliberal model of development (Jenkins, Kennedy and Mukhopadhyay 2014). In other 
words, SEZs are a political strategy providing impetus to the further strengthening of the 
capitalist forms of production, while realising the constraints placed on such forms of 
development by the forces operating within the contours of a political democracy. However, 
its execution, as noted from the case of Polepally, casts doubts on the very notion of a liberal 
model of development.  
  
The grassroots level experience of SEZ policy, as it was executed in Polepally, indicate that it 
contravened its own policy objectives and left the powerful political and business interests to 
prevail upon the dispossessed farmers’ claims to livelihood and means of subsistence. The 
relevant issue here also pertains to the sources of influence driving this model of development. 
Specifically, the study tries to understand to what extent the SEZ model of development is 
driven by the global structural forces. The thesis claims that the way the Polepally SEZ 
programme was implemented demonstrates that such developmental models can be understood 
through the thick description of political-economic forces operating at the subnational-level. 
Irrespective of who drives this trajectory of development, SEZ-type capitalist forms of 
industrialisation, in a vibrant democracy like India and AP, evince resistance. How the political 
bosses address this resistance leads to a sub-question: what devices were used by political 




As a first step toward the SEZ policy implementation, land acquisition is necessary. But it is 
also a politically sensitive issue as it involves the commodification of land and touches upon 
the sources of livelihood of the rural populace. The resistance of people against the 
commodification of land in a market economy can be understood in terms of Karl Polanyi’s 
double movement detailed in his masterpiece The Great Transformation (1944). In simple 
terms, a double movement may be defined as two separate movements in an industrialising 
capitalist society. The first movement relates to the organisation of a market economy separated 
from all the norms of society, including state intervention; a self-regulating market. The second 
movement is a response to the first movement from various sections of the society who seek 
social protection and legislation to safeguard themselves from the ravages of the market. The 
self-regulating market creates social dislocations through the commodification of land, labour 
and money. The commodification of these three elements causes counter movements whereby 
people resist the ‘pernicious effects of a market-controlled economy’ (Polanyi 2001 [1944], p. 
80). This study is informed by the Polanyi’s main thesis: that the commodification of land is a 
politically sensitive issue with potential to destabilise the socio-political and economic order 
of the day. The study explains how this contentious matter has been handled by the State-level 
political elite. 
. 
The authoritarian political leaders at the State level, such as YSR, willing to attract private 
investments into SEZs, devise political strategies to offset the trauma of land-related 
dispossession for development projects. These include reversal measures associated with 
capital accumulation (Chatterjee 2008) such as creating food for work, free corporate health 
care treatment for the poor, legally guaranteed employment for rural households, revised 
compensatory methods for the displaced people and better rehabilitation and resettlement 
promises and the like. If these reversal measures fail to calm the restive temper of the 
dispossessed, the authorities may consider the deployment of coercive state apparatus.  
 Further, the political bosses in favour of market-oriented development models in AP created a 
discourse that development means welfare and convinced the losers that it may involve pain 
but only in the short term (Kennedy 2004). The failure to manage political dissent against SEZs 
evoked popular discontent and Polepally was one such instance in AP. Notwithstanding this, 
the policymakers decided to establish SEZs across the State of AP. In this context, the true 
rationale for SEZ-type industrialisation in AP needs to be clarified. This leads to another 
20 
 
important question: what accounts for the AP government’s overwhelming response to SEZ-
type policies?  
  
The State governments across India, and particularly the AP government, pro-actively 
responded to the Central SEZ policy. In fact, in 2002, Chandrababu Naidu addressed the US 
business community in New York by unveiling a blueprint of the Andhra Pradesh SEZ policy. 
He invited the investors to come and invest in a newly planned SEZ which would take up 9,000 
acres in Visakhapatnam (The Times of India 7 February 2002). His government, as early as 
April 2002, also came out with policy guidelines for SEZs on the lines of the Government of 
India’s SEZ policy 2000 (Government of Andhra Pradesh [GoAP] 2002). With the United 
Progressive Alliance (UPA) government’s passage of SEZ Act 2005, the government of AP 
led by YSR of the Congress Party aggressively granted permissions to private corporations to 
develop SEZs and units within them.  
  
The government’s pro-active response to SEZs in AP can be attributed to the personal and 
partisan interests of the ruling elite. For instance, the YSR government granted thousands of 
acres of farmland, including the land in Polepally, to various private corporate firms, flouting 
the rules. In return, these firms that benefitted from land doles invested in YSR’s only son’s 
newly floated business ventures. Now this leads to another question touching on the 
consequences of SEZ trajectory of development: what inferences can be drawn from the study 
of SEZ-type developmental models from a subnational perspective?  
  
The Polepally SEZ and similar development projects have several implications. The State 
political elites’ favouring of a select group of business firms is a case for collusive state-
business deals. Arguably, dispossession in Polepally cannot be linked to a globally driven 
neoliberal project but can be understood as a growing state (regional) capital alliance. In such 
a scenario, the SEZ programme becomes a policy instrument designed to cater mainly to the 
intertwined interests of political and business classes. This also means dispossession of the 
farmers and enrichment of a few political-business elites. The fruits of growth derived from 
such development projects exclude not only those directly displaced but also a significant 
proportion of the people (who do not own land) that sustain on agriculture (agricultural labour, 




Moreover, the delay and changes to the projects, the non-utilisation of land in productive ways 
for long periods, the demand of the displaced to return their land back to them and the 
reluctance of the government to do so, and the subsequent legal controversies lead to a situation 
characterised as ‘development deadlock’ (Oskarsson and Nielsen 2014, p. 268). But one should 
be wary of the ‘development deadlock’ thesis, which argues that the present model of 
development in India benefits none. In land-based development projects, the initial favours in 
terms of land concessions and SEZ permits benefit the private corporations. Further, the land 
concessions to private SEZ developers and units in AP revealed a case of state-business deals 
on a quid-pro-quo basis. This may lead to a situation wherein the political and business elite 
share the fruits of economic development on a mutually agreed basis while leaving the larger 
mass of those displaced without any means to procure their livelihood.  
  
1.5 Significance of the study  
According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the number of export-processing 
and similar types of zones world over had increased from 79 in 1975 (in 25 countries) to 3,500 
(in 130 countries) by 2006 (Boyenge 2007). The Asian Economic Integration Report 2015 
(Asian Development Bank 2015), states that there are 4,300 zones worldwide. Many countries, 
particularly developing nations, have adopted the SEZ model of development to attract foreign 
direct investment, create jobs, promote exports and earn foreign exchange (Amirahmadi and 
Wu 1995; Farole 2011; Yiu Wong and Chu 1984). India was one of the first countries to 
experiment with the SEZ strategy. The Kandla Zone of Gujarat, established in 1965 by the  
Indian government, is said to be the first Export Processing Zone (EPZ) in Asia (Aggarwal, 
2010; Ananthanarayanan 2008; Ministry of Commerce and Industry, GoI, n.d.; Sampat 2010). 
Seven EPZs were established across seven Indian States between 1965 and 2000 
(Gopalakrishnan 2010). 
 
Despite being one of the first nations in Asia to adopt and implement SEZ policy in the form 
of EPZs, a comprehensive national SEZ policy, inspired by China’s SEZ model of 
development, was announced by India only in 2000 (Jenkins 2011; Sampat 2010). The context 
for the adoption of the revised SEZ policy, replacing the earlier EPZ policy at the turn of the 
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new millennium, was the broad reorientation of India’s economic policy initiated in the early 
1990s.  
  
Liberalising India enacted the Special Economic Zones (SEZ Act) in June 2005. This Act came 
into force along with associated rules in February 2006. As of April 2016, 415 SEZs have been 
granted formal approval; 329 of these are notified SEZs, and 205 have become operational.7 
Several State governments, including AP, adopted a SEZ policy modelled on the lines of the 
central SEZ Act. The SEZ policy provides scope for State governments to play a key role in 
export promotion and creation of related infrastructure. The State of AP promoted a pro-
business policy and became a favoured destination for private investments in the post-reform 
period. The State witnessed rapid industrialisation coupled with the enlargement of the private 
and corporate sectors during Chandrababu Naidu’s tenure (Alivelu, Srinivasulu and Gopinath 
Reddy 2010; Suri 2005).  
  
Proponents of liberalisation have advocated SEZs as the most favoured model. But, Preeti 
Sampat points out that ‘the displacement and disruption of livelihoods caused by SEZs and 
their grave implications are emerging even as the country witnesses steadfast resistance by 
peasants and state violence and repression or coercion in West Bengal, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, 
Goa or Maharashtra’ (2010, p. 166). The ‘legitimacy of SEZs as social and economic policy’ 
(Harding 2010, p. 156) as envisioned by the policy makers has been critically debated 
(Srinivasulu 2014; Kennedy 2010; Ananthanarayanan 2008; Singh 2011). The SEZ 
implementation has ‘generated not only a serious backlash against the SEZ policy, but a sense 
of disenchantment about the state’s approach to liberalization more generally – in particular its 
lack of attention to the agricultural sector and its disregard of the rural poor’ (Jenkins 2011, 
p.61).  
The study examines significant development problems in seeking to explain the circumstances 
and reasons for adoption and implementation of the SEZ policy by the AP government. It goes 
beyond the policy rationale offered for the establishment of SEZs in AP and investigates the 
SEZ phenomenon, with specific reference to Polepally, within the context of a neoliberal 
                                                          
7 The data pertaining to number of SEZs and their status, distribution etc. can be found on the official website of 
the Ministry of Commerce, Government of India, www.sezindia.nic.in. There are various links on this page which 
give information regarding various aspects of SEZs, including the policy objectives.  
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paradigm. The Polepally case has the potential to form the basis for an explanation of key 
political economy issues surrounding the SEZ-type development projects. The study will 
unravel the processes followed by the State of AP for adopting and continuing with the SEZ-
type industrialisation in the context of a political democracy. It provides a detailed explanation 
as to why and how SEZ model of development was zealously pursued by the YSR government 
in AP.  
  
The thesis provides an understanding of the nature and role of the state in market-oriented 
development policies in a federal democratic system such as India. As observed by Gupta and 
Shivramakrishnan (2011, p. 7) one needs to be wary of providing ‘unitary explanations’ of the 
Indian state (represented and referred to at the central or union level). The same authors also 
hold that the present political and economic decentralisation in India may lead to a situation 
wherein its subnational units would be treated akin to ‘that of European states under the federal 
structure of the EU rather than more strongly confederated nations such as the US’ (Gupta and 
Shivramakrishnan 2011, p. 7).  
  
This thesis contributes to the reformulation of critical neoliberal perspectives on contemporary 
models of development in the liberalising federal democracies, through a debate on top-down 
versus bottom-up perspectives on dispossession. It explicates the role of the apex level 
leadership at a subnational-level (here AP) in embracing market-oriented development policies 
and the real impetus for their decision to do so, notwithstanding the challenges posed by 
political democracy.  
 
The thesis has scope to provide and analyse the broad contours of shifts in the concentration of 
political power in the wake of a federal market economy. The centralising leaders’ use of 
political power to design and execute SEZ-type development models and the subsequent 
dispossession, calls into question the structural theories of dispossession for capital 
accumulation. The investigation of the Polepally SEZ provides scope for drawing and building 




1.6 Theoretical perspectives  
Developing states, such as India, plan to build SEZs can be comprehended by focussing on 
their strategies to deal with the rising neoliberal forces without losing sight of their existing 
social, cultural, political and economic conditions. As Ong (2000) argues, the experience with 
South East Asian states demonstrated that in dealing with neoliberal market forces the state 
graduates or mutates its sovereignty. States have adopted differential regulatory and 
administrative practices for different sections of populations, keeping in mind the imperatives 
of the market. In other words, the creation of SEZs as differential regulatory spaces is a 
response of the state in terms of segregating its population, keeping in view the market 
orientation. Ong’s notion of graduated sovereignty, underlying the SEZ model of development, 
involves two aspects:  
(a) the differential state treatment of segments of the population in relation to market 
calculations, thus intensifying the fragmentation of citizenship already pre-formed by social 
distinctions of race, ethnicity, gender, class and region; (b) the state transnational network 
whereby some aspects of state power and authority are taken up by foreign corporations located 
in special economic zones (Ong 2000, p. 57).  
  
The various mechanisms of governance adopted by the states under conditions of 
neoliberalisation explain the creation of SEZs or EPZs as spaces of ‘neoliberal exception’ (Ong 
2006, pp. 5-12). Ong (2000; 2006) theorized economic enclaves as sites suggestive of unfolding 
‘neoliberalism as exception’. She treated the economic enclave as a ‘nation within a nation’. In 
contrast, Cross (2010) demonstrated, drawing on his research on Visakhapatnam SEZ in AP, 
that zones are not exceptional neoliberal enclaves in states like India. He argued that,  
if much of India’s economy is marked by the absence of the state, if most people 
work without protection and security, and a majority of Indians do not experience 
citizenship as their inalienable entitlement to recognition, rights and protection, 
then what exactly would economic zones represent an exception from? (Cross 
2010, p. 357).  
  
Thus, for Cross (2010, p. 370), ‘India’s new economic zones are not closed or bounded systems. 
On the contrary the precariousness of work, the porosity of its boundary and the politics of 
citizenship inside the zone re-creates the character of working life outside’. Then, what is so 
special about these economic zones in India? Cross is of the view that these zones provide 
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legitimacy to the conditions under which most economic activity in India already takes place 
in the informal sector. In short, Cross (2010, p. 358) seeks to explain ‘how these spaces 
reproduce what are already de facto conditions of work for a majority of people’ located outside 
these zones in India.  
  
Ong and Cross explain the SEZ model of development by focussing on the working conditions 
of labour inside the SEZ factory or unit in comparison with those in the informal economy 
outside the zone, within the territorial borders of a nation. The central point addressed here is 
the relation between the capital and labour, both inside and outside of the zone, to arrive at an 
understanding of the SEZ-type development models from a comparative perspective.  
  
In The Great Transformation, Polanyi argued that point of production alone cannot be a sole 
determinant of class struggle in a capitalist society. Rather, he held that it is the ‘self-adjusting 
market’ (Polanyi 2001 [1944]) that is responsible for the living conditions of different classes, 
certainly not solely the antagonistic relations between the two classes – the capitalists and the 
workers. Polanyi argued that the commodification of labour, money and nature in a market 
society has disastrous implications for human society as a whole. Land commodification, 
which is part of the nature of a market society, threatens the very existence of human life. Land 
has several use values, like growing food, building shelter and so on. Polanyi wrote that market 
fundamentalism (including commodification of land, besides labour and money, gives rise to 
a countermovement from those who are affected by the market (like the displaced farmers in 
Polepally) to protect their society from the pernicious effects of the market. The counter 
movements included positive and destructive instances. Fascism and Stalinism on one hand 
and the New Deal and Social Democracy on the other were a result of market fundamentalism 
in the period between the two world wars. Polanyi predicted that the negative elements of the 
two counter movements (Fascism and Stalinism) were so strong that a self-adjusting market 
will never be sought by human society. In Polanyi’s words, ‘undoubtedly our age will be 
credited with having seen the end of the self-regulating market’ (Polanyi 2001 [1944] p. 148). 
Polanyi’s forecasting about the non-return of market fundamentalism does not stand as seen 




The failed optimism of Polanyi, that market fundamentalism will never return, can be 
understood by paying attention to David Harvey’s thesis of the periodical capital crises, which 
are innate to, and an inevitable outcome of, capitalism. One way to resolve such crises is to 
move capital across the globe into the avenues (such as SEZs) that help perpetuate capital 
accumulation, the main motto of the capitalist economy. David Harvey, the contemporary 
political geographer and Marxist philosopher, argues that SEZs are created for the 
redeployment of surplus capital. His theory is based on the structural dimensions of capital 
flows to further and safeguard capitalist accumulation. Harvey in The New Imperialism (2003) 
employed the concept ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (ABD) in a far-reaching analysis of the 
global political economy. This concept has been widely used as a framework for interpretation 
of the SEZ phenomenon (Ananthanarayanan 2008; Costa 2007; Dunn 2007; Gopalakrishnan 
2010; Holden, Nadeau and Jacobson 2011; Levien 2011a; Oza 2010; Sampat 2010; Sarkar and 
Chowdhury 2009; Steur and Das 2009).  
  
The ABD theory points to the creation of SEZs and other such industrial enclaves as a means 
of addressing the capital accumulation crises. The source of the crises is overaccumulated or 
surplus capital lying idle in the global economy. In specific terms, the surplus capital 
accumulated by Multinational Corporations (MNCs) which does not find profitable outlets for 
its reinvestment in developed markets generates economic crises. These MNCs hunt for 
profitable outlets elsewhere. From the perspective of ABD, the surplus capital crisis can be 
averted by shifting the surplus capital into the developing nations of the world. Accordingly, 
the global neoliberal order generates pressures on and opportunities for developing states to 
create SEZs and deregulate their respective economies in a way conducive for private business 
operations.  
  
Harvey’s theory emphasises the role of international financial and credit institutions like the 
World Bank and the IMF in making and sustaining the process of ABD. Harvey argues that the 
neoliberal austerity measures suggested by the global financial institutions (IMF and World 
Bank) to the states in the developing world would not have been necessary, ‘if there had not 
emerged chronic problems of overaccumulation of capital through expanded reproduction 
coupled with a political refusal to attempt any solution to these problems by internal reform’ 




The study accepts that the SEZ-type models lead to dispossession, as manifested in the loss of 
land and livelihood of several people and in the accumulation by elites, as is the case with 
Polepally. However, it departs from Harvey’s structural dimensions of capitalist exploitation 
as a focal point for dispossession. In main, it claims that the subnational-level political 
economic factors play a vital role in dispossession for capital accumulation.  
  
Further, the resistance to the land-based dispossession is managed by the subnational political 
elite in certain ways, so that it does not coalesce into a potential force to destabilise the political 
system. Accordingly, the thesis claims that the subnational political leaders’ dynamic 
management of the development and welfare in changed political-economic circumstances 
tends to legitimise dispossession.  
  
India is a federal democratic republic wherein the powers are shared between the union 
government or centre and the State governments or subnational units. The Indian Constitution, 
the highest and foremost law of the country, does not describe India as a federation. But it 
provides for the division of powers between two sets of governments (centre and State). The 
powers and functions of each level of the government are defined in the Constitution itself. The 
powers of the States in India’s federation have always been a source of debate and contention 
as it was variously called a ‘quasi federation’ or a ‘federation biased towards union’ to show 
that it tended to be much more centralised in nature (Adeney 2003).  
  
The single-party dominance of the Congress in post-independent India at both centre and State 
levels enabled central government’s control over the States. However, India saw a gradual 
erosion of the single-party dominance of the Congress Party, first at State level beginning from 
1967 and then at the national level in 1989. The demise of the one-party dominance of the 
Congress was complete by 1989 as it could not thereafter win the required majority to form the 
government at the centre on its own. Nor could any other party provide an alternative to 
Congress. This led to the emergence of an era of coalition governments, wherein the regional 
parties played a decisive role in the formation of the government at the centre. The formation 
and continued sustenance of the coalition governments in Delhi were dependent on the regional 
28 
 
parties starting from 1989 till the announcement of the results of the 2014 general elections 
(Kohli 2012; Manor 2010).  
  
The decentralisation of political power from centre to the States was synchronous with the 
decentralisation of economic power.8 The Indian government adopted liberal economic reforms 
since the 1980s and made a decisive shift toward a market economy since the 1990s. India 
transformed itself from a centrally controlled economy to a decentralised economy, wherein 
subnational units were provided with greater autonomy to attract private investments and 
design policies accordingly, on their own.  
  
Partha Chatterjee argues that governance should not be viewed merely as the relationship 
between the ‘rulers’ and the ‘ruled’. Governance implies ‘the body of knowledge and set of 
techniques used by, or on behalf of, those who govern and Democracy – the politics of the 
governed’ (2004, p. 1). This argument assumes that there exists a tension between the reform-
oriented development and populist welfare. The successive governments in neoliberal India, 
realising the ill effects of primitive accumulation (displacement of peasants and artisans from 
their means of subsistence) associated with new models of development, devised policies to 
reverse it. One such instance occurred in September 2005, when the UPA government notified 
the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA); the legal 
guarantee to provide employment to the rural households. It is important to note that the SEZ 
Act was also passed by the same government in June 2005. The fear is that if these welfare 
measures are not devised, then there is a danger of serious class wars (Chatterjee 2008).  
According to Rob Jenkins (1999), in theory, democracy places constraints on ‘sustainable 
policy reform’ including economic reform. In other words, there were political constraints to 
economic liberalisation policies adopted by India. Jenkins explained the political sustainability 
of reforms through three important aspects – political incentives, political institutions and 
political skills. Politicians, as decision makers, were cognizant of the risks of reforms. In the 
meantime, they were equally aware of the incentives provided by reforms. They knew that 
reforms were not going to cause a fundamental shift in the political arena. Besides, governing 
                                                          
8 It should be noted here that devolution of political authority was independent of the market reforms. It is not that 
economic decentralisation from centre to States led to shifts in political power or shifts in the power centres led 




elites realised that reforms provided scope for them to create new avenues of illicit earnings. 
Jenkins stressed the role of Political institutions, mainly the formal federal system and the 
informal political party networks, in the management of the resistance to reforms (Jenkins 
1999).  
  
One of the key strategies adopted by the central government of India was to shift the onus of 
reforms to the subnational units of India. The governments at the State level were given the 
task of handling some of the politically sensitive reforms and this halted the mounting 
resistance. Moreover, the party and non-party networks helped the leaders to sense the public 
pulse, which enabled them to accommodate competing interests of different groups affected by 
the new economic policies. More importantly, the ‘tactical skill of the governing elites at 
disarming opponents of reform’ was another important feature that enabled the sustainability 
of reforms in India. The government concealed the radical implications of reforms and thus 
followed stealthy measures with their reform agenda (Jenkins 1999).  
  
Jenkins’ idea about the importance of shifting the onus of reforms to the governments at the 
State level resonates with the key arguments of this study. Also, the political skills of leaders 
in managing reforms and sensing the public mood in order to dispel resistance is yet another 
important aspect. The study in this context engages with how a reform-oriented policy like SEZ 
was sustained in AP and the political stratagems used by YSR to pacify resistance against 
dispossession of land for SEZs. One caveat here, upon which Jenkins perhaps did not elaborate, 
is to note what factors motivated or compelled YSR to parcel large tracts of land for SEZ-type 
industrialisation. This thesis, while concerned with the sustainability of reform, goes on to trace 
the factors that motivated the leaders elected on a pro-rural and pro-poor platform to adopt such 
policies of land alienation which display ‘market fundamentalism’.  
  
This thesis claims that the subnational apex leadership (say State CMs) in AP particularly 
devised the measures to balance welfare and development. They have adopted policies to 
reverse the ill effects of primitive accumulation and at the same time executed development 
models to promote the private capital interests. Thus, they could avoid a serious backlash from 
the losers of economic liberalisation, consolidate economic reform and gain politically 
(strengthening the Party base, winning elections and creating a solid support base). It is not to 
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argue that a structural/global account of dispossession has no relevance, but that the grounded 
realities of the SEZ model of development point to the anomalies in the execution by the 
concerned local political agency in AP.  
  
1.7 Research methods and data sources  
This research is a qualitative study based on an empirical investigation of a single case. The 
study is a descriptive and interpretative analysis of the interplay of interests, institutions and 
ideas that led to the operationalisation of the Polepally SEZ. Through the thick description of 
this case, from the perspectives of stakeholders, the study aims to construct and develop an 
understanding of the story of SEZs in AP and India. As argued by Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 235) ‘the 
advantage of the case study is that it can “close in” on real life situations and test views directly 
in relation to phenomenon as they unfold in practice’.  
  
This investigation traverses through the contrasting terrain of official SEZ policy projections 
and the ground realities of the Polepally SEZ to comprehend and reflect on the SEZ model of 
development. The dissertation tries to probe, through the data obtained from this case study, 
the extent to which the SEZ model of development has conformed to its broad policy 
objectives. The study investigates the contrasting discourses pertaining to Polepally SEZ with 
an intention to reflect on the policy claims to development through SEZs.  
  
Yanow, Schwatz-Shea and Freitas (2010, p. 110) argue that ‘a single-site case study generates 
a multitude of qualitative-interpretive, within-case “observations” reflecting patterns of 
interaction, organizational practices, social relations, routines, actions, and so on’. This seems 
to be the case with Polepally SEZ, if one carefully takes note of the events and processes that 
entailed the operationalisation of the Polepally SEZ project. The shift from ‘Green Industrial 
Park’ to ‘pharmaceutical SEZ’, the location of the SEZ in a place with good connectivity to 
railways, roadways, air and seaport, the selection of potential sector – pharma sector SEZ 
creation; the loss of land, livelihood and environment; the caste/class configurations of the pro 
and ante SEZ stakeholders, the promise of alternate employment; the process of land 
acquisition by the State government; the collective response to the Polepally SEZ and the real 
intentions of the SEZ programme—are the important aspects to be described and interpreted in 




This research focuses on explaining and understanding SEZ policy while tracking the processes 
involved in its development through a close study of the case of Polepally SEZ. The SEZ 
phenomenon is understood by identifying the perspectives and experiences of the various 
stakeholders associated with Polepally SEZ. The overall story of SEZs is then developed and 
presented through the description and interpretation of the actions and events of this case. Odell 
(2001, p. 163) writes that ‘many cases are selected for investigation because they are recent or 
seem intrinsically important’.  
  
Further, Odell argues that ‘the disciplined interpretive case study interprets or explains an event 
by applying a known theory to the new terrain’ (Odell 2001, p. 163). The case under research 
is a recent phenomenon and a contemporary issue debated and discussed intensely. This 
research on SEZs enables us to apply known theories in the discipline, such as ABD, and go 
beyond them or modify them to interpret and understand the dynamics of the SEZ policy 
adoption and implementation by the AP State.  
  
The study is based on both primary and secondary data. Primary sources include reports and 
policy documents issued by international organisations (World Bank, ILO, OECD etc.) 
pertaining to economic zones, national and State level SEZ acts, rules, amendments and policy 
documents, public hearing meetings on SEZs, annual company reports, reports of the 
commerce and finance ministries at national and State level, data drawn from the official SEZ 
websites, newspaper and other media stories on SEZs, NGO and activist reports, special blogs 
and websites devoted to the SEZs and the like.  
  
One of the key primary sources is also the Comptroller and Auditor General Reports on the 
State government performance on such diverse issues as land allotment, irrigation and the 
social sector. The research also uses the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) charge sheets 
and Enforcement Directorate’s (EDs) money laundering probe documents as key sources of 




The research studies on SEZs and the specialised academic literature form the secondary 
sources for the purposes of this study. The key academic scholarly debates, policy reports and 
documents on the overall development trajectory since 1990 will be used to provide a historical 
descriptive analysis of the key political economy perspectives on India.  
  
1.8 Chapter outline  
 The introductory chapter of this study delineates the specific contention of this thesis: that the 
subnational political agency can be the main driver of ABD. The study claims to refine 
Harvey’s contention that ABD is primarily driven by the global economic institutions and 
actors to avert the capital crisis. The goal is to trace the causes of dispossession of land in AP 
through a case study of Polepally pharmaceutical SEZ. The case sits within the broader context 
of land allocation that accompanies these types of development models while YSR was the CM 
(2004 to 2009). The study argues that the intertwined political-business interests at the 
subnational-level (AP) are mainly responsible for the dispossession of land in AP and 
consequential distress of the people relying on farm related occupation, primarily the 
marginalised sections of the society. The chapter details the aims, problem, importance, theory 
and methods of the thesis as well. 
  
Chapter 2 provides an understanding of the evolution of SEZ policy in India. It details the 
economic rationale and key issues pertaining to the SEZs. Several of the commentators traced 
land dispossession to the global neoliberal leanings of the Indian state. Harvey’s theory of ABD 
and various scholarly modifications of it form the central focus of this chapter. A critical 
understanding of SEZs from a top-down approach constitutes an important part of this chapter. 
  
Chapter 3 departs from one of the key strands of the literature, detailed in the previous chapter, 
which views dispossession as a consequence of structural capitalist forces. It demonstrates that 
the leader-centric dynamics of managing development and welfare at a regional level leads to 
dispossession. The chapter narrates how the apex political leadership in AP (mainly represented 
by the CM) meddled with development and populist welfare after the State embraced liberal 
economic reforms. Specifically, this chapter traces with empirical evidence the reasons why 
YSR aggressively pursued a set of reforms that caused dispossession of farmers, despite 
coming to power on a pro-farmer stance. It also explicates how YSR negotiated the 
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considerable degree of political dissent. The broad purpose is to show how dispossession is an 
attribute of YSR’s embrace of capital for his personal and political interests and to lay the basis 
for understanding of the case of Polepally SEZ-type dispossession.  
  
Chapter 4 unveils the case study of this thesis, the Polepally pharmaceutical SEZ. The empirics 
pertaining to the case are detailed in order to comprehend the agency responsible for the 
dispossession of farmers for SEZ-type development projects in AP. The chapter traces the 
journey of the Polepally SEZ from a Green Industrial Park (GIP) to a pharmaceutical SEZ. It 
describes the legal framework and procedures adopted to acquire land for setting up the 
Polepally SEZ. The chapter provides the statistics pertaining to the land acquired in Polepally, 
which include the extent of land acquired, compensation fixed to various categories of land, 
compensation paid. The chapter argues, based on the land acquisition process in Polepally and 
its subsequent alienation to the pharma corporate houses, that dispossession in Polepally is led 
by the subnational-level political agency using ‘extra economic means’ (legal/illegal means 
backed by the coercive apparatus of the state).  
  
Chapter 5 narrates the story of the displaced farmers’ responses to the SEZ model of 
development in Polepally. It includes a thick detailing of the resistance movement by the 
displaced farmers during the period 2006 to 2009 against the YSR government for setting up 
the pharmaceutical SEZ on their lands. This chapter finds that the displaced farmers adopted 
elements of procedural and substantive democratic practices in opposing the SEZ project 
execution in Polepally. The chapter, drawing on the empirics of the struggle, questions 
Harvey’s notion of linking struggles over ABD and expanded reproduction.  
  
Chapter 6 traces why and how the YSR government, despite the popular ire, aggressively 
pursued SEZ-type development models with reference to the specific case of Polepally. The 
YSR government violated the procedures and laws in setting up the Polepally SEZ. The 
synergy between the ruling political and business elites accounts for the creation of a SEZ in 
the originally planned GIP. Drawing on the allegations of the top investigative agencies of 
India (CBI and ED) against Jagan and the YSR government (in Jagan’s disproportionate assets 
case), the purpose of the state-capital alliance at subnational-level is deciphered. This chapter 
provides scope for sensing the real drivers of dispossession. It also makes clear that the real 
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impetus for YSR’s government’s embrace of SEZ model of development is not so much for 
‘development’ than for building his son’s business empire.  
  
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. The chapter summarises the findings and explains the key 
inferences of the research. The Polepally-type dispossession cannot be linked to the structural 
logic of capital. The chapter demonstrates that dispossession of land is linked to regional 
political interests based on collusive state-business deals, nepotism and political stratagems 





Chapter 2: Development and special economic zones in India 
  
This chapter explains the debates and discussions on Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in India 
from a political economy perspective. More precisely the chapter, through a review of literature 
on SEZs, delineates the important debates and discussions surrounding SEZs under the 
contemporary neoliberal conditions. This chapter identifies key political economy issues 
pertaining to India’s SEZ policy in general and demonstrates their relevance in understanding 
and reflecting upon the SEZ scenario in the State of Andhra Pradesh (AP) and the Polepally 
pharma SEZ, which forms the main subject of this thesis. In other words, the review of the 
literature on the Indian SEZ scenario is conducted to provide a context for the study of SEZ-
type industrialisation in AP and to provide a rationale for the case study of the Polepally SEZ. 
The overall aim is to gain a better understanding of the theories and issues pertaining to the 
SEZ-type development programmes in India to reflect on the dynamics of the Polepally SEZ.  
  
The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Congress Party enacted the Special 
Economic Zones Act (SEZ Act) applicable for the entire province of India in June 2005, 
roughly a year after it came to power. The associated Special Economic Zones Rules (SEZ 
Rules) were adopted in February 2006. The SEZ Act and its associated rules contain laws, 
regulations and administrative measures for the creation and operation of SEZs. Following the 
SEZ Act there has been a rush on the part of India’s States to create SEZs. The main objectives 
of the new SEZ policy are to create employment opportunities, earn foreign exchange, solve 
infrastructural problems, enhance export base and promote regional development. SEZ policy 
enabled the private sector to play a key role in the development and operation of SEZs.  
  
The State governments across the length and breadth of India acquired land, including 
farmland, using the Land Acquisition Act (1894) to set up SEZs. The diversion of farmland for 
SEZs became controversial (Levien 2011; Sampat 2010; Sud 2009). People who survived on 
agrarian related occupations protested the land acquisition by the government for private and 
corporate business establishments. Civil society groups, NGOs, grassroots level activists and 




The anti-SEZ discourse accused the government of forceful land acquisition, displacement of 
the poor and farmers, polluting the environment, inadequate compensation to the displaced, 
improper rehabilitation and resettlement measures, failure to generate jobs suited to the people 
with traditional skills and, above all, siding with the private capital. The grassroots level 
opposition to land acquisition for SEZs culminated in huge protests, and, ironically, the first 
struggle that became more vociferous was the case of the Nandigram SEZ in West Bengal, 
where the leftist Communist Party of India (Marxist) CPI (M) was in power.  
  
In this chapter, firstly, I provide an historical overview of SEZs in India and discuss important 
policy-related provisions of the SEZ Act (Section 1). The chapter then delineates the economic 
and policy goals of SEZ policy and demonstrates how the SEZs failed to meet the avowed 
policy objectives (Section 2). I then answer the question of why SEZ policy came to be 
embraced by the political elite at the central and State level (Section 3). The last section, 
drawing upon the preceding sections, will set the context to narrate the story of SEZs in AP 
and provides a rationale for the Polepally case study.  
  
2.1 Historical overview of the SEZ policy  
After its independence in 1947, India embarked upon a ‘self-reliant economic development 
model’. The ‘import substitution industrialisation’ (ISI), besides others, was a key strategy of 
this model (Aggarwal, Hoppe and Walkenhorst 2008, p. 31). The ISI model, which started in  
1947 and continued until the 1990s, involved ‘high tariffs, an overvalued exchange rate, import 
controls, and industrial licensing’ in India (Mukherji 2010, p. 483). However, the shortcomings 
of this strategy were reflected in the form of a severe foreign exchange crisis by the mid-1960s  
(Chatterjee 2010; Gill 2007). Indian policy makers then devised plans ‘geared towards selective 
import liberalisation and export promotion’ (Ranjan 2006, p. 7) to overcome the crisis 
associated with the scarcity of foreign exchange. Their efforts, in this regard, resulted in the 
creation of Export Processing Zones (EPZs) to promote exports.  
  
The central government of India established seven EPZs with a relaxed regulatory environment, 
compared to the rest of the domestic economy, across seven Indian States between 1965 and 
2000 (Gopalakrishnan 2010, p. 139). The main objectives of the EPZs were to promote exports, 
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generate employment and earn foreign exchanges. They played a key role in ‘promoting new 
production sectors, exporting new products and in building up the country’s image in certain 
products in international market’ (Aggarwal 2006, p. 4533). Notwithstanding their positive 
effects, several empirical studies proved that EPZs were a failure in terms of avowed policy 
objectives (Aggarwal 2004; 2005; 2006; Gopalakrishnan 2007a, 2010; Menon and Mitra 2009; 
Palit 2009a; 2009b; Palit and Bhattacharjee 2008; Seshadri 2011a; Tantri 2011; 2012). The 
employment generation, exports and foreign exchange earnings from the zones were not up to 
the mark.  
  
India’s economy since the 1990s has undergone a gradual transformation from public sector 
control of the ‘commanding heights’ to its integration into global markets (Jenkins 2011; 
Kennedy 2009; Kennedy 2010; Sinha 2004). Since the 1990s, the Indian government adopted 
measures to liberalise trade by relaxing the industrial licensing system, providing tax, fiscal, 
land and other necessary incentives to the domestic and foreign entrepreneurs. In this context, 
the government focussed on the promotion of export-led growth strategies and resolved to 
address the obstacles toward such models of industrialisation. The policy makers took steps to 
revitalise EPZ structure by providing zones with liberal incentives, larger areas for operation, 
and a competitive environment to make India a global competitor in the world market (Tantri 
2011, p. 64). However, even a decade after the liberalisation of the Indian economy, the 
contribution of the existing zones was not substantial. The EPZs’ contribution in terms of 
exports, employment, value component and, above all, foreign investment, was very low.  
  
The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in 2000-01 introduced SEZ policy, 
replacing the conventional EPZ policy (Tantri 2010). The new SEZ initiative was inspired by 
the Chinese SEZ model of development. SEZ policy 2000 was intended to provide an 
‘internationally competitive and hassle-free environment’ for export promotion. The existing 
EPZs were renamed as SEZs and 11 new SEZs were notified (Ministry of Commerce and 
Industries, GOI 2009). Five years after the SEZ scheme, the government of India on 23 June 
2005 enacted the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005. Section 1 of the SEZ Act provides ‘for 
the establishment, development and management’ (Government of India [GoI] 2005) of the 
SEZs aimed to stimulate exports and earn foreign exchange. The Union Minister of Commerce,  
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Kamal Nath, epitomised the passage of the SEZ bill as ‘a golden milestone in the process of 
broadening and deepening India’s export base’ (Madhukar 2005). The government of India 
notified the rules to govern SEZ policy implementation on 10 February 2006.  
  
The SEZ rules provide for ‘drastic simplification of procedures and for single window 
clearance on matters relating to central as well as state governments’ (Ministry of Commerce 
and Industries [GoI] 2009). The SEZ Act, along with its rules, came into force on 10 February 
2006. While the SEZ policy 2000 was announced to overcome the regulatory, fiscal and 
infrastructural shortcomings experienced by the EPZs, the new SEZ Act was enacted to ‘instil 
confidence in investors and signal the Government’s commitment to a stable SEZ policy 
regime’ (Ministry of Commerce and Industries [GoI] 2009).  
  
The SEZ Act provided for the creation of what Bach (2011) called ‘a spatial capital 
accumulation machine’ or, say, a scaffold for setting up ‘hyper-liberalized enclaves’ (Levien 
2012, p. 934). Section 53 of the SEZ Act stipulates that a SEZ shall be ‘deemed to be territory 
outside the customs territory of India for the purposes of undertaking the authorized operations’ 
(Government of India [GoI] 2005). In the words of Brenner, (2004 cited in Kennedy 2009) 
these zones are the ‘creation of the state of new territorial coordinates that can serve as 
production platforms for the global markets’.  
  
SEZ policy provides tax incentives and fiscal concessions to SEZ developers and units housed 
within them. It is created with laudable objectives such as to provide world class infrastructure 
facilities, foster employment opportunities, promote domestic and foreign investment, augment 
export promotion of goods and services and generate additional economic activities. It provides 
a single window clearance system in matters pertaining to the establishment of SEZs and the 
units within them. The fiscal incentives offered to the promoters and the units in the SEZs are 
in the form of exemptions from import and export duties, custom duties, central excise and 
sales taxes, service tax and the like. The SEZ policy provides scope for State governments to 
play a key role in export promotion and creation of related infrastructure (Ministry of 
Commerce and Industries [GoI] 2009). Overall it is ‘an attempt to deal with infrastructural 
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deficiencies, procedural complexities, bureaucratic hassles and barriers raised by monetary, 
trade, fiscal, taxation, tariff and labour policies’ (Aggarwal 2006, p. 4553).  
  
According to the provisions of the section 3 of the SEZ Act, a SEZ can be established and 
operated by State governments, public sector, private sector, joint sector and a foreign company 
(Government of India [GoI] 2005). The economic activities allowed in SEZs include 
manufacturing, services, and trading. There are essentially three types of SEZs: ‘multi-product 
zones’, where manufacturing or services falling in two or more sectors can take place; ‘single 
sector zones’ in which manufacturing of one or more goods or rendering of one or more 
services in a specific sector occur; and other types of zones, which include ‘Free Trade and 
Warehousing Zones (FTWZ)’ and SEZs in a port or airport, where the focus is on storage and 
trade (Gopalakrishnan 2010, pp. 143-4). Each of these zones require a specific quantum of land 
– 1,000 hectares9 for multiproduct SEZs, 100 hectares for sector specific SEZs and 40 hectares 
for SEZs such as FTWZs, 10 hectares for IT/ITEs, Gems and Jewellery, Biotech and the like 
(Government of India [GoI] 2006; Aggarwal 2012, p. 70).  
  
Rule 5 of the revised SEZ policy rules place a ceiling of 5,000 hectares as the maximum area 
on multi product SEZs (Government of India [GoI] 2006). The SEZ is also divided into a 
processing area, where production activities take place, and a non-processing area meant for 
creating social infrastructure, industrial township or housing. The minimum processing area 
originally set as 25 percent has now been raised to 50 percent uniformly for all categories of 
SEZs as concerns are raised over misuse of the non-processing area for real estate development 
(Nagayya and Rao 2010).  
  
2.2 SEZs: Assessing the policy rationale  
India’s stringent regulatory and legal framework is not conducive to a liberal trading system. 
Hence, the Indian government considered the creation of at least a few liberal enclaves with 
export orientation in the form of SEZs to overcome these bottlenecks. Countering the 
arguments that treated SEZs as ‘tiny islands’ erected in a ‘vast ocean of relative backwardness’, 
                                                          
9 A hectare is a unit of measuring land. Hectare is bigger than the acre. One hectare is 2.471 acres. In this thesis, 
both units of measurements are used as some official policy documents use hectares and other prefer acres. For 
instance, the SEZ policy rules, 2006 used hectares and the APIIC documents detailing Polepally SEZ land records 
used acres.  
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Goswamy (2008, p. 23) asserts that ‘it is better to have few things work than the egalitarianism 
of nothing working’. SEZs can play a ‘long-term dynamic role in her (India’s) development 
provided that they are set up appropriately, managed well, integrated with the overall national 
economy, and the sensitivities involved in their implementation are deftly dealt with political 
maturity’ (Majumdar 2007, p. 1).  
  
SEZs can function as engines of all-round economic growth and development not only by 
exploiting ‘creative energies of the private sector’ but also by reducing the ‘burden of the 
government’ and thereby enabling the latter to concentrate its efforts in providing other basic 
human needs (Mitra and Menon 2009, p. 42). Notwithstanding the pro-SEZ policy arguments, 
SEZs in India failed to achieve their policy objectives in terms of investment, exports, 
employment and regional development (Aggarwal 2006; 2012; Sheshadri 2011; 
Mukhopadhyaya and Pradhan 2009; Gopalakrishnan 2007).  
  
Aggarwal (2006, p. 4534) points out that the economic contribution of SEZs in terms of 
exports, employment, investment and regional development was minimal. He notes that ‘the 
share of SEZs in exports was a mere 5 percent in 2004 to 2005. Furthermore, they accounted 
for only 1 percent of factory sector employment and 0.32 percent of factory investment in the 
same year’. However, after the introduction of the SEZ Act 2005, SEZs ‘witnessed expansion 
in employment, investment and exports in aggregate terms’. Although zones in the post-SEZ 
act period performed well, their performance in investment, particularly foreign investment, 
direct employment, and share of exports has remained far below policy expectations.  
  
Seshadri (2011a) argued EPZs and SEZs have had a minimal impact on export promotion in 
India. There is hardly any correlation between the export growth and the export zone policy 
that requires the setting up of EPZs or SEZs. The improvement in export performance in India 
can be traced to the trade reforms adopted in part since the 1980s and in full after the 1990s.  
  
The number of SEZs quickly proliferated after the SEZ Act was adopted. But their locational 
and sectoral composition has been quite uneven. Out of the total 588 formally approved SEZs, 
390 are housed in five states: Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and 
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Karnataka, amounting to 66 percent of the total formally approved SEZs. All the five states 
which account for large number of SEZs are already highly developed (Aggarwal 2012; 
Ananthanarayanan 2008). SEZs are also concentrated only in a few highly developed 
metropolitan cities such as Delhi, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Mumbai, Chennai and places 
adjoining them leading to urban congestion (Ananthanarayanan 2008; Mukhopadhyay and 
Pradhan 2009).  
  
The sectoral composition of SEZs suggests that Information Technology (IT) and Information 
Technology Enabled Services (ITES) have dominated the number of SEZs. As of 2012, 353 
out of 588 formally approved SEZs were IT/ITES SEZs. These SEZs require a very small 
amount of land (less than 50 hectares) and are concentrated highly in the urban or suburban 
centres. For instance, a total number of 19 IT/ITES SEZs out of the 27 SEZs are in Rangareddy 
District adjoining Hyderabad city (Mukhopadhyay 2009).  
  
The large pool of IT/ITES SEZs that fall under the service sector cannot create an industrial 
base in the manufacturing sector. The manufacturing sector has the potential to absorb 
increasing labour force in India. The SEZ status for IT/ITEs could also result in the relocation 
of the existing IT and ITES companies into the SEZs for tax and other incentives, making it 
difficult to state whether SEZs contributed towards attracting new investments 
(Mukhopadhyay and Pradhan 2009; Tantri 2012). Service sector employment is already doing 
well in India.  
  
SEZs, which are considered to be the ‘harbinger of manufacturing growth’, contributed very 
minimally to the employment in the manufacturing sector with their activities concentrated 
mainly in the service sector. Further, SEZs will lead to enhanced employment opportunities, if 
any, only in high-tech service industry (IT and electronics) and, in any case, this industry cannot 
provide employment to the abundant unskilled labour force of India. In sum, the uneven 
regional and sectoral spread of SEZs, with the maximum number of them in just a few cities 
and more than 60 percent in the IT industry, cannot become a panacea for regional and sectoral 




SEZs are not well conceived as a policy expected of a democratic country like India. The only 
factor that the government takes into consideration for the approval of a SEZ is whether the 
developer ‘is in possession of, or intends to acquire, the minimum area of land specified for the 
type of SEZ’ (Gopalakrishnan 2010). The state has hardly any regulatory powers over the 
activities within a SEZ. The policy provides for a centralised administrative structure to avoid 
multiple controls of the erstwhile bureaucratic system.  
  
The SEZ Act empowers the Development Commissioner (DC) of the SEZ with the political, 
administrative, judicial and policing functions. Bijoy (2009) points out that SEZ policy heralds 
a new form of ‘corporate statehood’ which reflects in its ‘integration of the powers of the 
executive, elected institutions and the judiciary, centralized in the SEZ Authority – the 
Development Commissioner (DC) and/or the developer (company) – paving the way for the 
creation of a political and economic entity separate from the Indian state’.  
  
Several State SEZ policies notified SEZs as ‘industrial townships’ under article 243Q of the 
Indian Constitution. This legal mechanism enables the concerned State government to exempt 
SEZs from the provisions of the Part IX of the Constitution which provides for the jurisdiction 
of the elected local self-governing bodies. The policy framework of SEZs has endowed the 
SEZ authority with powers to bypass local government institutions like Panchayats (elected 
local self-governing bodies at the village level in India) and urban municipal bodies. The SEZ 
and the units in it are insulated from the laws and regulations of the outside economy. The SEZ 
authority extends to the important law and governance matters such as revenue, internal 
security, law and order and judiciary (Bijoy 2007). The governance mechanism of SEZs do not 
provide any scope for democratic governance.  
  
SEZs are a means to promote urbanization. A world class city with all modern amenities 
providing comfort and luxury for the middle classes and creating them as spaces of connectivity 
to the global capital became the important agenda of the ruling elite, aimed at ‘neoliberal 
reconfiguration’ of Indian cities (Batra 2008). In this regard, the SEZ Act is a breakthrough. 
SEZs in India, especially the city-size multi-product SEZs, ‘promise “middle class” 
connectivity through the availability of economic opportunities, spatial proximity to ports and 
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airports, green landscapes, reliable infrastructure and services, and security’ (Banerjea 2011, 
p. 128). Middle class in the post liberalisation era has been quite popular in restructuring the 
pace and face of urbanisation in India.  
  
However, the benefits middle classes see through liberalisation are upset with the ‘entry into 
mainstream politics of previously marginalized groups’ (Jenkins 2011, p. 64) in India. The 
upsurge of the masses (mainly the backward and marginalised groups) into politics provided 
scope for manipulative populist politics resulting in the rise of “demagogues” who ‘sacrifice 
progress at the altar of equality’ (Jenkins 2011, p. 64). This kind of mass politics led the urban 
middle classes to perceive ‘living amidst India’s current democratic dispensation an 
unattractive proposition’ (Jenkins 2011, p. 64). In this context SEZs offer an opportunity to 
middle and elite sections to move into ‘an offshore haven located onshore’ (Jenkins 2011, p. 
64). In particular, SEZs like the Sri city multiproduct SEZ located in AP ‘offer the possibility 
of being part of a globally connected middle-class’ (Banerjea 2011, p. 132) living within the 
territorial borders of India.  
  
India in the post-liberalisation era has become a potential hub for real estate activities. 
Shrivastava (2008b) argues that the SEZ policy of India encompasses various elements that can 
turn the creation of SEZs into a ‘gigantic real estate scam’. As per the provisions of the section 
6 of the SEZ Act, the central government and any other suitable authority specified by it divides 
the SEZ into the ‘processing’ and ‘non-processing’ areas (Government of India [GoI] 2005). 
The non-processing area can be used by the SEZ developer for real estate, commercial and 
social infrastructure provision. Moreover, the SEZ rules and the subsequent central guidelines 
permit a list of activities in the non-processing area of the SEZ. The activities in the non-
processing area of the SEZ encompass, ‘restaurants, housing and apartments, club houses, 
gymnasia, shopping arcades and retail space, multiplexes, schools, “convention or business 
centers”, and – oddly enough – swimming pools’ (Gopalakrishnan 2010, p. 148). In other 
words, the non-processing area can be entirely used for non-industrial purposes by the SEZ 
developer.  
  
SEZ developers are encouraged to make property deals through the non-processing area, which 
is reserved for non-industrial purposes. They acquire land at cheaper prices, develop very 
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minimum infrastructural facilities and sell it at much higher rates (The Economist 12 October 
2006). Empirical evidence supports these kinds of real estate deals through SEZs (Jain 2011). 
It is no wonder that the majority of the big real estate developers such as ‘DLF, Ansals, Omaxe, 
Rahejas, Parsvnath and several others’ applied and got approval for SEZs (Shrivastava 2008b, 
p. 59). Taking cognizance of the real estate boom associated with the SEZs, the Reserve Bank 
of India (RBI) has categorised loans to SEZs as ‘real estate lending’ (The Economist, 12 
October 2006).  
  
The SEZ Act 2005 was passed in the Indian Parliament without much debate (Jenkins 2011; 
Bijoy 2009). However, a few concerns have been expressed, particularly about the issue of 
labour security and labourers’ working conditions (Singh 2009, p. 3). Section 49 of the SEZ 
Act empowered the central government to modify or repeal any central law except that 
pertaining to labour. While fiscal regulations can be altered, the laws and regulations pertaining 
to labour will remain intact even in SEZs and cannot be modified. Section 49 of the SEZ Act 
stipulates that the central government cannot modify ‘matters relating to trade unions, industrial 
and labour disputes, welfare of labour including conditions of work, provident funds, 
employers’ liability, workmen’s compensation, invalidity and old age pensions and maternity 
benefits applicable in any Special Economic Zones’ (Government of India [GoI] 2005).  
  
However, the exception made in the SEZ Act about the labour laws is annulled by the SEZ rule 
five which stipulates that State governments declare SEZs to be public utility services under 
the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947 and delegate the powers of the labour commissioner 
to the DC. The DC has been empowered to arbitrate any labour issues, albeit under pressure to 
achieve the twin goals of ‘speedy development’ and ‘export promotion’ of the zone. Moreover, 
only central government has relaxed the labour laws, and because labour is a State subject, 
States seek exemptions from the ‘Minimum Wages Act, the Contract Labour (Regulation and 
Abolition) Act, Employees State Insurance Scheme, requirements for posting information, and 
so on’ (Gopalakrishnan 2007b, p. 63).  
  
State governments of Punjab, Gujarat, Goa, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka issued 
notifications, ordinances or expressed intentions to declare SEZs as Public Utility Services 
(Singh 2009). Declaring SEZs as public utility services was a deliberate design to ‘curtail the 
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ability of workers to strike and therefore lower the bargaining strength of labour in a SEZ’ 
(Singh 2009, p. 18). SEZ policy created conditions whereby the labour force inside the zone 
cannot have any power of appeal to redress their grievances, and, at the same time the policy 
also deprived the tenants and agricultural workers of their livelihood (Ghosh 2008).  
  
The ethnographic study of the Worldwide Diamonds factory located inside the 
Vishakhapatnam SEZ (VSEZ), by Jamie Cross, revealed that the lived experience of the factory 
labourers in the zone contradicts the justification of the zones at policy level. SEZs are 
promoted by the policymakers, politicians, development economists and business elite at 
national and State level as ‘engines of growth’ and ‘vehicles of social mobility’. But for the 
Telugu employees inside the zone, the ‘zone is experienced as a space of immobility and 
stagnation rather than mobility and progress’ (Cross 2009, pp. 351-352). Cross details the 
working conditions in the Worldwide Diamond unit in VSEZ as follows:  
work here is insecure, low waged and labour intensive. The global mobility of capital meant 
that the company could shift production to other locations with ease, reducing workers’ ability 
to contest the conditions of work, and the company’s lack of local social or political 
accountability gave mangers a carte blanche in matters of discipline and control. While workers 
here were taxed on earnings and were eligible for a modest set of social security benefits 
(covering illness, leave, vacations and provident funds), wage levels remained akin to causal 
day labour in the informal economy. (Cross 2009, p. 361).  
  
The ‘sites of global production’, SEZs, shape both the ‘consent to and discontent with capitalist 
work regimes’ leaving waged labour with a feeling of ‘blighted hope’10. The ‘narrative of 
unmet aspiration and social immobility are an important riposte to the arguments that bring 
legitimacy and credibility to India’s SEZs and an important antidote to the ways zones continue 
to be framed in national and state-level development plans’ (Cross 2009, p. 376). 
 
The SEZ policy and its implementation revealed that it is neither a rational scheme nor a 
feasible economic exercise. Despite the counter arguments which favour SEZ-type 
                                                          
10 The phrase ‘blighted hope’ was used by Pierre Bourdieu to ‘describe the feelings of disenchantment and 
disillusionment among young men in industrial society as the upward trajectories on which they aspire to travel 
are broken’ (Bourdieu 1973, p. 143 as cited by Cross 2009, pp. 373-374). For further elaboration on this concept, 
see Cross (2009; 2010).  
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development models, the employment it created is only meant for IT professionals, not for the 
huge reservoir of unskilled labour available in India. Since SEZs are concentrated to a 
maximum extent in the IT and ITES sectors, the manufacturing led export growth cannot occur. 
Moreover, the establishment of SEZs in few cities and States resulted in developers utilising 
the already existing infrastructure rather than creating new infrastructure, and this has scope 
for furthering uneven regional development. SEZs also lead to urbanisation with middle class 
orientation and allows the private developers to fulfil their real estate dreams. The governance 
in SEZs is highly centralised, anti-democratic and anti-labour. Yet several State governments 
in a ‘competitive race to the bottom’ are providing sops to SEZs for private and corporate 
investments (Gopalakrishnan 2007a; 2010).  
  
Further, the multiproduct SEZs and sector specific SEZs that need a minimum amount of 1,000 
hectares and 100 hectares or more of land respectively, have adversely impacted the social and 
environmental terrain of the countryside leading to political unrest. Since urban areas cannot 
provide huge quantities of land, business firms with state assistance turned to semi urban, rural 
and tribal areas for procuring land. Most importantly, the acquisition of the fertile agricultural 
land such as in the cases of Nandigram (West Bengal), Raigad (Maharashtra), Nandigudi and 
Mangalore (Karnataka), Jagatsinghpur (Orissa), Kakinada and Polepally (AP), for setting up 
private corporate SEZs, inevitably raised the issues of displacement, resettlement and 
rehabilitation of those displaced, compensation to the displaced, the issue of project affected 
people (PAPs), environmental and ecological impact of the project, transformation of the 
countryside, governance, accountability, democratic consensus and the like.  
  
The transfer of agrarian land using the ‘eminent domain’11 clause of the Land Acquisition Act 
(1894) to the private corporate houses led to the ‘fierce resistance movement in different parts 
of the country and resultant state atrocities and violence’ (Banerjee-Guha 2008, p. 51). Farmers, 
                                                          
11 The Eminent Domain clause under the LAA (1894), framed by the colonial rulers, held that all land is state 
property within its territory and did not recognise private ownership of land. Using this clause, the concerned 
government can seize land, even if it is in private ownership, if it can establish that such seizure is in the larger 
‘public interest’ – such as for dams, roads and railways. But when the land taken is under the private ownership, 
then the government pays monetary compensation to the owners of the land. This law is still intact and has been 
widely used by the Indian States for several development projects. But LAA has come under severe criticism 
owing to the transfer of private and public land by the State governments using the provisions under eminent 
domain for private and corporate industrialisation under the neoliberal regimes. 
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agricultural workers, the urban poor, civil society activists, political leaders, grassroots level 
activists and media debated the rationality and viability of the policy. Despite the staunch 
opposition, several State governments continued with SEZ policy implementation, 
disregarding the ideological base of the ruling Party. In this context, the answer to the state’s 
embrace of SEZ policy is sought in the theoretical perspectives pertaining to global political 
economy.  
  
2.3 Theoretical lens for SEZs: Accumulation by Dispossession  
Accumulation by Dispossession (ABD) has been the predominantly used concept to interpret, 
explain, understand, reflect and narrate the story of SEZ-type development models (Dunn 
2007; Gopalakrishnan 2010; Holden, Nadeau and Jacobson 2011; Levien 2011, 2012; Oza 
2010). In the process, a critical debate has emerged over the ‘agency’ that carries out ABD. 
This refers to whether dispossession for capital is driven by the global capital or the domestic 
political-economic forces. The debate also invokes the role of the ‘state’ in ABD and thereby 
raises a question whether it should be treated solely as an economic process or extra-economic 
process (Brenner 2006; Glassman 2006; Hall 2013; Levien 2012). ABD as a concept was put 
forward by David Harvey, a Marxist political geographer, in The New Imperialism (2003). 
Harvey’s ABD substituted the ‘primitive’ or ‘original’ accumulation of Marx within the long 
historical and geographical dimensions of capitalist expansion.  
  
For Marx, primitive accumulation facilitated the process of capitalist accumulation under 
specific historical conditions and resulted in the transformation of social means of subsistence 
and production and, consequently, the mode of production. Primitive accumulation, which set 
forth the process of capitalist accumulation in modernising England, was conceived by Marx 
as ‘the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production’, transforming 
‘the social means of subsistence and of production into capital’ and ‘the immediate producers 
into Wage laborers’ (Marx 1967 as cited by Glassman 2006, p. 610). Marx treated primitive 
accumulation as a category that set necessary historical preconditions required for capitalist 




While Marx construed primitive accumulation as a ‘specific historical phase’ in the capital’s 
arising, Harvey treated it as an enduring feature in the global development of capitalism. In 
other words, 
the primitiveness of ‘primitive accumulation’ does not arise simply from its location in 
historical time, relevant only as the initial stage of capitalism; rather, it is the 
constitutive primitive of the capitalist system, a process that is essential for perpetuating 
its fundamental class structure – the separation between producers and means of 
production (Chandra and Basu 2007).  
  
Primitive accumulation has come to mean a continuous feature of, and is intrinsically 
associated with, capitalist expansion under advanced capitalism.  
  
Following Rosa Luxemburg’s proposition that ‘capitalism must perpetually have something 
“outside of itself” in order to stabilize itself’ (Harvey 2003, p. 140), Harvey demonstrated how 
capital accumulation has been an enduring feature to fix the problems associated with the 
surplus capital accumulated in the advanced capitalist nations since the 1970s. The surplus 
capital lacks profitable avenues for its reinvestment in the developed world. In the process of 
fixing the crises associated with overaccumulation, the capital travels, cutting across the 
geographical space to profitable terrains. The process of spatial dimension of capitalist 
expansion led to ABD whenever it encountered ‘not fully capitalized societies’ wherein a ‘fund 
of assets’– vast tracts of land, natural resources and cheap labour – are available. Global capital 
seizes these assets and puts them to use for further capital accumulation. Harvey defines 
‘overaccumulation’ as a ‘condition where surpluses of capital (perhaps accompanied by 
surpluses of labour) lie idle with no profitable outlets in sight’ (Harvey 2003, p. 149).  
  
ABD releases a ‘set of assets (including labour power) at very low (and in some instances zero) 
cost’ to enable the overaccumulated capital to ‘seize hold of these assets’ and convert them to 
‘profitable use’ (Harvey 2003, p. 149). ABD is manifested through a wide range of processes 
which Marx had already discussed under the rubric of ‘primitive accumulation’, such as 
commodification and privatisation of land and labour through forceful expulsion of peasantry, 
suppression of rights to commons, destruction of indigenous forms of production and 
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consumption, colonisation, neo-colonialism and imperial practices for appropriation of assets 
and the like (Harvey 2003, p. 145).  
  
Harvey writes that the myriad of dispossessions through the primitive accumulation process 
listed above ‘have remained powerfully present within capitalism’s historical geography up 
until now’ (2003, p. 145). Besides the above process of dispossessions, Harvey applied ABD 
to the contemporary 
dispossessions of private and social wealth – for SEZs, slum clearances, large-scale 
agricultural plantations, dams, real estate development, infrastructure projects and all 
manners of privatization of natural resources and public wealth – that may have little 
to do with agriculture and that emanate from, rather than create the pre-conditions for, 
advanced capitalism (Levien 2012, p. 938).  
  
Harvey emphasised the role of the credit system, finance capital and the role of international 
finance and trade institutions as agents of driving ABD, particularly in the developing nations 
of the global south. For Harvey, ABD constitutes accumulation of capital through a 
simultaneous dispossession of the assets of poor and marginalized sections of the community. 
The notion of ABD has been an ongoing feature ‘within the long historical geography of capital 
accumulation’ and in a neoliberal era it represents a ‘specific kind of attempt to overcome the 
structural problems of overaccumulation’ (Glassman 2006, p. 621).  
  
ABD: The Indian perspective  
As stated earlier the concept of ABD has been extensively used to describe the phenomenon of 
SEZ-type development projects. Levien (2011; 2012) reconstructed Harvey’s notion of ABD 
through an ethnographic study of Mahindra World City (MWC) SEZ located on the outskirts 
of Jaipur, Rajasthan in India. Capital (domestic or global), argued Levien, cannot form a prime 
analytical tool in creating a theory to explicate the contemporary forms of dispossessions from 
land and other resources for creating SEZs. The primary focus should be on creating a sound 
theoretical basis to offer answers as to why capital in general, irrespective of its origin, results 
in ‘forceful expropriation at any given point of time and place to sustain accumulation’ (Levien 
2012, p. 936). One of the goals of this dissertation, as noted in the Introduction, is to reconstruct 
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Harvey’s ABD in order to provide a basis for understanding and explaining the role of 
dispossession under advanced capitalism in India.  
  
Levien opines that there is confusion among scholars about the defining character of ABD. 
This confusion arose because ABD is taking place in the contemporary context of developed 
capitalism and not at a time of the origin of capitalism. Marx’s two key transformations 
discussed under the rubric of ‘primitive accumulation’, the conversion of land and other 
resources into capital and the proletarianisation (conversion of producers into wage labourers) 
were born out of violence and bloodshed. Once born, capitalism created its own conditions of 
existence.  
  
Levien argued scholars placed more importance on the origin of capital and proletarianisation, 
which Marx discussed as part of the transformation from a feudal society to capitalist society, 
than with the ‘extra-economic’ (state resort to coercive mechanisms of expropriation of land 
and other assets, fraud, deceit, and violence) processes encompassing these at any given point 
of time in history. Scholars, drawing upon Marx, defined primitive accumulation by its 
result/function – ‘first and foremost proletarianization – rather than its extra-economic means’ 
(Levien 2012, p. 938). The point is violence is intrinsic to such transformations, more 
importantly, to the conversion of means of subsistence such as land into capital in the 
contemporary era.  
  
As argued by Levien, scholars placed primary importance on the origin of capital as well as 
focused on the result or function of ‘primitive accumulation’. Many scholars argued that the 
SEZ phenomenon in India emulates Harvey’s notion of ‘Accumulation by Dispossession’, 
meaning the contemporary mechanism of the ‘global finance capital’ to fix the crisis associated 
with global surplus accumulation. This surplus capital fix resulted in the dispossession of 
primary producers from their means of subsistence, thus creating a surplus labour force from 
agriculture in India. The Indian government’s decision to set up SEZs has been a deliberate 
strategy to assist the global corporate sector to ‘directly appropriate land and resources and 
open up the possibility of having a huge army of cheap labour, a large section of them 




Basu (2007) argues that globalisation as a top-down and universal perspective drives and 
compels the states in developing nations to generate conditions for appropriating resources by 
the global capital. The global capital extracts rent ‘through the establishment of proprietary 
rights’ over immobile resources such as land, labour in the developing nations and the patented 
products. Basu states that ‘in order to facilitate rent earning of global capital the state must 
actively ensure both the proprietary rights of capital over resources and also the immobility of 
these resources’ (Basu 2007, p. 1283). The process that results in the acquisition of the rights 
over the resources that are either naturally immobile (such as land, mineral wealth) or made 
immobile through laws and regulations (such as labour power, patented products, monopoly 
trade) constitute ‘Primitive Capital Accumulation’ (PCA), which results in the dispossession 
of poor and marginalised rural people. This will generate a reserve rural work force to be 
employed by the exploitative and rich global corporate firms to their advantage.  
  
Sassen writes that land ‘is more valuable to the global market than people working on it’ 
(Sassen 2010, p. 23). Harvey’s attempt to ‘explain the contemporary upsurge in political 
struggles pertained to the dispossession of land and various other forms of privatisation and 
liberalisation rather than the exploitation of labour’ (Levien 2007; Burawoy 2010 as cited by 
Levien 2012, p. 938) alone distinguished ABD from the primitive accumulation of Marx. 
Harvey’s discussion of ABD is taking place in an historical epoch characterised by advanced 
forms of capitalism and consequently a situation characterised by the availability of an 
abundant ‘pool of waged-labour’. Thus, it is obvious that global markets and capital are more 
interested in ‘expropriated asset’, a product of conversion of land and other resources into 
capital through extra-economic means than in the ‘dispossessed owner’ (Levien 2012, p. 939).  
  
Harvey rejected the claim that ABD is exercised through ‘extra-economic coercion’ and argued 
that ‘if some states have indeed been reduced to supine adjuncts of capital, then perhaps 
structural adjustment by the IMF has had something to do with it’ (2006, p. 160). For Levien, 
ABD is exercised, facilitated and sustained not merely by economic forces but through extra- 
economic coercive apparatus of the state. Thus, it is not solely an economic process but also a 
political intervention to facilitate capital accumulation. He disagreed with Harvey’s notion of 
circuits of capital as the key parameter through which ABD gets operationalised. Rather, he 
reconstituted ABD as ‘the means of extra-economic coercion to expropriate means of 
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subsistence, production or common social wealth for capital accumulation’ (Levien 2011, p. 
457). 
  
Levien (2011) argued that if ABD is not setting preconditions for capital accumulation and in 
fact is an enduring feature of the capitalist trajectory of development in India, then there is no 
rationale in conceiving it merely as an economic process for it cannot clearly demarcate itself 
from the other forms of ‘spatio-temporal’ fixes and ‘expanded reproduction’ as well. An extra-
economic coercion process involves the legislative and manipulative state apparatus, backed 
by its monopoly to use force to dispossess the farmers and others of their rural assets and from 
the primary means of subsistence for the purposes of capital accumulation.  
  
Levien demonstrated that ABD is a ‘political process through which the state’s coercive power 
is deployed to make a key condition of production – land – available for capital in a context 
where increasing demand confronts the barrier to accumulation represented by smallholding 
peasants and incomplete capitalist rural land markets’ (Levien 2011, p. 457). His study 
proposed the concept of ‘rate of ABD’ to define and measure ‘accumulation based on the 
expropriation of land rather than the exploitation of labour’ (Levien 2011; 2012).  
  
In sum, ABD is a process whereby ‘states – or other coercion wielding entities – use extra- 
economic force to help capitalists set up SEZs and thereby overcome barriers to accumulation’ 
(Levien 2012, p. 940). Thus, the state-led commoditization of land through force, leading to 
ABD, has now come to be an important parameter to understand ‘Indian states’ relationship 
with domestic and global capital’ (Levien 2011, p. 463). 
  
Levien asserts that Harvey’s logic of spatio-temporal fix of overaccumulated capital, to 
overcome the capitalist crisis, cannot solely explain the phenomenon of ABD in such instances 
as the SEZs in India. However, Rupal Oza agrees with Harvey’s notion of ‘spatio-temporal fix’ 
of the capital as a solution to the accumulation crisis through dispossession of the poor from 
their lives and livelihood, as exemplified by the SEZ-type development models in countries 




Oza writes that the economic and policy rationale offered for the establishment of SEZs in India 
is inappropriate. Rather, the emergence of SEZs at the turn of the new millennium should be 
viewed as a ‘part of the trajectory of capital accumulation facilitated by the neoliberal reforms 
implemented in 1991’ (Oza 2010, p. 241). Oza argues that SEZs engineered as a strategy to 
avert a ‘crisis of overaccumulation’ corresponds to Harvey’s notion of ‘ABD’ (Oza 2010, p. 
244). She asserts that positing the attraction of foreign investment as a rationale for the adoption 
of SEZ policy is inadequate. She further holds that domestic surplus capital accumulated since 
the economic reforms in 1990s provided a sound framework for understanding the SEZ 
phenomenon in India.  
  
The ‘spatial fix’ involves the spatial relocation of ‘surplus capital’ into profitable terrains that 
facilitate and perpetuate the accumulation process, and the ‘temporal fix’ of surplus involve 
the investments in long term projects such as ‘infrastructure’ that can yield benefits over a later 
period. Indian SEZs fulfil these two conditions as ‘spatially they offer sites at which surpluses 
can be invested in the appropriation of valuable land and for the creation of enterprises that in 
turn will generate profit. And temporally, the SEZ policy prioritizes investment in 
infrastructure, which will absorb the profits with a promise of future returns’ (Oza 2010, p. 
245). Thus, in the name of the economic growth, development and the larger public good the 
neoliberal state codified the process of ABD.  
  
Swapna Banerjee-Guha examines the trajectory of SEZ development from the perspective of 
‘space [the spatial?] relations of capital’. The transfer of farmland from the agrarian sector to 
the private corporate sector for setting up SEZs, facilitated by the coercive apparatus of the 
state in India, has negative consequences for farmers and the society as a whole. These include 
dispossession of primary producers from their immediate means of subsistence (land), 
worsening the shortage of food grains, intensifying unemployment, the loss of common assets 
(wastelands, tanks, canals, green pastures, fodder and firewood and the like), and the 
employment of only middle and upper classes leading to unemployment of the rural peasantry 
and the land-related workers (Banerjee-Guha 2008).  
  
The greater income generation in the SEZs spurs the demand for ‘elite consumption’ goods, 
entry of private corporate capital into every sector of economy including agriculture, real estate 
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in and outside the SEZs, and industrialisation leading to the urbanisation and modernisation of 
the countryside. The SEZ establishment will result in real estate and land speculation activities 
rather than the policy claims to ‘manufacturing based export led growth’. All these implications 
of SEZ policy implementation ‘work towards a process of accumulation by dispossession at 
different socio-spatial scales’ (Banerjee-Guha 2008, p. 58). The role of the state in the process 
of ABD becomes crucial and the SEZ-type development growth brings in ‘various institutional 
realignments and political adjustments, imposing newer forms of market discipline upon 
global, national and local social formations’ (Banerjee-Guha 2008, p. 58).  
  
The irony of the present-day capitalism is that even the states such as West Bengal and Kerala 
of India that ‘legitimize their rule in terms of communist ideals, the general alliance of peasants 
and workers toward an egalitarian society, and whose ideological pillars historically include a 
pro-poor redistributive land reform’ (Steur and Das 2009, p. 67) embraced neoliberalism 
making ‘land expropriation’ the ‘order of the day’, thus, setting forth the process of 
dispossession. Citizens of Nandigram in West Bengal resisted CPI (M) government’s decision 
to acquire farmland for a proposed chemical hub SEZ. The Nandigram struggle, in the words 
of Sarkar and Chowdhury (2009, p. 79): 
stands for resistance against the intensified capitalist trend toward what Harvey (2005) has 
called “accumulation by dispossession” whereby fertile land is handed over for corporate profit 
making, actually productive potentials that could absorb India’s labour force are neglected, and 
peasants across India face the threat of being driven off their land and being added to the 
growing group of people considered surplus population.  
  
Sampat (2010) argues that while in the three or four decades following independence, the 
Indian state acquired land for development projects with true ‘public purpose’, the neoliberal 
state in India through the SEZ Act 2005 began to acquire land in the name of ‘public purpose’ 
but transferred it to the private corporate houses. Thus, the land acquisition process for SEZs 
marks ‘the trajectory of neoliberal corporate growth’ achieved through the process of ABD. 
The SEZ model of development leads to the impoverishment of the socio-political, economic 




The SEZ pattern of corporate industrialisation has come to be valued and projected as the only 
form of industrialisation by the Indian political elite in recent years. In this case, care cannot 
be ensured to minimize its effects on the affected population, especially the peasant class that 
faces dispossession of their key assets of subsistence. The SEZ trajectory of development 
rooted in the corporate nature of industrialisation unleashes the process of ‘primitive 
accumulation of capital’ or, in Patnaik’s words, ‘accumulation through encroachment’ (Patnaik 
2007, p. 1895). This term, which is akin to Harvey’s ABD, refers to the seizing of the public 
and private property – land, common resources, mineral wealth, etc, by the global capital as 
reflected in the SEZ model of industrialisation.  
  
Scholars agree with Harvey, directly or indirectly, that primitive accumulation is an enduring 
feature of the capital accumulation process. Its role is not merely confined to set preconditions 
for capital accumulation in a particular historical epoch. Scholars such as Banerjee-Guha, Basu 
and Patnaik explain primitive accumulation from a structural dimension, where global capital 
seizes the assets of the primary producers. Further they also treat it as a process which divorces 
primary producers from their means of subsistence and transforms them into wage labourers.  
  
Levien rejects the argument that in countries like India the role of the private capital is to 
dispossess the agrarian and related populace to create a ‘surplus pool of labour’ for 
industrialisation. India already has an abundant labour force and capital is more interested in 
the expropriated assets; land, water, natural resources, minerals and the like, than in the owner 
of these assets. SEZ-type dispossessions, therefore, cannot make sense in the form of 
proleterianisation in India. Rather, it should be treated as a continuous process intrinsic to 
capital accumulation at all times and in all places and which cannot be conceptualised as a 
sheer economic process driven from a structural capitalist dimension. Only when one 
understands the role of the state in SEZ-type capital accumulation process, and counts ABD 
here more as a political connivance than solely as an economic device, can it then be applied 
to make sense of the logic and role of capital under the conditions of advanced capitalism.  
  
Levien (2013), in his thesis on ‘regimes of dispossession’ accentuates the role of the state in 
dispossession for capital accumulation. Here he makes a distinction between dispossession of 
land for industry and other development projects during the Nehruvian model of state-led 
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developmentalism and the contemporary dispossession in neoliberal India. The earlier regime 
acquired land for steel towns and irrigation projects, citing social transformation and building 
the new nation as justification for dispossession. The present SEZ model of development 
represents a neoliberal regime of land for market wherein states play an active role in 
transferring assets, mainly land, from one class to the other. The government acquires land 
from the peasants and transfers it to private corporations. While in both regimes, the role of the 
state is vital, the present dispossession of land in a neoliberal era transforms the role of the state 
from that of provider of a larger ‘public good’ to that of a land-broker. The state increasingly 
acts as a land-broker state to transfer land possessed by the peasants to the capitalist class for 
SEZ-type industrialisation and real-estate ventures.  
  
The transfer of resources from the farmers to the capitalist class is carried by the state agencies 
through extra-economic coercion which is displayed openly without any concealment. This 
transparent use of extra-economic force by the state to dispossess people for capital 
accumulation makes it clear that ABD cannot be read merely as an economic project driven by 
capital flows or a space to accommodate the overaccumulated global capital. Dispossession is 
clearly a political process facilitated by the state (at the subnational-level here). This thesis also 
accepts Harvey’s theory of dispossession of land but, following Levien, contends it being 
treated merely as an economic process. In sum, the thesis is based on a theory of ABD as an 
extra-economic process, rather than merely as an economic process driven by the global 
finance and credit system.  
  
Nikita Sud, following Kohli’s pro-business approach, pointed out how the role of the state is 
crucial in the dispossession of land. The ongoing state-led land acquisition for setting up of 
SEZ-type industry revealed the pro-business nature of the Indian state. The state in India 
undertook the role of: 
(a) generator of legitimating ideas about the positive effects of liberalization; (b) 
institutional supplier of legislative authenticity and manoeuvrer of unfavourable 
bureaucratic regulations and anti-liberalization contexts; and (c) buffer through which 
both democratic, official and party as well as grassroots, NGO and non-party politics 
is acknowledged, filtered and tackled (Sud 2009, p. 662).  
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Thus, the Indian state has evolved from a developmental state into ‘a business-friendly operator 
that ideationally, institutionally and politically legitimates, buffers, negotiates and facilitates a 
contested and complex liberalizing landscape (Sud 2009, p. 663) for SEZs.  
  
The above discussion about why SEZs flourish despite being economically, politically and 
socially implausible, linked them with the compulsions of development models adopted under 
the neoliberal policy regimes and globalisation. Harvey asserts that dispossession is led mainly 
by the international finance and credit system. However, Levien’s reformulation of Harvey’s 
theory of ABD provides scope to understand dispossession from the bottom up. He explicates 
and attributes dispossession to the domestic political-economic factors. He views ABD more 
as an extra-economic process. Nikita Sud and Oza demonstrate that the current SEZ policy is 
more of a pro-(indigenous) business strategy and can be understood as paying attention to the 
state’s role in facilitating and safeguarding domestic capital interests.  
  
2.4 Rationale for the Polepally case  
Various scholars discussed above applied Harvey’s ABD to provide an understanding of land 
dispossession. But Levien’s thesis challenged Harvey’s theory of ABD for the latter’s treatment 
of dispossession as a sheer economic process ignoring the role of domestic political-economic 
factors. He is critical of Harvey’s notion of treating every instance of land dispossession as a 
determinant of global capital. He argued that land dispossession in countries like India can be 
a consequence of domestic political-economic factors. Further, land dispossession served the 
needs and aspirations of Indian capital at various points of time starting from the colonial period 
to the neoliberal era. For him ABD, thus, is an extra-economic process. He advanced a 
theoretical framework in the form of different ‘regimes of dispossession’ (Nehruvian regime 
and neoliberal regime) within India.  
  
Levien defined a regime of dispossession ‘as a socially and historically specific constellation 
of political, economic and ideological forces that underpin a relatively consistent pattern of 
dispossession’ (Levien 2013, p. 402). Dispossession is also varied from time to time and place 
to place. He sought to explain the transformation of the state’s role from that of a facilitator of 
land acquisition for ‘production’ and productive purposes during Nehruivian period to that of 
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a ‘land broker’ during the neo liberal regime. He advanced a theory to comprehend and 
compare the role of the Indian state historically in the land dispossession in the post-
independent India.  
  
Drawing on Levien’s argument that ABD is an extra-economic affair, this thesis provides an 
understanding of land dispossession for the purposes of capitalist modes of production, in the 
context of changed political-economic circumstances at the sub-national level (AP). At the 
same time, the thesis departs from Levien’s work as it goes on to address Harvey’s top-down 
perspective of ABD from a subnational perspective, using empirical-descriptive analysis of the 
state-business relations pertaining to SEZ-type industrialisation.  
  
The subnational perspective on economic development forms an important theme, particularly 
in the wake of India’s embrace of liberal economic policies. There is a considerable degree of 
variation among India’s subnational units in terms of their political, social, historical, cultural 
and ideological backgrounds. These differences also affected the pace of development in 
different States, which warranted a comparative analysis as to how different State-level leaders 
implemented economic reforms and shaped development policies (Weiner 1999; Kennedy 
2004; Sinha 2004). Further, ‘subnational variation within India offers an ideal context for 
analysing how a common global policy takes a variety of forms as it intersects with different 
environmental and political processes’ (Sinha 2004, p. 71).  
  
This thesis provides an analysis of how land dispossession for capital can be mediated by the 
subnational political and economic factors. Further, it explains how ABD can be read as an 
outcome of these domestic factors than the global imperatives of capital. Moreover, Levien’s 
thesis of regimes of dispossession explains the role of the Indian state from a comparative 
perspective contra Harvey’s global capital circuits theory of dispossession. This thesis is solely 
concerned with refining Harvey’s ABD. The thesis provides scope for reading ABD as an 
outcome of collusive state-business relations mediated by the centralising leaders like YSR. 
The idea is not to advance a grand theory applicable to whole of India or beyond it. It is only 
an exercise to demonstrate through the empirical evidence surrounding land dispossession in 
Polepally and similar cases in AP to refine and improve upon Harvey’s theory of ABD. The 
59 
 
thesis also explains the political fallout of the ABD and its management in AP by the YSR 
government. In sum, Levien seeks to counter Harvey’s notion of ABD through his own theory 
of regimes of dispossession and extends its applicability to national and perhaps to a global 
level. The present work develops an understanding of Harvey’s ABD based on the subnational- 
level state-business relations and at the same time confines the applicability of its findings to 
the subnational province of AP.  
  
The thesis is an advancement of Harvey’s notion of ABD through an intense study of tracing 
the agency responsible for the dispossession of land in Polepally for setting up a pharmaceutical 
SEZ. The Polepally case is explained in the context of the embrace of SEZ-type development 
programmes by the centralising leadership of YSR, the CM of AP, between 2004 and 2009. 
The key focus is to understand the role of the political elite (AP here) in dispossession of land 
for capital accumulation under the conditions of neoliberalism from a subnational perspective. 
  
The YSR-led Congress government, a year after coming to power, pursued SEZ policy in an 
aggressive way. The business-friendly policy of the government made the State of AP one of 
the favoured destinations for the private corporates to invest in SEZs. But, the SEZs in the State 
became a contested arena, particularly over dispossession of farmers from their land. Despite 
being contested at the grassroots, SEZs continued to be championed at policy level. This was 
also the case with the SEZs in general in India, and hence it would be interesting to examine to 
what extent the avowed policy objectives have been met in the case of SEZs in AP.  
  
The developments in AP are not an isolated phenomenon as there was resistance over SEZ-
type land dispossession across the States of India. But the resistance to SEZs is not uniform in 
the sense of the outcomes they produced. For instance, the movement against SEZs in AP did 
not produce outcomes similar to those of West Bengal or Goa, where government was forced 
to take a decision on the continuation or halting of SEZs. The State of Goa cancelled all 15 
SEZs on 31 December 2007 owing to the strong agitation from those displaced. On 19 March 
2007, following the Nandigram farmers’ agitation against setting up of a chemical SEZ on their 
lands and the state atrocities against protesting groups, the CPI (M) government in West Bengal 
formally announced that there would be no SEZ in Nandigram. Against the ‘outright popular 
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rejection’ of SEZs in Goa and Nandigram, in the case of AP ‘resistance has been partial and 
location specific’ (Srinivasulu 2014, p. 72). This calls for an explanation of the political 
management of the dissent over SEZs in AP.  
  
2.5 Conclusion  
In sum, the SEZ policy execution revealed that its stated development goals are not realised. 
SEZs have failed to meet the policy claims of employment generation, foreign investment, 
infrastructure creation, regional development, and above all export growth. SEZ policy 
provisions allowed SEZs to be anti-democratic and anti-labour projects embedded with 
governance and accountability shortcomings. They are a means to foster urbanisation and 
related lifestyle and consumption patterns. The non-processing area within the SEZ and the 
area surrounding the SEZ became potential hubs for real estate activities. They are a contested 
area mainly in the arena of land dispossession for private capital accumulation.  
  
Notwithstanding the fact that SEZs are economically, politically and socially an unfeasible 
scheme, the policymakers at the central and State levels pursued SEZ policy with audacity. But 
why? The scholarly literature seeks answers to this question referring to the dynamics of global 
capitalist imperatives. The policy makers were driven to pursue such development programmes 
owing to the structural compulsions of capital. SEZ policy adoption was explained through the 
conceptual links to Harvey’s concept of ABD wherein capital seizes the land, natural resources, 
mineral wealth and other resources, dispossessing the people of their livelihood and habitat.  
  
The dispossession of the people from their primary means of subsistence has been a growing 
tendency promoted and sustained through the adoption of SEZ-type developmental models by 
the states under the neoliberal economic conditions. This will result in accumulation of capital 
by the big corporate sectors and disaccumulation of rural assets of the underprivileged sections 
of the society. The structural capital flow theory of Harvey and others has paid less attention 
to the domestic political-economic factors. The following chapter provides a critical appraisal 
of the capital circuits theory, through a detailed investigation of the key role played by the 





Chapter 3: Rethinking dispossession in a political democracy: A subnational perspective  
  
India, inter alia, underwent three politically significant changes in the 1990s. First, the rise of 
subaltern or marginalised groups manifested electorally and through their political and social 
mobilisation. Second, political power was decentralised from the central government to 
subnational units (States) in the wake of the collapse of the one-Party dominance of the 
Congress Party at the centre and in a majority of the States. Subsequently, an era of coalition 
politics began at the national level. Third, a centrally planned economy transformed into a 
federal market economy in the context of central government’s adoption of liberal economic 
reforms. The influence of these transformations was particularly strong in the South Indian 
State of Andhra Pradesh (AP). In the context of changed political-economic circumstances, this 
chapter seeks to understand how senior political leaders in AP engaged with a politically 
sensitive market-oriented trajectory of development characterised by an interplay of global, 
national and subnational political-economic forces.  
  
The chapter details the stratagems used by senior and powerful political leaders, represented 
mainly by the Chief Ministers (CMs) of the State, in addressing the competing claims of the 
market economy and political democracy. The chapter specifically details the devices used by 
the AP State CM Yeduguri Sandinti Rajasekhara Reddy, popularly called YSR, between 2004 
and 2009, in balancing these conflicting interests of the society. YSR became the state’s leader 
in the context of noticeable distress among the people, specifically the rural and urban poor.  
  
The chapter argues, keeping in view the socio-economic context of AP, that reforms favour the 
rich and upper classes and are antagonistic to the interests of the poor and marginalised sections 
of the society. Development here is viewed as antithetical to welfare in an era of market 
dominance of the economy by the private and corporate sector (Suri 2005). The work focuses 
on the tensions emblematic of transformation to a market economy in the context of an 
established political democracy. Against this backdrop, it focuses on the leader-centric 
dynamics of managing development (through a reform orientation) and welfare (understood as 




The purpose of this chapter is to provide a political-economic framework for understanding the 
case of Polepally SEZ, the case study, on which this dissertation is based. While economic 
reforms in general led to a surge in economic growth rates, they also, at the same time, furthered 
impoverishment of the people through dispossession in AP. In doing so, the chapter draws on 
Harvey’s (2003) concept of the Accumulation by Dispossession (ABD). It acknowledges the 
importance of Harvey’s conceptual framework but departs from his analysis of dispossession 
being driven and guided solely by global neoliberal structural forces. The chapter demonstrates 
that ABD in AP, including Polepally, is a result of an interplay of domestic political-economic 
factors, which include electoral strategies to occupy or retain power, building the Party cadres, 
centralisation of the political power, political-business nexus for the personal benefit of the kith 
and kin of the apex political leadership, nepotism, and to an extent, the creation of dynasty-
oriented authoritarian power centres at the subnational-level polity.  
  
The contention of this chapter is that the leaders’ strategies, which aimed to reverse the effects 
of accumulation (through innovative populist welfare measures), legitimised dispossession 
without actualising development on the ground. In sum, the dispossession in AP can be viewed 
as a carefully designed political project. The chapter analyses the devices used by the 
centralising leadership in AP to strike a balance between development and welfare.  
  
The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section details the geographical, 
demographic, social, political and economic aspects of AP. The second section portrays the 
beginnings of dispossession in a liberalised economic context. It explains the leader-centric 
approach to reform-oriented development overcoming the barriers of political democracy. The 
third section explicates how YSR-led Congress government’s policies provide a case for a new 
model of development wherein dispossession, corruption, growth, and welfare coexisted. The 
section demonstrates with empirical evidence that the real reasons of dispossession lie far 
beyond the global capitalist desires to redeploy surplus capital. Rather, it can be traced more to 
the growing aspirations of realising personal and political interests of the subnational political-





3.1 AP: Geographical, demographic, social, political and economic background 
The southern State of AP is the rice bowl of India. It has 23 districts with the historic city of 
Hyderabad as its capital. As per the 2011 census data of India, AP has a total population of 
84,665,533 and is the fifth-most populous State in the country. It has an area of 276,754 km2 
making it the fourth largest state in India. Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs) and 
Minorities together constitute one third of the population. SCs constitute 16.2 percent, SCs 6.6 
percent and Muslims, the major religious minority, constitute 9.6 percent of the total population 
in the State (Census of India 2011). Other Hindu castes include the upper castes of Brahmins 
and Vaishyas, intermediary or dominant castes of Kammas, Reddys, Rajus, Velamas, and 
Kapus and a major chunk of Other Backward Castes (OBCs).12 2011 census data shows that 
the State’s literacy rate stands at about 67 percent. One third of the population reside in cities 
and towns and the rest live in the countryside. Two thirds dwell in rural areas and the other 
third live in urban regions. Agriculture is still the main source of livelihood for more than three-
fourths of the rural workforce.  
  
AP was formed in the year 1956 and was the first one in the post-independent India to be 
formed on a linguistic basis. The language spoken is Telugu. The State comprises of three 
different regions – Andhra, Rayalaseema and Telangana – which reflect different historical 
trajectories, unequal natural advantages and heterogeneous socio-economic and political 
development. Telugu speaking people were concentrated in the old Madras State and the 
princely State of Hyderabad at the dawn of independence. Andhra State was carved out of the 
Madras State on 1 October 1953. The Telangana was part of the Hyderabad State ruled by the 
Nizam dynasty, the sovereign and independent rulers of Hyderabad State from the 1720s till 
1948. The Andhra provinces were merged with Telangana leading to the formation of 
Visalandhra or AP, which formally came into existence on 1 November 1956 (Ram Reddy 
1989).  
  
The Coastal Districts were under the Madras presidency of British India and experienced early 
modernisation. The Andhra region has been endowed with natural advantages in the form of 
                                                          
12 For specific status, occupations, role and percentages of other Hindu castes whose data is not available 




availability of fertile land, rivers and irrigation facilities. The Telangana region was backward 
in terms of socio-economic development as it was under the feudal rule of the Nizam. The 
region lacked modern western education and social transformation in terms of caste and class. 
Socio-economic development in Telangana compared to Andhra was quite low at the time of 
independence. The land is also not as fertile as Coastal Districts and did not possess natural 
advantages akin to the Andhra region (Srinivasulu 2002, pp. 3-7, Suri 2002, pp. 4-12).  
  
Since its formation and until 1983, AP was ruled by the Congress Party. The State was referred 
to as the ‘citadel’ and ‘strong bastion’ of the Congress (Ram Reddy 1976). However, in 1983 
the TDP of Nandamuri Taraka Rama Rao (NTR) emerged as an alternative to Congress rule in 
the State. Since then AP witnessed a stable bi-polar Party system alternating power between 
Congress and the TDP. The dominant social composition of these two parties is from upper 
and middle castes/classes. The Reddy caste forms the main support base for the Congress while 
Kammas dominate the TDP. These two parties pursued politics of accommodation and 
populism respectively to secure the votes of backward and lower castes/classes (Chatterjee 
2009; Kennedy 2004, pp. 57-58).  
  
The governments in AP until the 1990s, particularly under the leadership of NTR of TDP, 
introduced several populist schemes – 2 kg rice, free housing scheme and subsidies to farmers 
such as power, seeds and fertilisers (Kohli 1988; Ram Reddy 1989). Following the 
liberalisation of the Indian economy in 1990s, AP adopted liberal oriented policies. It has 
become an exemplar of economic reform policies for several other States in India since the 
mid-1990s (Mooij 2013). Meanwhile, it should be noted that the State witnessed farmer 
suicides, inequality and social and political unrest in the post-reform period (Mahendra Dev 
2007).  
  
The construction of dams across the rivers Godavari (1847) and Krishna (1853) during the pre-
independence period transformed the political economic terrain of Coastal Andhra. Agriculture 
became a favourite occupation and there was surplus agricultural output. The agrarian related 
employment also grew and the rural workforce stopped to migrate for alternative employment 
elsewhere. However, the land was concentrated in the hands of few dominant castes, namely, 
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Kamma, Raju, Velma, Kapu and Reddy, which accounts for their subsequent political and 
economic domination (Ram Reddy 1989).  
  
The advent of the Green Revolution in AP in the post-independence period in the 1970s 
provided stability to agriculture and there was surplus agrarian output. The rich peasants 
belonging to the dominant castes, particularly Kammas, diverted the surplus income gained 
from agriculture into various businesses. They made investments, accrued as profits from 
agriculture, in sugar, cement, textiles, chemicals, fertilisers, pharmaceuticals, electronics, 
education, steel, engineering goods, hotels, films and the software industry. An emergence of 
a regionally operating, dynamic capitalist class and middle classes with global orientation 
changed the political-economic aura of AP (Srinivasulu 1999; Srinivasulu 2014; Mooij 
2013).The new regional business classes faced several hurdles to obtain licenses during the 
pre-reform period. They had to seek central government’s permission for various business 
establishments. But the Congress government in Delhi favoured big businesses (Tata and Birla) 
and ignored the interests of regional entrepreneurs in AP. In such a scenario, the dynamic 
business classes turned to the local political leadership. However, the State Congress leadership 
was directed by the central high command of Indira Gandhi in almost every issue, including 
business-related matters. The regional congress leadership could not be of much help to 
promote the rising business aspirations of the regional capitalists (Baru 2000).  
  
The new agrarian capitalists, specifically from the Kamma community, were looking for a 
change and they saw in NTR a leader to cater to their aspirations. This, coupled with other 
factors (like Telugu glory and pride) played a role in changing the course of political history in 
AP where, in 1983, for the first time, a non-Congress Party, TDP with regional roots, came to 
power (Upadhya 1988a, 1988b; Baru 2000; Damodaran 2008). However, this did not put an 
end to the Congress Party as it remained as a strong opposition and retained power in 1989 and 
again in 2004.  
  
3.2 The dawn of dispossession  
The TDP, after its record victory in 1983 under NTR, adopted policies to serve the interests of 
peasants, industrialists, women and the poor people. The TDP manifesto promised to provide 
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a transparent, non-corrupt and efficient administration. The manifesto contained measures 
aimed at deregulation and downsizing the government. Suri (2013, p. 170), states that ‘the 
TDP’s programme represented a mixture of social democracy and neoliberalism’. However, in 
the 1989 elections, the Congress Party emerged as victorious. As an opposition Party (1989-
1994), TDP heavily criticised the liberal economic policies of the Congress. The Congress 
government restructured AP’s economy on the lines of the central government’s economic 
liberalisation package adopted in 1991. The Congress government in the State adopted fiscal 
reforms and hiked the price of subsidised rice from ₹2 per kg to ₹3.50 (Pai 1996, p. 145). It 
also designed the best incentive regime to attract private industry, particularly in the IT sector, 
to boost economic growth and development (Kapoor and Ahluwalia 2015).  
  
In the 1994 elections, TDP won the election with a resounding majority on a pro-poor and 
welfare agenda, defeating the Congress who made development through reforms as the main 
electoral issue. The populist package of TDP included subsidised food, clothing, shelter and 
prohibition of liquor. TDP under the leadership of NTR implemented populist policies and also 
continued with the reform-oriented measures of the previous government. It should be noted 
that the TDP attacked Congress’s reform package as an opposition Party (Suri 2013; Pai 1996, 
p. 145).  
  
The TDP led by NTR witnessed an intraparty power struggle in August 1995. This power 
struggle was successfully led by Chandrababu Naidu, aspiring to succeed NTR. He was a 
finance and Revenue Minister in TDP government and also the son-in-law of NTR. He replaced 
NTR as CM of AP on 1 September 1995. The immediate reason for the intraparty power 
struggle was the increased political sway of Lakshmi Parvathi, the biographer and second wife 
of NTR, in the Party affairs. However, a more important reason was the hostility of the upper 
and middle classes’ support base of TDP toward the populist measures of NTR in the changed 
policy arena (Srinivasulu 1999).  
  
The business elite in AP saw in Chandrababu Naidu, as Suri (2013, p. 170) puts it, ‘a prudent 
and pragmatic leader with views commensurable to the emergent global paradigm of economic 
development’. The leadership tussle within the TDP was taken advantage by the ‘disgruntled 
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capitalist class, which was restless with the populist policies and obsessive self-image driven 
governance of NTR’ (Alivelu, Srinivasulu and Gopinath Reddy 2013, p. 204). In retrospect, 
Naidu’s programmes and policy agenda show, on a balance, that they were designed to cater 
to serve the interests of the business elite, urban middle and upper classes. 
 
Naidu brought shifts in the policy arena during his tenure as AP’s CM. One of the early 
measures in this direction was his government’s white paper on the financial scenario of the 
State released in June 1996 (Government of Andhra Pradesh [GoAP] 1996). The white paper 
attributed the revenue deficits and huge fiscal strain to the State’s populist programmes like 
rice and power subsidies, wages to the public-sector employees and the existence of the loss-
making public-sector undertakings. It sought a prompt action on all these fronts to alleviate the 
economic plight of the State and amply hinted at the departure from a populist welfare regime 
(Government of Andhra Pradesh [GoAP] 1996).  
  
Meanwhile, the political acumen of Chandrababu Naidu inspired the World Bank team, headed 
by Edwin Lim, to visit Hyderabad in December 1996 to consider AP as a suitable case for the 
Bank’s new ‘policy-based lending’ for subnational units in India. Consequently, as early as 
January 1997, the World Bank published a report titled, ‘India Andhra Pradesh: agenda for 
economic reforms’ (Kirk 2005).  
  
The World Bank report applauded the few reform-oriented measures already taken by Naidu’s 
government between July and August 1996 to improve AP’s deteriorating fiscal condition. 
Still, the bank found these measures as inadequate to save the State from fiscal crisis. The bank 
recommended measures such as the reduction of subsidies, government salaries, and welfare 
programmes to curtail the financial burden on the State’s exchequer and more important 
recommendations pertained to the reform of the power sector (World Bank 1997). The AP 
1997-98 budget speech echoed the recommendations of the World Bank.  
  
In line with the above, Naidu’s government adopted reform measures encompassing key sectors 
of the economy and governance. These mainly included the reform of industrial, agricultural 
and service sectors alongside the fiscal and governance reforms. Several tax and other 
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concessions, like land, water and power to business entities were provided to attract 
investments (mainly private). Information Technology (IT) was promoted as a key growth 
sector and the construction of the Hyderabad Information Technology and Engineering 
Consultancy City (HITEC City) housing foreign and domestic IT units was a major step in this 
direction. Subsidies on rice under the public distribution scheme were reduced. The number of 
government employees were reduced through the policy of closure, reform or privatisation of 
the public enterprises. User charges in the health and water delivery services were introduced. 
Fee charges were increased in higher education as well. Subsidies on farm inputs were 
withdrawn (Mooij 2007).  
  
Naidu’s government used information technology effectively and implemented e-seva service 
centers across the State within a few years. The e-seva was a government based, citizen friendly 
initiative to facilitate payment of utility bills like electricity, tax, and telephone and to procure 
government licenses and permits through electronic mode. The Computer-aided 
Administration of Registrations Department (CARD), to ease and regularise land and tenancy 
transactions in transparent ways without any corruption were introduced. These two were 
considered as major e-governance initiatives to help the middle classes and educated citizens 
to save time by avoiding long queues to pay their utility bills (Kennedy 2004).  
  
In tune with the changed economic scenario, the TDP government also came out with need- 
based self-help initiatives targeting different groups. The government’s flagship participatory 
developmental initiative, Janmabhoomi (literally meaning land of one’s birth) was 
implemented, making people at the grassroots level key stakeholders. In this regard, the 
formation of stakeholder committees in irrigation, education and village level planning was a 
major step to promote and sell the idea of self-help development programmes. A mention 
should be made about the huge expansion of women’s self-help groups through a programme 
called Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA). This programme was 
originally a central government initiative to provide credit to women and thereby ensure their 
financial autonomy, and it saw a huge expansion in AP during Naidu’s tenure. The government 
projected it as a participatory form of governance whereby the majority of rural women could 
access financial resources and manage them on their own. He also coined such acronyms as 
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SMART government to characterise his government as simple, moral, accountable, responsive 
and transparent (Kennedy 2004; Mooij 2005).  
  
AP government was also successful in influencing the World Bank to grant loans. The World 
Bank granted a US$543.2 million conditional loan to AP and it was the first policy oriented 
subnational lending in India. The assistance continued to AP later also and it obtained a major 
share of the World Bank’s loan to India during Naidu’s tenure (World Bank 1997, p. iii; Kirk 
2010, pp. 62-63). The loans were based on the condition that AP government would take 
measures to reform its economy by reducing strain on its exchequer. As a matter of fact, by 
October 2002, Naidu’s government closed 11 public sector units, restructured/downsized six 
and 15 others were considered for privatisation or closure (Mooij 2007, p. 37).  
  
On 26 January 1999, the government of AP released its Vision 2020 document. The report was 
jointly prepared by an internationally reputed management consultancy firm, McKinsey, and 
the government of AP. The report laid down a strategic framework for AP to achieve 
sustainable development through redefining the role of the state in economic affairs. The Vision 
document clearly emphasised that the state alone cannot take the onus of sustainable economic 
development and sought the active involvement of the private sector and international donor 
agencies (Government of Andhra Pradesh [GoAP] 1999).  
  
Amid the adoption of transformative policy measures, Naidu won the real political test by 
winning the elections to the Legislative Assembly of AP State held alongside the elections to 
the Lok Sabha in October 1999. The Telugu Desam Party, in alliance with Bharatiya Janata 
Party fared well in assembly and parliamentary elections, silencing the claims of opposition 
who dubbed Naidu as a World Bank agent (The Economist 1999). Times Magazine awarded 
Naidu the ‘South Asian of the Year 1999’, claiming his victory in elections was despite running 
a ‘pork-free election campaign’ against the free power promise of the rival congress. The 
TDP’s victory was a ‘watershed’ in not only the AP and Indian politics but in the whole of 
South Asian politics, as it provided evidence that ‘reforms are not ballot box poison’ (Ghosh 
1999). The TDP government conceived its 1999 elections as a vote for development and good 
governance initiatives.  
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Pursuant to the electoral victory, the TDP government intensified its development agenda. One 
of the important initiatives was the promotion of SEZs in AP. Naidu, during one of his visits 
to the US for seeking investments into the State of AP, unveiled his SEZ plans. Addressing the 
senior business community of the US in New York in February 2002, Naidu invited the top US 
business investors to invest in a proposed 9000-acre SEZ near the port city of Vizag (Times of 
India 7 February 2002). A few months later, the government of AP formalised its SEZ policy. 
The APIIC was designated as the nodal agency to develop the already proposed SEZs in the 
State and for the future SEZ projects. The government through this policy promised to assist 
private investors interested in setting up SEZs in the State and assured them of concessions in 
the allotment of land, power and water. Also, it guaranteed the provision of infrastructural 
facilities and tax exemptions to the SEZ developers and units within them (Government of 
Andhra Pradesh [GoAP] 2002)  
  
On 6 April 2000, the TDP government increased the price of subsidised rice from ₹3.50 to 
₹5.50 per kg. It also decided to revise power tariffs (Harshe and Srinivas 2000, p. 1888). The 
decision to reform the power sector caused a violent protest that resulted in the killing of two 
demonstrators and left several of them injured (Sridhar 2000). The liberal economic policies 
also affected the food producers of AP. Naidu’s government withdrew input subsidies on 
power, seeds, fertilisers and pesticides. Farmers lacked access to institutionalised credit from 
nationalised banks, cooperatives and specialised rural banks. This led the farmers to borrow 
heavily from the private money-lenders, paying huge interest rates. The farmers in many parts 
of AP could not yield agrarian output sufficient to repay their debts. Unable to bear the debt 
burden, thousands of farmers committed suicide. AP accounted for the highest number of 
farmers’ suicides (4403) between 1998 and 2006. The uncaring policy regime was responsible 
for the agrarian crisis in the state (Galab, Revathi and Reddy 2010; Sridhar 2006; Narasimha 
Rao and Suri 2006). Naidu’s open embrace of the Hitech model of growth and reforms 
continuously attracted criticism for creating a huge urban-rural divide, leaving the countryside 
populace in severe distress.  
  
Although social discontent, particularly from the rural side, culminated at times into violent 
protests, yet reforms continued. How Naidu managed reforms under the political constraints 
needs some explanation. Naidu understood the importance and necessity of reforming the 
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economy and at the same time was aware of the consequences of not meeting the demands of 
the majority of the voters.  
  
Riding two horses  
Naidu’s leadership style and functioning hardly provided scope for the emergence of second 
order leadership in the TDP. The centralisation of command was achieved through such 
flagship programmes as the hugely funded Janmabhoomi programme wherein resources were 
pumped through Party channels and were sternly controlled by Naidu himself (Manor 2004). 
Most of the works under Janmabhoomi projects pertained to rural work contracts. These 
contracts were allotted to TDP cadres and its allies. That the Janmambhoomi programme 
suffered from corruption can be gleaned from an observation that CM himself permitted his 
Party activists to ‘eat one-third of the Janmabhoomi funds’ (Manor 2004, p. 265). The TDP 
government began to spend heavily on the development policies through this programme. 
Several user committees and self-help groups were formed under the Janmabhoomi programme 
which led to bypassing, undermining and even demoralising the local elected bodies in favour 
of building the Party structure, base and support of the ruling regime (Balagopal 1999; Manor 
2002; Powis 2003).  
  
Naidu’s government projected DWCRA scheme as a participatory form of governance wherein 
the majority of rural women could access financial resources and manage them on their own. 
However, the real intention behind the expansion of DWCRA was to create a gender-based 
rural vote bank for the TDP. The rural citizenry criticised Naidu’s IT programme as favouring 
urban sections and western educated middle classes. Moreover, his government lifted the ban 
on prohibition which was imposed following the women’s movement in the State by his 
predecessor, NTR. It was also the poll promise of the TDP during the crucial 1994 elections. 
Thus, DWCRA was devised to tackle the backlash from the rural side, particularly from the 
rural women, who, since the time of NTR strongly supported the TDP (Manor 2007).  
  
The claim that TDP won the 1999 elections on a neoliberal development plan is also not entirely 
true. The TDP government floated several populist policies on the eve of the 1999 elections to 
appeal to the different sections of the society. During the electoral campaign, Naidu made ‘no 
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mention of his successful courtship of Bill Gates and other corporate executives or his efforts 
to restore fiscal balance to the southern state’s budget’ (Dugger 1999). Rather, he floated 
several populist schemes a few months before the elections.  
  
The TDP government’s populist schemes included Deepam, under which DWACRA women 
members were provided with gas cylinders and stoves; the Adharna scheme under which 
artisans and occupation groups were provided with tool kits; Roshni, under which Muslim 
minorities were provided with financial assistance for the construction of marriage halls and 
repair of mosques; and Cheytu, for people with disabilities and so on. These schemes targeted 
specific voter groups such as women, backward and marginalised sections of the society, 
scheduled castes, minorities, youth, artisans, agrarian labour and so on. As Suri (2005, p. 147) 
points out, ‘Chandrababu Naidu pulled out one welfare scheme after another from his hat, 
averaging one every week’ just a few months before the elections, outdoing even his 
predecessor, NTR, who happened to be the most populist leader in the State.  
  
The Naidu-led TDP government devised strategies to seek popular legitimacy under the 
conditions of a contestation between the market economy and a political democracy (Nayyar 
1998). Economic reforms were projected as a panacea for social transformation and a 
mechanism to alleviate poverty, distress, illiteracy, and unemployment. The neoliberal 
discourse is based on a dichotomous relationship between development and welfare. But Naidu 
convinced, for about 5-6 years, the majority of the citizens that they were one and the same. 
He promised to deliver both on economic and social fronts through economic restructuring. 
Naidu created a public discourse that the market could achieve not only economic growth, but 
also social development (Kennedy 2004).  
  
Naidu’s economic reform policies did not lead to much social discontent because of his 
recourse to ‘neoliberal populism’, floated through such flagship programmes as Janmabhoomi 
to create an impression that neoliberalism and populism, or development and welfare, can 
coexist (Krishna Reddy 2002). Further, the TDP government, using partisan regional media 
created a hype around economic reforms. This hype ensured financial support from the external 
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aid agencies and simultaneously allowed the continuation of populist measures through misuse 
of developmental funds.  
  
One study indicated that Naidu’s reform agenda failed to realise the goals of social and 
economic transformation. During the post-reform period, particularly from 1995 to 2004, 
economic growth declined, social and economic infrastructure did not improve in relation to 
several other States, agricultural and industrial growth decelerated, government allocated 
insufficient funds to the health and education sectors, the quality of services was poor and was 
inaccessible for the marginalised and needy, employment generation and even growth was 
confined only to few software services. Moreover, the marginal rise in growth rates accrued 
through the service sector was not inclusive and led to social and economic inequalities 
(Hanumantha Rao and Mahendra Dev 2003; Mahendra Dev 2007).  
  
Naidu’s policies led to dispossession of the people in the sense of allowing or devising a road 
map to enable market forces to take over the hitherto non-market areas such as land, water, 
power, education, healthcare, and social security. The much-hyped Vision 2020 policy aims to 
provide huge employment opportunities but recommends that over ‘twenty million people 
should be thrown off the land’ (Monbiot 2004). Despite these policy shortcomings, Naidu’s 
strategies could yield him victories in 1999.But the State of AP faced severe drought between 
2001and 2004 and this aggravated the plight of the farmers who were already under distress 
due to reform of the agricultural sector. This led to the failure of Naidu’s strategies in winning 
the 2004 elections.  
  
YSR replaced Naidu in 2004 elections. He was elected because of his pre-poll promise to 
alleviate the suffering of the poor and the rural populace. Ironically, once in power, YSR 
continued with reforms. For instance, if Naidu advocated SEZs as engines of economic growth, 
YSR diligently pursued them. While both leaders managed political dissent arising due to a 
conflict between the economics of market and politics of democracy, YSR’s management of 
such dissent provides deeper insights to understand the real triggers of dispossession. The study 
of YSR’s model of development provides a case for understanding dispossession from the 
perspective of subnational political-economic dynamics.  
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3.3 Dispossession for development?  
YSR of the opposition Congress, allied with other parties, fought the 2004 elections in AP on 
a pro-poor and pro-rural agenda. YSR assured the farmers, on the eve of the election, of an 
agricultural loan waiver and free power, and promised a welfare regime. Naidu ridiculed the 
free power promise of the opposition, saying that ‘we can also make a similar promise but there 
will be no power left to supply to consumers. We will end up using the transmission lines for 
drying clothes’ (The Hindu 20 March 2004). Naidu’s sarcasm was not received well by the 
severely affected farming community.  
  
The poll assurances of YSR came as a relief for the farmers from their grief and pain caused 
due to a lack of rural orientation of the TDP government. Consequently, the agrarian sections 
(electoral majorities) of the countryside voted YSR to power. Anti-incumbency, regional 
development issues ushering in a demand for the separate Statehood for Telangana, Naxalism 
and continuous drought for three years preceding the elections also had a great impact on the 
outcome of the 2004 elections. All these factors backed by YSR’s extensive poll campaign 
with the promise of several social security measures led to the victory of the Congress Party.  
  
As promised, once in power YSR implemented several of the promises he made during the 
elections, particularly the pro-rural ones. Economic growth and revenue bulge during his tenure 
as CM was impressive. Meanwhile, YSR’s rule also was notorious for its state-business 
relations with high levels of political corruption. The corrupt and underhand state-corporate 
deals led to social discontent and popular ire against the specific models of development, 
particularly the SEZ-type export-led industrialisation (Srinivasulu 2009). The intriguing aspect 
here is how YSR, who came to power on the pro-poor and pro-farmer electoral plank, adopted 
SEZ policy, which ideological critics and opposition parties dub as representing ‘market-
fundamentalism’ (Jenkins 2011).  
  
The ways through which YSR balanced development and welfare provides an insightful story 
of development politics at a subnational-level in India. The politics surrounding this balancing 
act are explained in the following sections, traversing through YSR’s leadership style, State-
business relationship and welfare schemes.  
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Ruthless rule  
Yeduguri Sandinti Rajasekhara Reddy or YS Rajasekhara Reddy, popularly known as YSR 
was born on 8 July 1949 in Pulivendula of Kadapa (also known as Cuddapah) District, located 
in the Rayalaseema region of AP, to Y.S. Raja Reddy and Jayamma Reddy. Rayalaseema is a 
drought prone area with scanty rainfall and inadequate water resources and thus the most 
backward region in the State. Added to this natural disadvantage, the region also has a history 
of factional feuds. YSR’s family also is known for factional lordship.  
  
YSR’s early political career resembled a factionalist warlord representing the bomb and 
violence cult of Rayalaseema region as he engineered dissidence against the Chief Ministers 
and played a key role in dethroning them from their office. But from the early 1990s he started 
to create an image of himself as a more mature and responsible leader and started to settle 
differences with different factions (Deccan Herald 1998 cited by Price 2011, p. 141). During 
the run-up to the 2004 Assembly and general election campaign in AP, YSR, through his 
extensive campaign on foot, projected himself as a promising leader able to alleviate the 
sufferings of the poor and farming community, while overcoming all the intraparty 
factionalism.  
  
The extensive 2004 election campaigns of YSR paid off and consequently his party, the 
Congress, won the Assembly elections with 185 seats on its own and 226 in alliance with the 
TRS, CPI and CPI (M) in the 294-member Assembly. In the Parliamentary elections conducted 
along with the Assembly polls, Congress secured 29 seats on its own out of the total 42 
Parliamentary seats. Its allies, TRS, won five seats, CPI and CPM one each. The victory in the 
Lok Sabha polls also contributed to the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) victory at the centre 
(Nagesh Kumar 2004a; 2004b). YSR’s style of functioning in politics soon after assuming 
power reflected a strong feudal tendency and a factionalist leadership (Balagopal 2004; 
Srinivasulu 2009, p. 10).  
  
Since the 1980s, political parties in the Rayalaseema region increasingly started to ally with 
one or the other factional group. As part of factional politics, several of the elected 
representatives were killed using bombs. Since YSR came to power, the opposition leader, 
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Chandrababu Naidu of TDP alleged that 19 TDP leaders and its supporters were killed and 41 
injured (Aiyar 2004). YSR’s son is alleged to have engineered the murder of Paritala Ravi, a 
strong factionalist leader and the TDP Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) from 
Penukonda of Ananthapur District on 24 January 2005 (Rakesh Reddy 2011). The point is that 
YSR directly or indirectly started to eliminate rivals, which displays his attitude of intolerance 
toward the opposition.  
  
YSR did not spare even the media. He targeted the Eenadu group of businesses, run by the 
media baron Ramoji Rao who was supportive of the TDP. Eenadu’s widely circulated Telugu 
newspaper, Eenadu, carried editorials alleging that YSR, his family, and several of his 
ministers were responsible for corrupt land deals. Following these allegations, YSR, along with 
his home minister, filed defamatory cases against Eenadu for its editorials, issued government 
orders to confiscate its properties, and ordered a Crime Investigation Department (CID) probe 
into its chit fund company. YSR used State and central powers and every available means to 
demoralise and trouble the media baron (The Hindu 23 December 2006; The Indian Express 
22 February 2007; Kandula 2006).  
  
YSR also allowed his son to set up a media house, Jagati Publications. The media house 
launched a regional Telugu newspaper, Saakshi in March 2008 and the Saakshi TV channel as 
well. In the words of Ninan Sevanti, although Saakshi ‘is a platform for Y.S.R. Reddy more 
than one for the Congress, it has successfully exploited the space that existed for a Congress 
affiliated publication in a State where all Telugu media is partisan’ (Ninan 2009).  
  
The Congress fought the 2004 elections in alliance with the Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) 
Party. The TRS is a regional Political Party formed solely to fight for the formation of a separate 
State of Telangana. The alliance was on the condition that Congress, being a national Party, if 
voted to power, would grant the separate Statehood for Telangana. After coming to power both 
at the centre and the State, the central Congress leadership influenced by YSR dilly-dallied 
over the creation of a separate State of Telangana. Consequently, TRS broke its alliance with 
UPA at centre and Congress Party in the State (Nagesh Kumar 2008). Following discussions 
over the divorce of alliance with the TRS within the Congress Party, YSR convinced the high 
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command that they could win even the 2009 polls going alone and without a pre-poll alliance 
with TRS.  
 
Another key promise was to end the Naxal menace in the State through peaceful negotiations. 
There is no doubt that the YSR government initiated talks with the Naxal groups, but the talks 
ended abruptly. Later YSR executed several of the top order Naxal leaders using repressive 
State mechanisms, thereby halting the Naxal movement (The Hindu 18 January 2005).  
  
In sum, YSR ruthlessly crushed several countervailing powers that had the potential to pose a 
threat to his rule. He eliminated rival factionalist leaders like Paritala Ravi of TDP, troubled 
the Eenadu media which was pro-TDP, subdued the Telangana issue and halted the Naxal 
movement.  
  
Centralisation of political power  
YSR, once in office, started to consolidate his power over party and governmental affairs. One 
main reason for this consolidation of power lies in the changed political-economic context of 
India. Politically, at the national level the demise of the dominance of the Congress Party led 
to an era of coalition governments. The formation and continued sustenance of the coalition 
governments in Delhi were dependent on the regional Parties and leaders at the State level 
starting from 1989 until the announcement of the results of the 2014 general elections. The 
Congress that led the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition realised the importance of 
the regional Pradesh Congress Committees and provided autonomy to its regional leaders 
(Srinivasulu 2011; Suri, Narasimha Rao and Anji Reddy 2014).  
  
Alongside the above political changes, since the liberalisation of the Indian economy in 1990s, 
the central government provided the States with considerable space for policy autonomy in 
terms of designing their economic agenda. The (subnational) States in India have become key 
players in the economy as they devised measures to attract private investment and AP is no 
exception to this phenomenon (Rudolph and Rudolph 2001). The adoption of economic 
reforms by the central government and the subsequent abolition of central regulations 
(deregulation) resulted in the enhanced regulation/re-regulation at subnational-level. 
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According to Aseema Sinha (2004, p. 30) several States, including AP, ‘saw in liberalisation 
policies an opportunity to reassert their own regional agenda and extract further regional 
autonomy in development policy’. Sinha provides an explanation as to how economic 
decentralisation of the development policy agenda of the Indian federal state created space for 
recentralisation of development policies at the subnational-level. The State-level apex 
leadership, particularly the CMs, used their power to devise measures to boost their economy 
and redistribute the gains accrued from it. The dispersal of power (political and economic) from 
the national level to regional/State level enabled CM’s like YSR to centralise and concentrate 
power in their hands (Manor 2015).  
  
The Congress Party at State level had always had a culture of infighting and this caused the 
frequent dethroning of the CMs. YSR after assuming power effectively put an end to this intra-
Party power struggle and thus emerged as a strong leader. His centralisation of power in party 
affairs was facilitated by three important factors. Firstly, unlike Indira Gandhi, the Congress 
high command under the leadership of Sonia Gandhi provided greater autonomy to the 
provincial State level Congress leadership and intervened less frequently into the APCC affairs 
(Srinivasulu 2011).  
  
Secondly, under the leadership of YSR, the Congress Party won the elections to the State 
Legislative Assembly and the Lok Sabha in 2004 and 2009. The victory of the Congress in 
2004 Assembly elections saw its return to power after a decade in the State of AP and its victory 
in 2009 Assembly elections made YSR the first CM to consecutively win a second term after 
serving a full term in office. Further, YSR’s strategies helped AP to win the maximum number 
of seats in 2004 and 2009 elections to the Lok Sabha and this contributed to the Congress-led 
UPA coalition to form the government at the centre twice. During YSR’s rule, in the majority 
of the by-elections held due to the frequent resignation of TRS members, the Congress Party 
performed well and won the majority of the seats. Congress even triumphed in the local body 
elections to the municipalities and Panchayats in the State.  
  
Thirdly, YSR did not depend on the centre to fund his welfare and developmental programmes 
during his first term in office (Donthi 2012). YSR was also the biggest fundraiser for the 
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Congress Party in Delhi. Since taking charge as CM in 2004, he made it a regular practice to 
send huge amounts monthly as ‘organisational expenses’ (Nag 2010).  
  
The efforts and personal traits of YSR included electoral success at all levels, tackling dissent 
within the Party, consolidating the Party position through a stronghold over its cadres, and 
overcoming the opposition from all walks of life such as film stars with popular appeal 
(Chiranjeevi), shrewd politicians (Naidu and KCR) and social activists (Jaya Prakash Narayan 
of Lok Satta). His innovative welfare measures, his ability to raise funds, his mass appeal, his 
quickness in grasping and resolving issues of public concern (bearing the increased cost of ₹50 
per gas cylinder), his ever-smiling face, loyalty towards friends and hostility towards his 
opponents made him a ‘loyal, dependable and perhaps the most trustworthy lieutenant of the 
Congress president Sonia Gandhi’ (Menon 2009). His work made him close to the high 
command allowing him to take full control over the State affairs. In the words of political 
analyst, Narasimha Rao (2008), Sonia Gandhi gave YSR ‘a carte blanche’ to manage the 
government and the Party affairs in AP. Using this to his advantage, YSR became a regional 
satrap and vetoed on every governmental and Party issue. 
  
The autonomy provided by the high command and the lack of strong alternative political power 
led YSR to design policies in his own style. In the process, YSR designed several of the 
industrial, infrastructural and welfare policies in ways that simultaneously catered to the needs 
of business and political elites as well as satisfied the electoral majorities. But several of these 
policies were only apparently development oriented and, in reality, catered to the interests of 
select private business entities and close associates, including his son’s business aspirations.  
  
State-business deals  
The US consul for Chennai, David Hopper’s, confidential cable dated 22 October 2007 sent to 
the US government was exposed by WikiLeaks in September 2011 (Srinivasa Rao 2011). 
Hopper, in the cable, stated that allotment of irrigation project contracts and construction of 
houses for the poor by the Congress government of YSR in AP were beset with corruption 
(Wikileaks 2007). The timing of the WikiLeaks gained prominence as it was released at a time 
when late YSR’s son, YS Jagan, was under the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) scanner.  
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The CBI alleged Jagan of amassing huge wealth in very short time through nefarious deals, 
unduly influencing his father who was the CM of the State from 2004 to 2009. Several 
opposition Parties, particularly the TDP, blamed YSR’s rule as the most corrupt. But YSR’s 
corrupt practices came to light after his sudden demise in a helicopter crash. More importantly, 
a series of corruption charges were levelled against YSR’s government in the wake of Jagan’s 
rebellion against the decision of the Congress high command denying him the post of his 
deceased father (Mohan 2012).  
  
Notwithstanding the politics of vendetta and the partisan attitude of CBI, the data pertaining to 
Jagan’s rise in wealth is suggestive of nefarious and corrupt deals. Jagan, in a very short time 
became one of the richest entrepreneur-politicians in India. He declared his assets as worth 
₹77.70 crore while filing nomination to Kadapa Lok Sabha seat in 2009 general elections. If 
one compares it with his income declared on the eve of the 2011 May by-election to the Kadapa 
constituency as 430 crores, then, to everyone’s amazement, he added assets worth about 15 
crores every month. The quick amassment of wealth is certainly an issue to be wary of (Sainath 
2012; Srinivasa Rao 2012). To this extent, Gurucharandas’s argument that Jagan’s case reveals 
how corruption occurs when ‘excessive discretionary authority’ is placed in the hands of 
politicians and officials rather than relying on the ‘impersonal forces of market to decide 
economic outcomes’ is a point to reckon with (Das 2012).  
  
Land alienation  
The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG)13 of India in the 2011-12 performance audit of 
land allotment conducted for the period from 2006 to 2011 in Andhra Pradesh, found that the 
State government alienated or allotted 88,492 acres of land to 1027 private persons/entities. 
The major part of the report covered the land allotment under YSR’s tenure as CM. The CAG 
in its audit sampled 11 of the State’s 23 Districts in AP covering 409 land allotments amounting 
to 50,285.9 acres. The State government, as per the audit, flouted several established rules and 
procedures in the process of land alienation to private firms. The scrutiny of the sampled cases 
revealed that the government granted undue favours to various business establishments 
                                                          
13 CAG is a constitutional body of India. It audits the accounts of the central, State and local level government 




amounting to a loss of ₹1,784 crore to the State’s exchequer. The loss was owed to the 
difference in rate at which government allotted land, ignoring the market value fixed by the 
District Collector and the authorised institutions (Comptroller and Auditor General of India 
[CAG] 2012, p. viii and pp. 8-9).  
  
The CAG report argued that the ‘State Government has ignored the prescribed procedures and 
disregarded canons of financial propriety’ in allotting land to several of the private entities 
(Comptroller and Auditor General CAG 2012, p. viii). Flouting the set procedures and rules, 
thousands of acres of land were allotted to Brahmani Industries Ltd (BIL), Obulapuram Mining 
Company, Lepakshi Knowledge Hub (LKH), Indu Tech Zone Pvt Ltd, Vodarevu and 
Nizampatnam Port Industrial Corridor (VANPIC) and several other noted business entities for 
the development of ports, mining, SEZs and IT parks.  
  
The point is that, during YSR’s tenure as CM, there were grave anomalies noted in land 
alienation to the private entities or individuals, either directly by the government or through its 
nodal agency, APIIC. These lands were allotted at concessional rates compromising the public 
interests. Even the assigned land was resumed by the government and handed over to the 
private business firms as noted in the case of the land allotment for the establishment of the 
Polepally SEZ. Legally, the sale or alienation of assigned land given for the landless poor is 
prohibited and the government of YSR cannot plead innocence to these kinds of violations.  
  
The disproportionate assets case  
The AP government made land allotments to the corporate industrial units conscious of the fact 
that those were against the law. The land was allotted in nefarious ways because YSR’s son 
wanted select business firms to be granted favours in lieu of their investments in his newly 
floated business ventures. CBI filed 11 charge sheets between March 2012 and September 2014 
in Jagan’s disproportionate assets case. The investigative agency alleged that the CM granted 
undue favours to the firms in return for their investments into Jagan’s media, cement and power 
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businesses which mainly include Jagati publications, Sandur Power, Carmel Asia Holdings and 
Bharati Cements.14 
  
Jagan sold his shares worth ₹10 at an inflated rate ranging between ₹61 to ₹1440 to several 
reputed companies, such as VANPIC, Dalmia Cements, India Cements, Penna Cements and 
several others. As an instance, VANPIC purchased shares worth ₹20 Crore of Caramel Asia 
paying a premium of 252 per each share. The company purchased these shares as YSR 
government allotted 15,000 acres of land in Prakasam District and provided several 
concessions in allotting the land to VANPIC projects headed by Nimmagadda Prasad. Key 
political, bureaucratic and business elites, including Jagan were found to be involved in these 
land deals.  
  
The Enforcement Directorate (ED) taking cognizance of the CBI charge sheets, registered a 
money-laundering probe against Jagan in 2012. The ED of India is a specialised financial 
investigation agency empowered to scrutinise suspected cases of legal violations of foreign 
exchange and the illegal assets obtained through fraudulent means. If found guilty, the ED is 
authorised to attach the illegally obtained assets.  
  
The ED attached assets worth ₹1778.53 crore of Jagan’s and various firms involved in Jagan’s 
disproportionate assets case between October 2012 and August 2015. The ED’s seizing of 
assets in Jagan’s case belong to Hetero drugs, Aurobindo Pharma, Ramky Pharma, the 
VANPIC project, the Indu group of companies, Penna Cements, India Cements, Jagati 
Publications, Janani Infrastructure and Indira Television (Deccan Chronicle 27 February 2015; 
Business Standard 26 March 2015; The Economic Times 27 March 2015; The Economic Times 
13 August 2015).  
  
                                                          
14 The CBI and ED charges and actions against Jagan’s illegal assets case is drafted based on available charge 
sheets, ED’s attachment order copy, several English newspaper clippings and media reports. For details on the 
charge sheets and their contents, see: First Post 23 September 2013; The Times of India 14 August 2012; The 
Economic Times 7 June 2013; Business Standard 25 Sep 2013; Chandrashekhar 2013; The Economic Times 17 
October 2013; Chandrashekhar 2014.  
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Both CBI and ED alleged that business entities involved in the cases purchased shares of 
Jagan’s companies at much higher rates than the actual worth as part of quid pro quo in 
exchange for the land doles, license permits, tax incentives and other concessions they received 
from the YSR government. Several industrialists, higher-level bureaucrats and top political 
leaders, including Jagan, were arrested for their involvement in Jagan’s disproportionate case.  
  
Jalayagnam  
In mid-2004 YSR government made a policy to construct new irrigation projects and complete 
the existing ones. The provision of irrigational facilities to serve the farming and drinking water 
needs of the people of the State was named as ‘Jalayagnam’. The term ‘Jalayagnam’ literally 
means a sacred ritual to bring water to the fields and households. A total of 86 irrigation projects 
which include 44 major and 30 medium projects, four flood banks and eight modernisation 
works were planned. The scheme intended to cover an area of 97.46 lakh15 acres and stabilise 
the existing 22.53 lakh acres with an estimated cost of ₹1.86 lakh crores. The projects were to 
be constructed mainly on the rivers Krishna, Godavari, Pennar and their tributaries.  
  
The Jalayagnam programme was conceived as a panacea to the long-standing agrarian crisis 
manifested through the record number of suicides of the farmers in the State (Comptroller and 
Auditor General of India [CAG] 2013, pp. vii-viii). The conception and the implementation of 
the projects under the scheme were beset with major anomalies such as lack of transparency in 
tendering and contracting systems. This caused delays in the execution of projects and incurred 
huge losses, in the form of rising costs of the projects compared to the estimated costs, to the 
State’s exchequer (Comptroller and Auditor General of India [CAG] 2013, p. X).  
  
The YSR government’s violation of the set procedures can be traced to the award of projects 
for political and personal gains. Most of the projects were awarded to entrepreneurs who also 
happen to be politicians, mostly belonging to YSR’s camp. For instance, YSR’s government 
awarded eight contracts worth 3,739.22 crores to a company, Progressive Constructions, 
founded by the five-time Congress MP, Kavuru Sambasiva Rao. The Gayathri Group, founded 
                                                          
15 In the Indian numerical system, one lakh (1,00,000) equals hundred thousand (100,000) 
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by the noted filmmaker and Congress MP and one of India’s 100 richest billionaires, T 
Subbiram Reddy, secured 14 projects worth 4,798 crores. Lagadapati Rajgopal, another 
Congress MP and founder of the Lanco group, is the beneficiary of three Jalayagnam projects 
worth 128.41 crore. Surprisingly, YSR also facilitated the business interests of opposition 
parties through his infrastructure projects. Nama Nageshwar Rao, a TDP MP from Khammam 
and director of Madhucon Infra, got four Jalayagnam projects worth 1,644.15 crores. These are 
only a few instances but there are several such cases. Several of these projects have not yet 
been started despite the government’s disbursement of ₹90,000 crores towards these projects 
in the form of advances and other expenses (Kirpal 2013).  
  
Welfare on a saturation basis  
YSR’s popular poll promises had a soothing effect on the people, particularly the rural citizenry 
and marginalised sections who were reeling under a severe distress owing to the previous 
government’s policies. Following his success in the elections, YSR as CM of the State designed 
welfare policies, on a saturation basis, which endeared him to the people. The saturation 
schemes were not the ‘election handouts’ that are usually floated on the eve of the elections, 
targeting specific groups like minorities, artisans and women. Rather, they were ‘long term’ 
schemes with the aim of spreading the funding to all the eligible beneficiaries. Enhanced 
revenues and stable economic growth in the State of AP allowed YSR to thoroughly implement 
the slew of welfare schemes (Elliott 2011, p. 70). 
  
The elaborate welfare regime included schemes such as the provision of subsidised housing for 
all the shelterless poor under the Indiramma scheme; free power to all the farmers, subsidised 
farm inputs and agricultural loan waiver scheme; subsidised rice made available at ₹2 per 
kilogram for the Below Poverty Line (BPL) families; health insurance, covering tertiary care, 
under Rajiv Arogyasri with financial protection up to ₹2.00 lakhs per annum to all the BPL 
families; pensions for the aged, widows, persons with a disability and for weavers; Pavula 
Vaddi (interest subsidy), a scheme to provide loans for the Self Help Group (SHG) women 
members at three percent interest; the 108 emergency ambulance service available for both 
rural and urban area citizenry 24/7; and fee-reimbursement (since 2008) for all those post-
matric students who are eligible to pursue professional education but cannot afford to pay. 
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Andhra Pradesh, under YSR, became a torchbearer for other States across India in the 
implementation of the centrally sponsored ‘Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee’ scheme, which enables assured employment, legally, to the people living in the 
countryside.  
  
In sum, the co-existence of economic growth, corruption and welfare characterised YSR’s rule. 
After coming to power, YSR introduced policies to improve the condition of the poor and 
farmers. But taking stock of his policies and programmes makes it clear that he continued with 
the reform-oriented policies of Naidu with much more vigour. He went on, in an aggressive 
mode, to parcel private and government lands to the big industrial houses for setting up of 
SEZs, industrial corridors, and mining and real estate businesses. Thanks to YSR, AP tops the 
list of both approved and operational SEZs in the country. His government ruthlessly resumed 
the assigned land granted to landless poor belonging to Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribe 
(ST) and backward classes for development projects violating the established legal procedures.  
  
Although YSR’s welfare and agrarian developmental schemes endeared him to the people and 
transformed his image of a faction leader to a mass leader, they did serve the interests of private 
and corporate entities. His welfare schemes are a novel example of how to combine welfare, 
development and corruption to serve the electoral interest, calm popular ire and the corporate 
business interests as well. For instance, YSR’s Arogyasri (health insurance scheme) provided 
free tertiary medical treatment for the poor in corporate hospitals while ignoring primary and 
public sector health-care development. The rich corporate hospitals benefitted from the public 
funds as they inflated the medical bills (Rao 2014). Similarly, the fee-reimbursement scheme 
for the professional education enriched the private colleges (Vasu 2011).  
  
YSR created a stable and strong set of political and business elites with intertwined interests. 
There was no clear-cut demarcation between the political and business spheres as several of 
the MPs in YSR’s government were business-people turned politicians or politicians aspiring 
to set up business. Several of the development contracts were awarded to these close associates, 
including his son, Jagan. The state-business relationships were highly collusive. YSR 
unleashed a new wave of politics-business relations. His rule enabled the interlinking of 
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politicians, businessmen and bureaucrats to cater to the needs of each other. Despite 
innumerable cases of corruption that came to the fore and the implementation of reform-
oriented policies such as SEZs, YSR was able to manage the public rage. He engineered 
effective ways to stall the mass protests against industrial and infrastructural projects. He 
floated several populist schemes to offset the trauma associated with his development policies 
that favoured private actors.  
  
3.4 Conclusion  
The Indian state liberalised its economy and it transformed itself into a federal market economy 
in 1991. A federal market economy provided considerable autonomy to the States in matters 
of economic decision-making. Politically, this was also an era of coalition governments which 
provided scope for the regional parties and leaders at the State level to become key actors in 
deciding the fate of the central government formation and its continued existence. The political 
and economic decentralisation was used by the apex leadership in AP, to centralise and 
consolidate their rule. The decentralisation of political and economic power led to the shift of 
power away from the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and other central institutions to the Chief 
Minister’s Office (CMO) and other institutions at State level. Ironically, the devolution of 
power from centre to States resulted in the centralisation of power in the apex political 
leadership (CMs) at State level.  
  
In the context of a federal market economy, this chapter demonstrated the role of YSR in 
dispossession for capital accumulation in the State of AP. It can be gleaned from the empirical 
evidence detailed above that the global finance capital, as propounded by Harvey, has not 
determined dispossession in AP. Rather, the subnational-level political-economic factors 
played a key role in the dispossession of land for capital. YSR allotted several development 
projects like SEZs, mining leases, ports and industrial corridors to select business associates, 
resulting in the dispossession of the poor, despite having come to office on a pro-rural and pro 





YSR’s son, Jagan, was a businessman. He floated new businesses in media, real estate and 
cement after his father became the CM. The data surrounding various development projects 
revealed that several state-business deals were on a quid-pro-quo basis. Jagan influenced his 
CM father to allot favours to corporate industrial houses for their return investments into his 
newly floated businesses. Now this was true, as detailed above, of several SEZs and other 
development projects while YSR was in power, including the Polepally SEZ.  
  
In YSR’s government, several of the political leaders, including Members of Parliament (MPs), 
Members of Legislative Assembly (MLAs), and ministers, are entrepreneurs first and 
politicians next or politicians with business aspirations. Even the CM’s son was also a 
businessman and received official favours from his CM father to augment his business empire. 
In this context, the thesis traces the drivers of dispossession. Several of the developmental 
projects, particularly those undertaken by YSR, were also non-starters leading to a situation 
aptly characterised as ‘development deadlock’. The following chapters on Polepally SEZ are 
narrated to better our understanding as to the agents responsible for dispossession.   
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Chapter 4: Green Industrial Park to pharmaceutical enclave 
  
On 20 November 2009, K. Rosaiah, the Chief Minister (CM) of Andhra Pradesh (AP), 
inaugurated the Aurobindo pharmaceutical unit VII in the pharmaceutical Special Economic 
Zone (SEZ) located in Polepally village in the Mahabubnagar District. This event marked the 
operationalisation of the SEZ. The 250-acre SEZ forms part of the 954-acre Green Industrial 
Park (GIP) developed by Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (APIIC). The 
APIIC developed the SEZ to attract domestic and foreign investments and promote export-led 
industrialisation (The Hindu 21 November 2009).  
  
In his inaugural address at the opening of the Aurobindo pharmaceutical unit, the CM remarked 
that this SEZ was a ‘dream project’ of the late CM, YS. Rajasekhara Reddy. He proclaimed 
that the ‘misconception over Polepally SEZ would come to an end with the inauguration of 
pharma units, as over 5,000 people would get jobs once all pharma companies in the SEZ 
started functioning’ (The Hindu 21 November 2009). Why did the CM say that there were 
misconceptions over Polepally SEZ? What were these misconceptions? How does the creation 
of jobs put an end to these misconceptions?  
  
In order to answer the above questions, the story of Polepally SEZ needs to be narrated. As a 
first step, this chapter provides a historical-descriptive background to the creation of the 
Polepally pharmaceutical SEZ (hereafter referred to as Polepally SEZ). This background will 
demonstrate the role of the key institutions and legislations, particularly operating at the 
provincial level in India, in the dispossession of land for capital accumulation. The chapter 
helps to understand the ways in which the formal political-legal framework underpinning the 
alienation of land for industry works on the ground.  
  
In addition, the chapter demonstrates the contrast between the assurances of the government in 
producing farmers’ initial consent for parting with their lands and the fulfilment of those, once 
the land is taken possession of. Above all, the empirics surrounding the dispossession of land 
in Polepally for a SEZ will help us to further test the applicability of Harvey’s theory (2003), 
which holds that dispossession in the global south, under the conditions of neoliberalism, is a 
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determinant of economic dynamics associated with the redeployment of the overaccumulated 
global capital in search of profitable investment sites with the sole aim to further accumulate. 
  
The chapter begins by tracing the history of the Polepally SEZ. I firstly delineate in brief the 
geographical and demographic aspects of Polepally village (Section 1). Secondly, I narrate the 
details pertaining to the transformation of a Green Industrial Park (GIP) into a Growth Centre 
(GC). While doing so, I describe the concepts of GIP, GC and the profile of Andhra Pradesh 
Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (Section 2). As the first requisite of any development 
project is identification of land and its acquisition, I describe the land acquisition processes for 
developmental projects. Drawing on the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) 1894, I sketch the 
procedures used to acquire land in Polepally (Section 3). I explain the shift in domestic 
economic policies that influenced the creation of a pharma SEZ within the GIP (Section 4).  
  
Lastly, I use this case to show how dispossession is an extra-economic affair. Levien’s thesis 
on regimes of dispossession (Levien 2015, p. 149) argued in this regard that the ‘character and 
outcome of dispossession in different times and places will be shaped by heterogenous and 
nationally specific political, economic and ideological factors that cannot be read off of global 
imperative of capital’. I demonstrate how dispossession is led by the subnational-level political-
economic factors using the ideology of development (read jobs and regional development) as 
justification for the state-led transfer of land from one class to another. This process is visible 
in terms of transfer of resources of the farmers to rich corporate houses leading to the former’s 
dispossession from their means of subsistence to enable accumulation by the latter. In short, 
this detailed empirical work leaves space to assess whether domestic (regional, subnational and 
provincial here) economic developments and the acts of political leadership played any role in 
the dispossession of the farmers. Alternatively, whether it is a case of/for releasing a set of 
hitherto uncommodified assets (by the supine governments) into the market to be seized upon 







4.1 Geographical and demographic profile  
The pharmaceutical SEZ in the GIP developed by the APIIC is in the village of Polepally16. It 
is located about 80 km from Hyderabad, on the right side of the Hyderabad-Bengaluru national 
highway number 7. At the entrance of this SEZ, APIIC laid a marble stone hoarding. The 
hoarding reads as ‘Green Industrial Park’ Jadcherla, under the emblem, ‘APIIC, The Future is 
Here’, engraved in big font in black coloured letters visible from a long distance away.  
  
A straight walk into the GIP from its entrance for five minutes leads to a gate on to the right 
side marking the entrance of the pharma SEZ. The SEZ is in 250 acres of land and is cordoned 
off by a big fencing wall of not less than 10 feet in height with pharma units Aurobindo, Hetero, 
Mylan, Optimus Generics Limited, Epsilon and Shilpa Medicare Limited housed in it. Coming 
out of the SEZ entrance, a right turn will lead to the Polepally village through billboards of 
APIIC specifying the Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R&R) colony for those displaced to set 
up a SEZ. The two billboards displayed side by side on the R&R site, one in the regional 
language Telugu and the other in English, mark the site as APIIC housing scheme under the 
R&R package in Polepally village in an area of 26.83 acres with 200 sq. yards of plot for each 
displaced family.  
  
The Polepally village is in the Jadcherla Mandal of Mahabubnagar District in AP. 
Mahabubnagar, also known as Palamoor, is one of the ten Districts of the Telangana region in 
AP.17 It is one of the most backward Districts in terms of economic, industrial and social 
aspects. It has high levels of migration; with a significant proportion of the population going 
to other places in search of their livelihood. It has 65 Mandals or subdistricts and 1477 villages. 
The rivers flowing through the District are ‘Krishna’ and ‘Tungabhadra’. The rivulets that flow 
through this District are Dindi, Peddavagu and Chinnavagu. The principal crops grown in the 
region are paddy, sorgum, finger millet, pearl millet, groundnut and castor.  
                                                          
16 The locational, geographical and demographic information is based partly on my visits to Polepally village in 
December 2012 and February 2013 and the 2011 Census Data of Government of India.  
17 The State of Andhra Pradesh was the first one to be formed on linguistic basis in 1956. It comprises of three 
regions – Coastal Andhra, Telangana and Rayalaseema. There are nine Districts in Coastal Andhra, 10 Districts 




Polepally village has a total population of 5,187 and 1,114 households. The village has different 
caste groups. Large sections of the population belong to the previous untouchable category of 
Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). About 50 percent of the population is 
literate in the village. The village has a considerable amount of people engaged in agricultural 
and allied work.  
  
The main crops grown in Polepally are paddy, jowar, maize, horsegram, red gram, chillies, 
finger millet, pigeon pea, groundnut, oranges, mangoes, guavas, different vegetables, castor, 
sesame and sunflower. The village is well connected by air, road and railway network. It is 50 
km away from the Rajiv Gandhi International Airport at Shamshabad and has a good approach 
to the road. The Jadcherla Railway station is about 6 km away and the Jadcherla Andhra 
Pradesh State Road Transport (APSRTC) bus terminus is just 5 km away. The District 
headquarters, Mahabubnagar, is 23 km from Polepally. The nearest seaport is Vizag port. The 
postal, telecommunication and banking facilities are available within a 5-10 km range.  
  
4.2 The beginnings  
Bill Clinton, the American President, visited the city of Hyderabad on 24 March 2000 as part 
of his trip to the South Asian nations of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. During his visit, he 
addressed a seminar on Information Technology (IT) and knowledge-based industries jointly 
organised by the State government of AP, the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and an 
association of American companies in India (Dikshit 2000). The US and India declared in the 
conference to cooperate on trade and investment for clean energy development in India. For 
this purpose, they announced the establishment of a ‘Green Business Centre’ (GBC) in 
Hyderabad (Embassy of India 2000, p. 7).  
  
The GBC project was aimed to develop excellent green technologies and assist local industries 
in adopting cleaner and greener methods of production. The government of AP allotted 5 acres 
of land to the GBC near Hitech city at Hyderabad. Jamshyd Godrej funded the establishment 
of the GBC and the United States Agency for International Development/India (USAID/India) 
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provided technical assistance (CII – Sohrabji Green Business Centre 2013).18 The centre was 
named CII: Sohrabji Green Business Centre, and was inaugurated by the then President of 
India, Dr APJ Abdul Kalam, on 14 July 2004.  
  
Subsequent to the formalisation of the GBC plan in 2001, CII proposed to set up a ‘Green 
Business Park’ in AP modelled on the lines of the Environmental Green Park located in 
California. The Green Park would be a first such park in Asia that would house companies 
engaged in ‘environment, pollution control and green technologies’ (The Hindu Business Line 
6 January 2001). In this context, Tarun Das, the then Director-General of the CII, said a detailed 
plan would be submitted to the AP government during the seventh partnership summit of the 
CII to be held in Hyderabad from 9 January 2001 to 11 January 2001. The CII planned to 
procure a few hundred acres of land near Hyderabad to set up the Green Park and make 
Hyderabad its national headquarters for energy and environment (The Hindu 6 January 2001).  
  
According to Tarun Das, the GBC would undertake research and development and training 
activities for promoting green business, and ‘environmental related Companies’ would operate 
in the GIP (The Hindu Business Line 6 January 2001). The CM during the inaugural session of 
the CII partnership summit accepted the proposal of CII. He approved the allotment of about 
1,000 acres of land for housing industrial units with environmentally friendly technologies (The 
Hindu 10 January 2001). The CM, speaking at the valedictory session of the summit remarked 
that ‘he looked forward to the Green Park becoming a world-class location for world-class 
companies in the area of green technology’ (The Hindu 12 January 2001).  
  
As promised at the CII partnership summit, the Andhra Pradesh State Investment Promotion 
Board decided to make available about 1,000 acres of land in Jadcherla and Balanagar Mandals 
of Mahabubnagar District for a GIP. This was decided in a meeting headed by the CM on 23 
May 2001 (The Hindu 24 May 2001). The GIP was one of several initiatives towards the 
                                                          
18 Jamshyd N. Godrej is the Chairman and Managing Director of the Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Company 
Limited. He was also the former president of the CII (1993-94). He is the Chairman of the CII Sohrabji Godrej 
Green Business Centre in Hyderabad.  
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achievement of the goals in the vision 202019 document of the State of AP – ‘to protect 
environment and make the state of AP a clean and green place to live’ (Mohanty 2003, p. 2).  
  
The TDP government took several measures to promote the concept of ‘green’. These included 
‘one-day one lakh plantation’, afforestation programmes, beautification of lakes around 
Hyderabad with the help of international funding agencies, covering the area under Hyderabad 
Urban Development Authority (HUDA) with greenery, setting up of GBC in Hyderabad with 
joint support of the State government, United States Energy Agency and the Confederation of 
Indian Industry (CII), hosting of Green Building Congress 2001 and the like (The Hindu 
Business Line 2001; The Hindu 1 September 2001).  
  
The APIIC was authorised to develop the GIP. The APIIC, a wholly owned undertaking of the 
government of AP, was created on 26 September 1973. It was mainly created with the purpose 
of providing industrial infrastructure through the development of industrial areas. The 
corporation, to its credit, has developed 300 industrial parks in an extent of about 121,655 lakh 
acres of land. In the wake of the liberalisation of the economy, APIIC changed its role from 
providing infrastructure for the development of industrial areas to becoming a facilitator in 
developing government as well as private industrial projects.  
  
APIIC in association with a private developer developed the Hyderabad Information 
Technology and Engineering Consultancy City (HITEC City). It is the main facilitator in 
several mega industrial projects: SEZs, ports, industrial parks, hardware parks and the like. It 
has also executed government works like the construction of a sports village at Gachibowli in 
the capital city of Hyderabad and other such civil works. It is the nodal agency for government 
schemes such as Growth Centres (GCs), Export Promotion Industrial Parks and Integrated 
                                                          
19 This document contains measures to achieve economic growth and overall development through simple, moral, 
accountable, responsive and transparent government (Bandyopadhyay 2001). It lays down a plan of action to 
achieve transformation in healthcare, poverty, education, industrial development, e-technology and environment 




Infrastructure Development Centres. By 2013, it had taken possession of 126,324.27 lakh acres 
of land for various developmental projects in the State.  
  
The APIIC, in charge of developing the GIP, planned to establish the latter comprising of non-
polluting and eco-friendly industrial units. The APIIC officials informed the farmers, on whose 
land the GIP was to come, that the GIP would shelter green industries such as horticultural and 
nursery plantation units that are pollution free and environmentally friendly in nature (Andhra 
Jyothi 21 April 2007). However, APIIC in 2002-03 processed land acquisition for a Growth 
Centre in Jadcherla, while retaining the label of the GIP. The government did not inform the 
Polepally farmers about the proposed change. The reallocation of previously acquired land for 
other projects with a different purpose has been a practice in AP. For instance, in Kakinada 
land was originally acquired for an oil refinery to be developed by the Oil and Natural Gas 
Commission (ONGC) of India. But the acquired land was later allotted for a SEZ to be set up 
by a private developer (Srinivasulu 2014, p. 93).  
  
The Growth Centre (GC) scheme was announced by the Government of India in 1988. The 
scheme aims to promote industrialisation of backward areas in the country. It became 
operational in 1991. The central government allocated 71 GCs to various States on the 
‘combined criteria of area, population and industrial backwardness’ (Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, GOI 2004). The GC acts as a ‘magnet’ to attract investments in the industrially 
backward regions of the nation. It should be located near the railhead, national or state 
highways, or port.  
  
The GC scheme provides for the best infrastructural facilities which include sufficient land, 
water, electricity, telecommunication, education, and health facilities (Development 
Commissioner, Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, GOI 2013). It is a joint 
venture between the central government and the State industrial corporations. The finances are 
jointly shared by the central government, State government, all Indian financial institutions, 
and the market. The financing pattern is: central government – ₹10 crores, State government – 
₹5 crores, financial institutions/Banks – ₹5 crores, and market borrowings – ₹10 crores 
(Development Commissioner, Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, GOI 2013).  
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Of the 71 proposed GCs, the union government of India approved four Centres for the State of 
AP. These are in Bobbili (Vizianagaram), Vemsoor (Khammam), Ongole (Prakasam), and 
Hindupur (Ananthapur) (Narsaiah 2003, p. 25). Due to unfavourable logistics (The Hindu 29 
September 2008), the government of AP could not proceed with the establishment of the GC 
at Vemsoor in the Khammam District of AP. Hence, the government converted the GIP at 
Jadcherla into a fourth Growth Centre ‘in lieu of Vemsoor of Khammam District’ 
(Commissionerate of Industries, GoAP, n.d.). The AP government sent the proposal to the 
central government and obtained in-principle clearance in October 2002. Following this, the 
government of AP through G.O.Ms. No.277, Industries and Commerce (INF) Department, 
dated 20 September 2003, conveyed its approval for the setting up of the fourth GC at Jadcherla 
(Commissionerate of Industries, GoAP, n.d). Despite the change in the project from a GIP to a 
GC, the APIIC continued with the label of GIP. The government began to hasten up the process 
of land acquisition after the central government granted approval for the GC.  
  
4.3 Legal framework for land acquisition  
The government of AP identified land to set up a GIP in Jadcherla and Balanagar Mandals of 
Mahabubnagar in AP in 2001. The government informed the Polepally farmers about the intent 
of the government to acquire their land for setting up green industries. But, as mentioned above, 
it issued notification to acquire land for a Growth Centre in 2003. It is still not clear whether 
the government of AP informed the central government of the change in the proposed project 
from a GIP to GC. The APIIC in its first quarterly progress report of the Jadcherla growth 
centre20 for the quarter ending 31 March 2004 stated that requisition for Ac.1001.16Gts.21 of 
land was filed with the competent authorities. Out of the Ac.1001.16Gts., Ac.692.70Gts. were 
identified as the Patta (title deed) land, and the remaining Ac.308.46Gts. was 
assigned/government land.22 The report also mentioned that APIIC had taken possession of the 
                                                          
20 I obtained the progress reports of Jadcherla Growth Centre from the Deputy Director, Commissionerate of 
Industries, Hyderabad in February 2013. APIIC sent the progress reports of the Growth Centres on a regular basis 
during 2004-06 to the Commissionerate of Industries with a request to duly sign and forward them to the central 
government. A certificate from the commissionerate of industries stating that the central assistance released for 
the implementation of the Growth Centre project was fully utilised in accordance with the provisions of the 
scheme was necessary for continuation of the project. These reports contain information regarding the Jadcherla 
Growth Centre project implementation and other Growth Centers in the State. The text developed here is partly 
based on this information.  
21 Ac. – stands for acre/s and Gts. – stands for gunthas. Forty Gunthas equal one acre of land.  
22 ‘Patta’ (title deed) land is one’s owned property procured through purchase or inheritance and the person in 
possession of such land has the legal right to sell, transfer or gift it. The government can acquire this kind of land 
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government/assigned land on 28 June 2003 and requested an amount of ₹400 lakhs (four 
crores) to be deposited with the District Collector, Mahabubnagar, towards compensation to 
those displaced.  
  
The APIIC acquired, on an instalment basis, funds from the central government and State 
government amounting to a total of ₹6.90 crores during 2003-06. It also sent regular reports to 
the Government of India (GoI) till the first quarter of 2005. While the TDP government set the 
process for land acquisition in 2001, the Congress government, which came to power in 2004, 
passed the compensation awards in 2005. However, both governments retained the project label 
as ‘GIP’. The following sub-sections detail the evolution of land legislation in India, the 
procedure followed in the land acquisition and the details pertaining to land acquired in 
Polepally.  
  
The land acquisition legislation  
The Land Acquisition Act 1894 (hereafter the Act or LAA) as amended in 1984 is used to 
acquire land for State-led development projects in India.23 This Act is based on the doctrine of 
‘eminent domain’. As per the doctrine, all land (private, public and common) within a nation’s 
territorial boundary belongs to the state. The state is empowered through the ‘eminent domain’ 
to seize the private property of the citizens for ‘public use’ by paying compensation at 
prevailing market rates (Mohanty 2009, p. 44). The Act was enacted by the colonial British 
government. The LAA contained the rules for the acquisition of lands and mechanism to 
determine the compensation. This law allowed the government to acquire land for roads, canals, 
railway networks and for other public works. The colonial state was empowered through this 
Act to expropriate even the private land ‘to serve some “public purpose”, for performing some 
public good or for satisfying a public need’ (Kasturi 2008, p. 33). However, the Act did not 
specifically define what constituted ‘public purpose’ and left it to be decided by the concerned 
                                                          
for public purposes or setting up a company paying compensation as per the prevailing market rate. The assigned 
category of land refers to the government lands assigned to the landless poor as part of land redistribution policies 
of the government. The assigned land can be resumed by the government at any time paying ex-gratia. 
23 The Land Acquisition Act 1894 underwent several amendments up until 1984. The Act is available on the 
online national portal of Government of India at http://dolr.nic.in/hyperlink/acq.htm. The sections and parts of the 
Act cited in this text are drawn from this source.  
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executive power. The Act was intended at speedy acquisition of land while paying minimum 
compensation to the displaced (Ray and Patra 2009, p. 41).  
  
Article 372 of India’s Constitution specifies that all laws from the British period would remain 
in force ‘until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent 
authority’ (Government of India [GoI] 2015, p. 260). Several Acts and laws legislated by the 
British remained in force in the independent India until annulled or amended through 
legislation. Following this legal framework, the republican Constitution of India retained the 
colonial 1894 Land Acquisition Act making hardly any changes to it.  
  
Under the leadership of the first Prime Minister (PM), Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru, India 
embarked upon an economic model aimed at achieving self-reliance. In this period, a 
developmental state with an active role in the economic affairs took shape. Nehru’s government 
took up the responsibility of massive industrialisation and development under the aegis of 
public sector, leaving the private sector to engage with ‘consumer and intermediate goods’ 
(Chatterjee 2010, p. 4).  
 
The state-sponsored development programme warranted land acquisition for constructing 
roads, railways, dams and industries. The large-scale land acquisition using the colonial LAA 
(1894) for ‘public infrastructure’ and ‘public sector industry’ resulted in the displacement of 
farmers, agricultural labour, village artisans and tribal people. The estimates suggest that at 
least 60 million people were displaced between 1947 and 2004 through developmental projects 
(Fernandes 2004 as cited by Levien 2011, p. 67).  
  
State governments in India, during Nehru’s tenure as Prime Minister, not only acquired land 
for public sector industries but acquired land also for private companies. This led to the issue 
of ‘what constituted public purpose’ which was not clearly defined under the Act. In 1962, a 
case of government’s land acquisition for a private company was challenged in the Supreme 
Court, the apex legal institution of India. The Court in its judgment declared that governments 
cannot acquire land for private companies in the name of ‘public purpose’ (Gonsalves 2010, p. 
38). As a response to the Court’s ruling, Nehru’s government amended the Act in 1962 to 
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‘allow land to be acquired for a company, which was engaged in or was taking steps for 
engaging in any industry or work for a public purpose’ (Kasturi 2008, pp. 33-34). The law was 
further amended in 1984 to include planned development and sale of land to private enterprises 
through State Corporations (Kasturi 2008).  
  
The crucial issues until the 1980s pertained to ‘fair compensation’ and ‘the definitional 
ambiguity of public purpose’ of land acquisitions. Under the provisions of the LAA, the 
affected parties had the right to contest in the Court regarding the issue of compensation. Many 
affected parties approached the Courts leading to the enhancement of the compensation (Iyer 
2007). But the definitional vagueness of the ‘public purpose’ was left intact even after several 
amendments to the LAA.  
  
While the issues of public purpose and compensation received wide attention from the 
government and public, the crucial issues that emanated from the displacement of people from 
their lands – resettlement and rehabilitation – were hardly discussed. Over the years, 
particularly in the wake of the liberalisation of the Indian economy in the 1990s, the issues of 
resettlement and rehabilitation of the displaced persons, the project affected persons, and the 
environment and ecology issues, led to massive resistance movements (Sampat 2010; 
Shrivastava and Kothari 2012). In this context, the central government initiated the drafting of 
a national rehabilitation policy to rehabilitate people from all types of development related 
displacement in the mid-1980s, which underwent several revisions. The huge protests and 
resistance movements over the issue still did not translate into the enactment of a law on the 
issues of resettlement and rehabilitation.  
  
Meanwhile, the Indian government, after having experienced a decade of liberal reforms 
decided to introduce reforms aimed at export led industrialisation in 2000. As part of this, it 
announced SEZ policy influenced by the Chinese pattern of export led manufacturing. SEZs 
require enormous amounts of land ranging from 10 hectares to 10,000 hectares depending on 
the type of SEZ. The States across India competed to establish SEZs and authorised the State 
industrial corporations (such as APIIC) to acquire land for the SEZ developers. There have 
been wide protests and resistance movements across the country over the divorce of fertile 
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agrarian land for private corporate industry in the last decade, particularly for SEZ-type 
industrialisation. 
  
The violent protests in Singur, Nandigram, Goa, Raigad and Kakinada, to name a few, over the 
controversial land acquisition for SEZs and other private corporate industrial projects forced 
the central government to make policy changes. The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led 
by the Congress introduced amendment of the LAA 1894 and an accompanying ‘Rehabilitation 
and Resettlement’ bill in 2007. Both these bills lapsed in 2009 owing to the dissolution of the 
Lok Sabha for general elections. The UPA government came back to power in the 2009 general 
elections and introduced a new bill combining the land acquisition and resettlement and 
rehabilitation. The Land Acquisition, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Bill 2011 (LARR 2011) 
was introduced in the Lok Sabha in September 2011 and became an Act in September 2013. 
  
Land acquisition procedure  
Prior to the land acquisition legislation of 2013, the State governments in India acquired land 
using the colonial LAA 1894 for themselves or for a company. The States, through this Act, 
can resort to the use of ‘eminent domain’, the power of the state, to seize a citizen’s private 
land in the larger interest of the public.  
  
The land acquisition process begins with the issuance of a preliminary notification under 
section 4(1) of the Act. Subsequent to this, the landowners and others who are interested in the 
land can file objections against the preliminary notification under section 5(1) of the Act within 
30 days from the date of preliminary notification. The objections submitted to the District 
Collector are raised on the grounds that the land acquired is not for a public purpose, the land 
under acquisition does not fulfil the stated purpose, more land than needed is being acquired, 
and the land has historic monuments, places of public interest and the like. After hearing these 
objections, the District Collector submits a report to the government.  
  
Based on the Collector’s report, the government, if it decides to go ahead, issues a declaration 
under section 6(1) of the Act. The Act specifies that such declaration should be issued within 
a year from the date of preliminary notification. The Collector informs the landowners and 
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other interested stakeholders through a public notice about taking possession of the land and 
invites them to claim compensation under sections 9 and 10 of the Act. The concerned parties 
can submit their objections to the Collector about the measurement and price of the land. After 
enquiring into the objections raised, the Collector under section 11 of the Act passes an award 
detailing i) the true area of the land; ii) the amount of compensation to be paid; and iii) the 
apportionment of the compensation payable among all the interested parties. The award should 
be passed within two years from the date of the issuance of the declaration notice. After the 
declaration of the award, the land becomes the possession of the government. 
 
Section 17 of the Act allows the States to take possession of the land without passing an award 
in cases of urgency. Through this section, technically, the collector can take possession of the 
land after the preliminary notification issued under section 4(1) of the Act. Under part VII, land 
can be acquired for non-government purposes on the condition that the company for which 
land is sought takes the onus of paying the entire amount of compensation.  
  
Land acquisition in Polepally  
The basis for land acquisition in AP, like other States in India, is the colonial Land Acquisition 
Act 1894, as explained above. States in India enacted only procedural changes while retaining 
the substantive part of the Act. The States have adopted context specific modifications to the 
Act for the acquisition of land for developmental projects. For instance, the States of 
‘Maharashtra, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh provide for a preliminary survey of the land–to 
undertake an assessment of the land for its feasibility for acquisition–even before the 
notification of intent under Sec.4 of the LAA is issued’ (Upadhyay and Sinha 2009, p. 52).  
  
The State governments can acquire land either through a market route wherein it negotiates 
with the landholders to arrive at a consensus for parting with their land or can resort to the 
doctrine of ‘eminent domain’. The market route is consent based and hence results in the 
voluntary transaction minimising the chances of resistance and discontent. The land acquired 
using eminent domain leads to forceful eviction of the landowners and in such a case even the 
rate of amount towards compensation is fixed by the government. The compulsory nature of 
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land acquisition against the willing consent of the landowners has been often used in India 
leading to social and political turmoil.  
  
As per the records of the APIIC, the actual amount of land acquired for the GC was 
Ac954.23gts. The land was acquired from two villages, Polepally and Rajapur, in Jadcherla 
Mandal.24 The extent of Assignment land acquired in Polepally was Ac276.58gts and Patta 
land was Ac420.62gts. The amount of Assignment land procured in Rajapur was Ac.32.57gts. 
and Patta land was Ac.224.46gts. In all, a total of Ac.309.15gts. Assigned/government land 
was acquired and Ac.645.08gts. Patta land was acquired for Jadcherla GIP. Majority of the 
landholders in Polepally village were either marginal or small farmers owning less than 2 
hectares (5 acres) of land. 
  
Table 4.1 Green Industrial Park (GIP) land acquisition details   
S.No.  Name of the  
Village  
Extent of  
Assigned  
Land in Ac.gts.  
Extent of Patta 
Land in Ac.gts.  
Total in  
Ac.gts  
1  Polepally  276.58  420.62  697.2  
2  Rajapur  32.57  224.46  257.03  
 Total  309.15  645.08  954.23  
Source: APIIC [Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation], n.d.  
  
                                                          
24 Technically only Polepally is in Jadcherla Mandal and Rajapur is in Balanagar Mandal of Mahabubnagar 
District. Mudireddypally, the then hamlet of the Rajapur village, lost the land for the GIP. Mudireddypally is 
adjacent to Polepally village. Presently Mudireddypally village exists as a separate Panchayat. Despite these facts, 
APIIC continues to place both Polepally and Rajapur villages in Jadcherla Mandal on its website.  
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The APIIC documents are obtained under the Right to Information Act (RTI) for the purposes 
of this research.25 The RTI was enacted by the UPA government in the year 2005. The APIIC 
documentary sources specified that its executive director submitted proposals for the 
acquisition of land to an extent of Ac.439.09Gts. to establish a Growth Centre at Polepally 
village of Jadcherla Mandal vide Letter No 393/A3/APIIC/Lands/2001, dated 7 March 2002. 
This proposed communication was addressed to the Land Acquisition Officer, the Revenue 
Divisional Officer (RDO), Mahabubnagar. Accordingly, the Mahabubnagar Revenue District 
authorities surveyed the lands and demarcated an extent of Ac420.25gts as Patta against the 
requisition of Ac439.09gts of land submitted by APIIC in the Polepally village. It should be 
noted that the records obtained show the land acquisition process only about the Polepally 
village. The lands on which pharma SEZ came up belong to Polepally village. The maximum 
extent of land was acquired from Polepally village, which was more than two and a half times 
compared to the land acquired in Rajapur.  
  
The AP government orders in 1987 empowered the District Collectors for approval and 
publication of Draft Notification (DN) and Draft Declaration (DD) pertaining to the land 
requisition cases submitted by APIIC (Government of Andhra Pradesh [GoAP] n.d.,). As per 
the Land Acquisition Act26, a screening committee at State level needs to approve the DN. 
However, the government of AP issued orders on 9 July 1989 which held that as far as the land 
acquisition cases of APIIC are concerned, the approval of the State level screening committee 
is not needed.  
  
Accordingly, the APIIC submitted the DN and DD proposals to the Collector of Mahabubnagar 
District on 8 January 2003. The District Collector, Mahabubnagar, approved the DN under the 
section 4(1) of the LAA. The DN was published (in Andhra Pradesh. GAZETTE PART 1 
                                                          
25 I filed an application dated 27 December 2012 under the Right to Information Act (2005) addressing the Zonal 
Manager and Public Information Officer, APIIC, Shamshabad Zone seeking documents related to Polepally SEZ. 
The zonal officer considered my application and through a letter dated 7 February 2013 sent me the documents 
pertaining to Polepally and stated in his letter that the balance will be furnished in due course. This chapter drew 
from these documents, particularly the land acquisition process in Polepally. 
26 AP government follows the amended LAA 1894, but adopted few procedural changes. For further information 
on land acquisition process in AP, please see: Chief Commissioner of Land Administration (GoAP n.d.), Revenue 




EXTRAORDINARY MAHABUBNAGAR No.1, pp. 13–23) on 18 January 2003. The 
substance of the DN was also published in the village on 19 January 2003. The same was also 
published in the English news daily, Pledge and Telugu news daily, Vaartha on 29 January 
2003.  
  
The last date of the DN publication was taken as the date on which it was published in 
newspapers. Accordingly, 29 January 2003 was taken as a date to fix the price valuation of the 
land. The DD was approved by the District Collector of the Mahabubnagar on 20 January 2003 
and was published (in the Andhra Pradesh. GAZETTE PART I EXTRAORDINARY on pages 
1-11). The DD was published in Telugu news daily, Vaartha on 30 January 2003 and the 
English news daily, Pledge on 31 January 2003. The DD was later published in the visible 
places of the village on 10 February 2003. The DD was issued for a total of Ac.420.25gts of 
Patta land in the village of Polepally.  
  
The compensation to the Patta landholders in Polepally village was based on the true market 
value of the land under acquisition, the category of land – dry, wet, garden, its location – interior 
from the main highway or near to the main highway, and the structural developments on the 
land. The market value was assessed considering the sale particulars for the preceding three 
years to the DN issued under section 4(1) of the LAA. As the DN was last published on 29 
January 2003, the market value for the land was calculated based on the sales of the land in and 
around Polepally between 29 January 2000 and 28 January 2003. During the past three years 
similar kinds of land in the Polepally village were acquired by the Revenue authorities from 
the Sub-Registrar’s office, Jadcherla. Accordingly, the Revenue officials calculated the 
compensation for the Patta landholders.  
  
As per the official records of the APIIC, meetings/Gram Sabhas were convened to ‘explain the 
land acquisition process and to convince the pattedars’ regarding the benefits of accepting 
consent award.27 The farmers were informed about the government’s decision to acquire their 
                                                          
27 Gram Sabha is a general body of villagers consisting of all the adult citizens. Convening of Gram Sabhas at 
least twice a year has been legally mandated. The Gram Panchayat, a basic institution of local self-governance at 
the village level in India and AP, is accountable to Gram Sabha.  
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land and the compensation formulae. The awards passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer 
(RDO) of Mahabubnagar District stated that almost all Pattedars accepted the compensation on 
a consent basis. The consent award to compensate the farmers was set at the Market Value 
(MV) + Solatium of 30% + Additional Market Value of 12% + 50% of the sum of these three 
components. They have also considered the natural and artificial structural developments on 
the displaced farmers’ lands. These include fruit bearing trees – mango, guava, pomegranate, 
tamarind, custard apple and timber trees, submersible pumps and open well pump rooms. The 
competent authorities: the Assistant Director (Horticulture), the Superintendent Engineer 
(Rural Water Supply and Sanitation), the Deputy Conservator (Forest) in government 
departments from the Mahabubnagar District calculated the prices for the structural 
developments.  
  
The value of the land was calculated based on specific categorization of lands. The land was 
categorized into A and B. Within category A, two sets of lands were demarcated: i) 
Garden/Irrigated Dry Lands and ii) Dry Lands. So also within the category B, two sets of lands 
were delineated: i) Garden/Irrigated Dry interior lands which were more than 2 km interior and 
ii) Interior Dry lands which were more than 2 km interior.  
  
Based on the above factors the compensation per acre of land for Pattedars was as follows28:  
Table 4.2: Compensation based on the category of land 
Category A Catergory B 
S.no  Type  of  
lands  
Compensation per 
acre in INR  
S.no  Type of lands  Compensation per 
 acre  in  
INR  
1.  Garden/Irr 
igated Dry  
75,000  1.  Garden/Irrigated  
Dry Interior  
65,000  
                                                          
28 The compensation figures provided in the table were calculated only on the Market Value (MV) + Solatium of 
30 percent + Additional Market Value of 12 percent + 50 percent of the sum of these three components only. The 
structural components were considered on individual basis and added to the compensation.  
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2.  Dry Land  60,000  2.  Interior Dry  50,000  
Source: APIIC [Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation] n.d.,  
  
The District Collector informed all the landowners and interested parties about the 
Government’s taking possession of their lands and invited them to claim compensation and file 
objections, if any, regarding the amount of compensation and land measurement, under sections 
9 and 10 of the Act. The public notice was published in the village on 29 November 2004. 
Notices to the individual Pattedars were also served. The Land Acquisition Officer made an 
enquiry into the objections filed by the landowners and interested parties on 27 December 2004. 
After the completion of the enquiry, the passing of the award was initiated and completed on 
25 January 2005.  
  
As per the official sources, most of the awards in Polepally village were ‘consent awards’ 
meaning people accepted the compensation as calculated above. Farmers were made to sign 
the consent award which contained the statement that they would not approach any court of 
law for ‘enhancement of compensation’. Enough time was taken by the Revenue administration 
to check whether there were other claimants for the land under acquisition. Having found that 
the land was not under any such litigation, the compensation was given to the original 
claimants. In the award enquiry, statements of no objections from Pattedars and the concerned 
were recorded. Out of the total Ac.420.25Gts. land acquired in Polepally, the consent was 
received for Ac.362.25Gts. and only five to 10 Pattedars did not give consent.  
  
Figure 4.1 [Award Declaration]  
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Sri. Nenavath Kishan S/O Bodya is the pattedar and in possession of Sy.No. (Survey Number) 
411(Ac. 3.00). In response to the notice issued U/Sec. ((1) and (10) of the LA Act, no one 
else claim or objection received for payment of compensation. The pattedar has given consent 
for payment of compensation @ Rs. 50,000/- per acre and he will not approach any Court of 
Law for enhancement of compensation U/Sec. 18/28 of LA Act. These lands come under 
Category-B (ii) for which Rs. 50000/- per acre fixed. Hence compensation for Ac.3.00Gts. 
comes to Rs. 150000. The Divisional Forest Officer (SF), Mahabubnagar has given the 
valuation for other trees Rs. 347/-.Hence, the total compensation amounting to Rs.  
150347/- is awarded in favour of Sr. Nenavath Kishan S/O Bodya.  
Source: APIIC [Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation] n.d.,  
  
Assigned land to an extent of Ac.276.23Gts. in Polepally and Ac32.23gts in Rajapur were 
handed over by the MRO, Jadcherla and Balanagar Mandals to the APIIC on 28 June 2003. 
Following the G.O. Ms No. 1307 Revenue Department dated 23 December 1993, authorities 
paid 18,000 per acre as ex-gratia to the assignees and took possession of the land. The assigned 
land in Polepally belonged to the farmers from the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and 
Backward Castes (Eenadu 26 April 2008).  
  
The land, as seen from the above, was identified for a GIP and the intent of land acquisition 
was for setting up green industrial units. However, the land in legal terms was acquired for a 
GC. The Jadcherla Growth Centre reports state that the central government allotted funds for 
the GC, which the AP government utilised for compensating the Patta landowners. The story 
did not end here. Rather, the Congress government, which came to power in 2004 May, ending 
the decade long rule of the TDP, earmarked a certain amount of land for setting up a 
pharmaceutical SEZ within the GIP. The government of AP has been setting up SEZs in the 
previously acquired land as with the case of Polepally SEZ and at the same time acquiring new 






4.4 The policy shift  
The CM of AP, Chandrababu Naidu, was part of the Indian delegation in the World Economic 
Forum annual meeting held at New York in February 2002. On the sidelines of the meeting, he 
addressed senior representatives of the US business community. He invited the business 
associates from the US to invest in AP developmental projects. He announced his government’s 
plan to set up a 9000-acre SEZ near Visakhapatnam in AP. Naidu assured the investors of the 
world class infrastructural and logistical facilities; water, power, transport, communication 
facilities and governmental assistance, to set up their business units in the SEZ (The Times of 
India 7 February 2002). Meanwhile, the State of AP formally adopted SEZ policy on 9 April 
2002 (Government of Andhra Pradesh [GoAP] 2002).  
  
Naidu went to Malaysia and Singapore in August 2002 and invited investments from the 
potential foreign investors to set up their units in the SEZs and other development projects in 
the State of AP (The Hindu 14 August 2002). AP has been a front-line State within India to 
implement market-oriented policies. It provided a congenial business environment as it aimed 
to attract a larger volume of investments (mainly private). This was particularly true during the 
TDP regime from 1995 to 2004. However, later Chief Minsters, YSR, Rosaiah and Kiran 
Kumar Reddy, all from Congress, continued with reform agendas more vigorously (Mooij 
2005, p. 1). Since the mid-1990s, AP became a leading investment destination for many 
domestic and global business firms.  
  
AP is not new to the SEZs as the Visakhapatnam SEZ has been in operation since 1994.29 With 
the announcement of SEZ policy in 2000, the State took a lead and started setting up SEZs 
across AP. The State government drafted a SEZ bill on the lines of the central SEZ Act in 2005, 
which is yet to receive presidential assent. (Government of Andhra Pradesh [GoAP] 2005b; 
The Statesman 10 August 2011). The SEZ programme was not affected due to the delay in the 
approval of the State draft SEZ bill. As of February 2012, there were 76 notified SEZs in AP 
and 37 operational SEZs, taking it to the top position in the country (Ministry of Commerce 
                                                          
29 Vishakhapatnam SEZ (VSEZ) earlier known as Vishakhapatnam EPZ (VEPZ) was set up in 1989. Due to some 
technical reasons, it became operational in 1994. After the SEZ policy was announced by the central government, 




and Industry, GoI 2012). AP has a large number of sector specific SEZs and among them, 
Information Technology (IT) and Information Technology Enabled Services (ITES) dominate 
the scene, followed by biotech and pharma SEZs. There are five multiproduct SEZs notified in 
AP (APIIC [Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation] n.d.,).  
  
The Polepally pharmaceutical SEZ with which the present study is concerned was notified in 
2007. The State of AP has been a hub of pharma and bulk drug manufacturing, processing and 
allied industrial services. The pharma drive in AP began with the establishment of Indian Drugs 
and Pharmaceutical Ltd (IDPL) in Hyderabad by the central government in 1961. The 
liberalisation policies adopted by India since the 1980s gave further impetus to this sector.  
  
The State of AP housed private pharmaceutical firms which include Dr. Reddys, Aurobindo, 
Hetero and several reputed national and multinational companies. Moreover, it is luckily 
backed by strong pharmaceutical research facilities. The Indian Institute of Chemical 
Technology (IICT), the Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology (CCMB), Centre for DNA 
Finger Printing and Diagnostics (CDFD), National Institute of Nutrition (NIN), and several 
medical colleges producing experts in the pharma field are in the State. The State has strong 
infrastructural facilities and a business climate conducive to the operations of the pharma 
related businesses. The Union government established Pharmaceuticals export promotion 
council (Pharmexcil) in Hyderabad in 2004 as a ‘gateway to global pharma trade’ (Industries 
and Commerce Department, GoAP 2010; Raju 2010). 
  
AP is the bulk drug capital of India for it manufactures one third of the total bulk drugs 
produced in India (UK Trade and Investment 2010). It ranks third in pharma formulations. In 
the recent times, the pharma industry in AP faced tough challenges due to an unfavourable 
policy environment. The BJP led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) announced a ‘New 
Industrial Package’ to the northern States of India in 2002-2003. Through this initiative, 
government provided 100 percent excise duty exemptions, tax holidays and several other 
incentives for industrial units in the northern States of Himachal Pradesh (HP), Uttarakhand 
and Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The package aimed to attract investments and promote 
industrialisation in the otherwise ‘difficult terrain of the hill states’ (The Tribune 19 November 
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2012). The central government as well as the concerned State governments exempted excise 
duty and other kinds of taxes on drugs in these states which led to huge advantages in lowering 
the production costs compared to pharma units located in other parts of India.  
  
As a consequence of the concession package, several pharmaceutical companies from across 
the country moved their production units to the northern States of Himachal Pradesh, Jammu 
and Kashmir and Uttarakhand to avail themselves of the tax benefits. Nearly 500 pharma units 
which include the big giants like Novartis, Pfizer, Wockhardt, Cipla, Lupin, Aristo, Nicholas 
Piramal, Cadila, Torrent, Dr Reddy’s, Natco and Aurobindo from Maharashtra, Gujarat and 
Andhra Pradesh migrated to the northern States (Business Standard 2 June 2005).  
  
The State of AP, which was hitherto the dominant player in the pharma industry, started losing 
its sheen. Several pharmaceutical companies migrated from the State to profitable hilly terrains 
of India. At least 40 leading pharma companies and several small companies from the State of 
AP shifted (either partially or fully) their production base to these states (Times of India 19 
September 2006).  
  
The mass exodus of the pharmaceutical companies from the traditionally strong pharma-based 
State of AP became a concern for the government. The State government brought this issue to 
the notice of the central government and requested the latter either to provide a tax incentive 
package on par with the northern States or discontinue the concessional package in the hill 
States (Human Rights Bulletin 2009). The central government did not heed the requests of the 
State government and continued with the concessional package to the northern States.  
  
The AP government, having realised the losses incurred owing to the migration of 
pharmaceutical units from the State to the northern States took advantage of the newly enacted 
SEZ Act. Following the guidelines of the Act, it sent proposals to the Union Ministry of 
Commerce for the approval of a few pharma SEZs in 2006. Out of the six notified pharma 
SEZs, 4 SEZs, including the pharmaceutical SEZ at Polepally, were notified during 2006-07. 
With this, the State to some extent expected to regain its status of a favoured destination for 
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national as well as global pharma companies. It began to lead in the exports of bulk drugs and 
formulations which accounted for about 50 percent of India’s total exports (Raju 2012).  
  
There are 23 formally approved pharmaceutical and chemical SEZs in India and out of these 
20 are notified. There are eight functional pharma and chemical SEZs in the country (Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry, GoI 2012). AP has a total of nine pharmaceutical SEZs developed 
by public, private and joint sectors. Out of these five are notified pharmaceutical SEZs. Dr 
Reddy’s Lab at Medak was notified on 24 April 2009. However, it applied for denotification 
in November 2011. The government considered the request and the decision to denotify the 
SEZ was approved by the inter-ministerial Board of Approval (BoA) on 28 November 2011. 
Two pharma SEZs received in-principle approval and one was formally approved. All the five 
notified SEZs have become operational. The Polepally SEZ was the only one developed by 
APIIC. Ramky pharma is a joint venture between APIIC and Ramky pharma. Six other pharma 
SEZs are either developed or being developed by the private developers. Only one pharma SEZ 
is being developed by Hyderabad Urban Development Authority (APIIC [Andhra Pradesh 
Industrial Infrastructure Corporation] n.d.,).  
  
The Congress government led by YSR in AP authorised the APIIC in charge of the industrial 
development, including the SEZs in the State, to set up an exclusive pharmaceutical SEZ in 
2006. Accordingly, APIIC earmarked 250 acres of land in GIP for this purpose. The APIIC 
stated that the migration of State-based pharmaceutical units to northern States owing to tax 
benefits created huge discontent among the pharmaceutical entrepreneurs. Since the 
concessional package to the northern states was to continue for 10 years, i.e., till 2013 (The 
Hindu 26 February 2010), the government of AP favoured the creation of sector specific 
pharma SEZ at Polepally in 2006.  
  
However, the conversion of the part of the GIP into a pharma SEZ caused unrest among the 
displaced farmers. The agitated farmers reasoned that government originally informed them 
that their land was needed for setting up a GIP. The government, during land acquisition in 
2003 assured of establishing agrarian related production units capable of providing 
employment to the displaced farmers suiting their skills. But the government changed the 
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purpose and planned for a pharmaceutical SEZ in which people with farming, horticultural and 
allied skills could not secure employment. Hence, displaced farmers began to oppose it and 
demanded their lands back (Andhra Jyothi 21 April 2007).  
  
4.5 Rethinking capital circuits  
The change in the project from a GIP to a SEZ without informing the people, as well as the 
meagre compensation paid to the farmers, in particular to the assignee landholders, stands in 
violation of the set legal canons. The means adopted to take possession of the lands from the 
farmers, in the form of allowing them to imagine a secured employment suited to their skills, 
and the use of the LAA to acquire land for private capital only demonstrated that liberalising 
India at the turn of the millennium unleashed a process of ABD, very much like that articulated 
by Harvey. Noting the resistance of farmers against the acquisition of their lands, the 
government used measures encompassing consent and coercion to calm their restive temper. 
When farmers contested the change in the project from a GIP to a pharma SEZ, the state, led 
by YSR oppressed their movement. In sum, the Polepally farmers were robbed of their basic 
means of subsistence to further capital accumulation.  
  
Harvey sees these forms of dispossession for SEZs in the developing world as a project driven 
by the global financial and credit agencies. This global project is undertaken to avert a capital 
crisis arising out of an overaccumulated capital in the core economies of the globe (mainly the 
US). The US government exercised decisive control over the global economy through the 
medium of finance capital in recent years. The credit to the needy nations was provided through 
the global financial institutions (such as the IMF) controlled by the US. These finance 
institutions allowed the US to bail out the developing economies in financial crisis on the 
condition that the latter open up their economies to the global markets of the world and all this 
only to overcome the surplus capital crisis of the core economies.  
  
In short, in Harvey’s terms, global monetary institutions like the IMF and the World Bank have 
influenced the economic development policies of the developing nations in the global south. 
The direction from these finance institutions is so powerful that the developing states have lost 
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the powers of executing their planned economic agenda. Rather, they began to facilitate the 
global finance institutions’ agenda.  
  
But as this process of implementing SEZ model of development in Polepally amply 
demonstrated, land acquisition is more an extra-economic process whereby the state, backed 
by its monopoly to use force (read subnational political agency here) played a key role in 
dispossessing the farmers of their land to facilitate capital accumulation. The idea of setting up 
a GIP was conceived based on a summit organised during the then US President Clinton’s visit 
to AP in 2001. The US business delegates in the summit declared to help AP promote 
industrialisation using green technologies and cleaner methods of production. The delegates of 
the two countries accordingly arrived at trade and investment cooperation. But who directed 
the conversion of a GIP into a pharma SEZ, green industrial units to polluting pharma 
companies, is a point to reckon with.  
  
Moreover, the farmers were misled by the State government back in 2001 at the time of the 
acquisition of their lands. An impression was created among the would-be dispossessed that 
industrial units capable of employing people with farming and allied skills would appear on 
their lands. They were promised jobs in the upcoming green industries and were assured a 
secured life for themselves and their families. The upcoming industrial hub on their lands 
would lead to all round development of the farmers and their region as well. This was not at all 
the case, even if the GIP were to come. The idea of green units in GIP was meant to set up 
industries (not necessarily horticultural or agricultural), which would use environmentally 
friendly technologies in production. Again, those green industries would be high-tech 
industries capable of employing only a skilled and professionally educated workforce with 
hardly any provision to provide employment to the people with farming backgrounds.  
  
Further, the decision to set up a SEZ deviating from the original plan was a decision of YSR’s 
government. At this juncture, when farmers resisted, YSR used force to silence them. The land 
acquisition began in 2001 and the SEZ came up in 2009 and that too in only 250 acres of land. 
The state apparatus used non-transparent and undemocratic means to acquire land. Hence, this 
should be conceived more as an extra-economic process whereby the subnational ‘political’ 
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agency’s acts caused dispossession of the marginalised and small farmers. It cannot be 
conceived as a case whereby the ‘political’ in the developing world succumbed to global 
capitalist imperatives. Given the above process of land acquisition, it is not hard to sense 
whether the ABD in Polepally is a result of a top-down capital approach or an extra-economic 
process carried out by the subnational-level political agency, backed by ideology of 
development and coercive apparatus of the state as well.  
4.6 Conclusion  
The story of Polepally SEZ began with the idea of setting up a Green Industrial Park in the 
village. While the label of GIP remained intact, the acquisition of land in legal terms was done 
in the name of Growth Centre, a central government scheme aimed at fostering industrialisation 
of backward areas. The land acquisition notifications for this purpose were issued during the 
tenure of Chandrababu Naidu of TDP as CM. The compensation award was passed in 2005 by 
the YSR government of Congress that came to power in 2004. The YSR government, taking 
advantage of the newly enacted SEZ, transformed the 250 acres of land within the GIP into a 
pharmaceutical formulation SEZ in 2006. Farmers were driven from their basic means of 
subsistence. But this dispossession was not led by global capitalist agency and the drivers of 
dispossession were subnational-level political-economic factors. The farmers of Polepally 




Chapter 5: Political contestation in a SEZ 
  
On 5 May 2008, the election authorities issued by-election notifications for the four 
Parliamentary and 18 Assembly seats in Andhra Pradesh (AP). All four Parliamentary and 16 
assembly seats (out of 18) fell vacant with the resignation of Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) 
Parliamentarians and legislators over the issue of separate Statehood for Telangana30. Two 
assembly seats had to go to the polls with the demise of the sitting members. Earlier, the 
Congress Party entered into a pre-poll alliance with the TRS and won the 2004 AP Assembly 
and Parliamentary elections. The pre-poll alliance in the 2004 elections was based on the 
condition that the Congress Party leadership at the centre in coordination with the State 
Congress leaders would carve out the State of Telangana, if voted to power. The Congress 
formed government in AP and the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Congress 
came to power at the centre as well.  
  
After coming to power, the Congress government dilly-dallied over the formation of a separate 
State of Telangana. Following this, the TRS broke its alliance with the Congress and its 
members resigned. Consequently, the May 2008 by-elections in AP were politically construed 
as a ‘referendum’ on the Telangana issue. While the ruling Congress fought on the plank of 
development, the opposition TDP highlighted the failure of the Congress government to 
provide good governance. But the farmers who contested the Jadcherla Assembly constituency 
in the Mahabubnagar District had a quite different agenda from that of the other Political Parties 
in the State.  
  
Thirteen farmers together from the Polepally village contested the Jadcherla Assembly 
constituency. Although none of them could win, they let the TRS and TDP candidates be 
defeated in the polls and thereby reduced the percentage of votes of the Congress Party 
candidate. Fifteen farmers later also contested the Mahabubnagar Parliamentary constituency 
in the 2009 May general elections. Who were these farmers and why did they jointly contest 
                                                          
30 ‘Telangana’ is a region in the State of AP. The State of AP was formed in 1956 with the merger of 10 Districts 
of Telangana with nine Coastal Andhra and four Rayalaseema Districts. There have been several agitations over 
last five decades for the creation of a separate State of Telangana. The movement has been led for the past ten 
years by the TRS Party.  
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the same Jadcherla Assembly seat and Mahabubnagar Parliamentary seat? What was their 
agenda? Did they aspire to political careers, leaving their traditional occupation and main 
source of livelihood, farming? These questions can be answered by going back and forth 
through the electoral contest and through mapping the people’s resistance against the decision 
of the government to set up a pharmaceutical SEZ in Polepally.  
  
This chapter maps the Polepally farmers’ debates, discourse and actions expressed through the 
resistance movement organised against a particular model of industrial development. The 
farmers’ protest against the government’s decision to set up a pharmaceutical SEZ on their 
fertile lands is detailed in seven sections. Section 1 sketches the key contentious issues 
pertaining to SEZs in India in general and Polepally in particular. Section 2 portrays the initial 
movement against the land acquisition for the Green Industrial Park (GIP)31 and accounts for 
the delayed popular response. It also provides details pertaining to the decision of the State 
industrial corporation (APIIC) to allot a portion of the land for a SEZ within the GIP.  
  
The various events, incidents, meetings, demonstrations and efforts of the farmers during the 
Polepally SEZ struggle to force the government to denotify the SEZ are detailed in Sections 3 
to 6. Section 3 describes the events encompassing the organised farmers’ struggle in the wake 
of the YSR government’s decision to set up a pharmaceutical SEZ in Polepally. Section 4 
details how the displaced farmers adopted a novel way to convey the people across the state of 
AP the cause celebre of their decision to contest 2008 by-election to the Jadcherla Assembly 
constituency in which Polepally village is located. The fifth section envelops the intensified 
struggle of the dispossessed farmers in Polepally after the completion of the by-election to the 
Jadcherla Assembly Constituency. The sixth section details how farmers once again resorted 
to the formal democratic means by contesting 2009 Parliamentary election to the 
Mahabubnagar Constituency. The farmers’ contested in 2009 to make the nation know the 
implications of the SEZ model of development to the farmers of Polepally and the injustice 
done to them by the YSR government. It also outlines the YSR government’s response to 
                                                          
31 The land was originally identified by the TDP government in 2001 for setting up a GIP comprising of green 
industrial units in Polepally village. The land acquisition notifications were issued for the same in 2002-03. The 
Congress government that came to power in 2004 May completed the compensation process, technically called 
the ‘award enquiry’, in 2005. However, there was no industrial activity in the GIP till the last quarter of 2006. In 
September 2006, the government decided to process a pharmaceutical SEZ within the GIP.  
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Polepally SEZ struggle. Section 7 demonstrates how the political management of the dissent 
and politics around controversial land-based development projects, in AP and India, contravene 
Harvey’s notion of forming a coalition of different struggles (proletarian and non-proletarian) 
against capitalist and imperialist forms of exploitation. The purpose is to map how the key 
stakeholders understood, debated and acted in the context of the adoption and implementation 
of the Polepally SEZ project and the primacy of political management of the dissent.  
  
5.1 The contentious issues  
The diversion of land (private, government and common lands), particularly the fertile agrarian 
lands, for SEZ-type industrialisation in India became a contentious issue. The acquisition of 
land and related issues arising thereof for SEZs attracted huge popular, civil, social and political 
discontent in various parts of the country.32 The Information Technology/Information 
Technology enabled Services (IT/ITES) SEZs amounts to 60 percent of the total formally 
approved SEZs in India. These SEZs require only 10 hectares of land. They are located by and 
large in urban and sub-urban regions. Hence not much resistance is noted against these SEZs. 
But the farmland acquisition, for the purposes of town size multiproduct SEZs, large size sector 
specific SEZs, and, for any such development projects, invariably invoke the issues of 
livelihood, compensation, resettlement and rehabilitation, environment destruction, 
compensation to the sharecroppers, and the landless agricultural labour. The reason for the 
emergence of these as ‘key concerns’ in most cases has been attributed to the gross violation 
of existing policies by the state or private corporate entities in alliance with the concerned 
government. The central and State governments increasingly ignored these important issues 
affecting the lives of the rural populace in the name of growth and development, notably since 
the 1990s.  
  
Rural unrest and violent movements against the state have been inevitable fallouts of SEZ-type 
developmental models in contemporary India. The resistance movements challenged the 
                                                          
32 Although the diversion of fertile agrarian land for SEZs attracted huge popular ire, the economic feasibility of 
the SEZ scheme has also been debated in India. While some believe in its ability to promote economic growth 
and development, others argue that it would create economic distortion and are found unnecessary in an already 
liberalised economy. On the economic rationale of SEZs see: Aggarwal (2004; 2006; 2012); Gopalakrishnan 
(2010) and Seshadri (2011b).  
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contemporary liberal democratic political landscape of India at central and State levels. Often, 
the state resorted to violence to curb these protests. In a case or two, the projects were shifted, 
scrapped or continued with few policy changes. For instance, the Tata automobile project in 
Singur of West Bengal shifted to Gujarat; the proposed Nandigram chemical hub SEZ in West 
Bengal was scrapped; and SEZs in Goa were denotified.  
  
As a response to the people’s ire, the UPA government revised the SEZ policy. The SEZ area 
is divided into a processing and non-processing area. The minimum processing area, wherein 
manufacturing and processing goods and services takes place within the SEZ, initially was 
pegged at 25 percent. Later it was raised to 50 percent of the total acquired land. The rest of 
the 50 percent of the land under the non-processing area can still be used for schools, buildings, 
amusement parks, hotels and, in short, for real estate purposes. A ceiling of 5000 hectares of 
land for multiproduct SEZs was placed against the earlier policy of no cap on the amount of 
land for SEZs.  
  
The government also announced non-involvement of the state in acquiring the land and banned 
fertile land acquisition for SEZs. Most of these policy changes occurred in 2007 owing to the 
stiff resistance by the farmers across the country. The UPA government’s decision to revise 
SEZ policy can be attributed mainly to the success of the Nandigram peasant resistance. The 
farmers of the Nandigram fought against the West Bengal’s left government’s decision to allow 
the Indonesian multinational company, Selim group, to set up a chemical hub SEZ on their 
fertile lands (Shrivastava and Kothari 2012; Jenkins 2011).  
  
Despite these policy revisions and a temporary moratorium on SEZs owing to popular pressure 
in a few cases, several State governments continued with the SEZ projects with a promise to 
enhance compensation, better rehabilitation and resettlement measures, provide job cards and 
the like in many States. This has been the case particularly in the State of AP. It should be noted 
here that the State of AP as of July 2013 tops the list of both the notified and operational SEZs 
in India. It has 78 notified SEZs of the total 392 and 39 exporting SEZs (operational/functional) 




While the whole country was outraged at the SEZ policy, the State government went on with 
its proposed and new SEZ projects unhindered. Despite a negative popular response, there has, 
so far, never been a single instance of a SEZ project being scrapped or shifted. The Polepally 
SEZ stands testimony to this. The focus of the movement against Polepally SEZ was over the 
loss of fertile farmland, livelihood, inadequate and unjust compensation, delayed project 
implementation, improper rehabilitation and resettlement measures, environmental concerns 
and above all directed at the extra-economic means adopted by the State government to favour 
private corporate business entities.  
  
5.2 Origins and the delayed popular response  
Farmers in Polepally were against parting with their land right from the start of the land 
acquisition process for GIP in 2001. They blocked the national highway in 2003 and 
demonstrated in front of the State Legislative Assembly in 2004 against the forcible land 
acquisition (Asher 2008; Prashanth Reddy 2009). However, most of these protests were in bits 
and pieces and not well organised. The serious struggle in Polepally originated with the 
decision of the government in the last quarter of 2006 to earmark 250 acres of land for a pharma 
SEZ within the GIP. The movement gained momentum when the construction was initiated to 
house pharma units in 2007. But why people did not resist at the time of land acquisition itself 
is a crucial question and warrants some detailing. The delayed resistance to the Polepally SEZ 
project can be understood from two dimensions as explained below.  
  
Popular resistance during the time of land acquisition was minimal. This was because 
government assured the farmers that it would set up a GIP comprising of industrial units 
capable of employing people with agricultural and horticultural skills. They were lured by the 
guarantee of secured employment. Even then, they would have refused to part with their lands 
but were in a helpless situation as agricultural production was also in distressing conditions.  
  
The Chandra Babu Naidu-led Telugu Desam Party (TDP) government’s reform-oriented 
policies had disastrous effects on the agrarian communities in AP. His government promoted 
cash crops, followed disinvestment policies in agriculture, reduced institutional credit, removed 
input subsidies such as for seeds and fertilisers, adopted a pattern of water consuming crop 
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production, lacked proper regulatory mechanism to control wastage of water, reduced 
irrigational facilities and the like, resulting in the huge agrarian crisis from 2000 to 2005.  
  
During Naidu’s tenure as CM, farmers were left to purchase agricultural inputs such as seeds 
and fertilisers from the market. Access to the surface water in AP also became a problem owing 
to the decline in the public investment, regional disparities in spending and the like. Therefore, 
farmers in most parts of the countryside of AP began to doubt the ‘economic viability of 
farming as a productive activity’ even in the short run, let alone its ‘sustainability over time’. 
Several farmers committed suicide, making the agrarian crisis in AP a national issue to be heard 
by the otherwise jaded ears of the central government (Chandra Sekhar and Ghosh 2004; 
Mahendra Dev 2007). The lack of prospects for agriculture, synchronous with the 
government’s promise to create industries capable of employing people with agricultural skills, 
sealed the fates of Polepally farmers forever.  
  
Another reason for delayed resistance could be attributed to the fact that, until the end of 2006, 
there were no plans for setting up a SEZ. During the ‘Green Business Summit 2005’ held in 
December at Hyderabad, the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and the government of AP, 
in the presence of top international dignitaries from the World Resource Institute and 
USAID/India program, reinforced the idea of setting up of ‘green industrial units’ GIP at 
Jadcherla. The major industries minister in the inaugural session assured the entrepreneurs 
interested in setting up the green units that ‘state government would closely associate with and 
support the initiatives in the areas of environment, efficiency, green buildings, water 
management and renewable energy’ (Business Standard 9 December 2005). The Minister 
released a ‘marketing brochure for GIP at the inaugural two-day Green Business Summit’ and 
invited the companies to set up their units in the GIP (The Hindu Business Line 9 December 
2005). The government also assured the units of tax and various other incentives. Such were 
the government plans until December 2005.  
  
The YSR-led Congress government could not attract green industrial units into the GIP despite 
their advertising about it in the 2005 Green Business Summit. Meanwhile, the central SEZ Act 
2005, along with its rules, came into effect in February 2006. The pharmaceutical industry in 
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the State was also in a state of distress and several of these units migrated to profitable northern 
States for the reasons explained in the previous chapter. The government then decided to set 
up an exclusive pharma SEZ within a short time. The AP government thought the best possible 
site to propose a pharmaceutical SEZ was the ‘GIP’ as the land was already in its possession.  
  
As per the YSR government’s directives, the APIIC’s chairman had submitted a proposal on 9 
September 2006 to the union ministry of commerce for the approval of the SEZ in Polepally. 
B.P. Acharya, the then Managing Director (MD) and the Vice Chairman (VC) of APIIC, stated 
that ‘Aurobindo and Hetero pharma companies expressed their willingness to be the anchor 
clients in the proposed pharma formulations SEZ’ (The Hindu Business Line 19 September 
2006). Ministry of Commerce and Industry [GoI] through its Letter No. F.2/527/2006-SEZ 
dated 27 October 2006 granted ‘formal approval’ to the proposed sector specific SEZ at 
Polepally (APIIC [Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation] n.d.)33. Following 
this, the Aurobindo and Hetero pharmaceutical firms applied for 75 acres of land for each to 
set up their units in the proposed pharma SEZ at Polepally on 17 November 2006. The MD of 
APIIC signed the letter of in-principle approval on the same day allotting 75 acres of land at 
the rate of 7 lakhs per acre, bypassing the legal procedure. The price fixation committee of 
APIIC fixed the cost of each acre of land at about 20 lakhs in GIP (The Asian Age 1 April 
2012).  
  
The central government through its notification dated 13 June 2007 notified the Polepally SEZ. 
The news of a pharma SEZ created huge discontent among the displaced farmers and villagers 
in Polepally. The government never informed them of a SEZ let alone a polluting 
pharmaceutical SEZ. The popular anguish culminated into an organised movement against the 
government’s revised policy decision to set up a SEZ. The following section maps the various 
activities undertaken by the people and their supporters to force the government to go back on 
their revised decision of setting up a SEZ.  
5.3 Farmers protest against the policy changes  
                                                          
33 I have obtained APIIC records on Polepally SEZ using the Right to Information Act 2005.  
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Drawing on the SEZ-type industrial movements in India, Jones (2008) held that India’s 
democracy is thriving in the sense of an ‘engaged citizenry’. He particularly focussed on 
Nandigram (SEZ) and Singur (not a SEZ) movements and stated that they not only influenced 
the SEZ-type industrial movements across India but also caused the State and central 
governments to amend several provisions of SEZ policy. These policy revisions particularly 
concerned the land acquisition, rehabilitation and resettlement issues. Jones (2008, p. 68), 
similarly to Harvey (2005), contended that the ‘forces of economic globalization are severely 
curtailing democratic institutions and values in many countries across the world’. However, he 
concluded that India’s democracy has a ‘heart beat’ and ‘anti SEZ movements across the 
country illustrates that the country’s citizens will not give up their democratic values without 
a fight’ (Jones 2008, p. 68). There seems to be a combination of formal and substantive 
democratic practices at play in the Polepally movement. Regardless of the success or failure of 
a movement, certainly the Polepally anti SEZ movement can be a case for the deepening of 
democracy. The following sections are a descriptive, detailed, and chronological account of the 
Polepally anti-SEZ movement.  
  
The Polepally movement began in an organised way only with the news of the setting up of a 
pharmaceutical SEZ. Displaced farmers, concerned village citizenry, individual activists, 
human right groups, political parties and media actively participated in the people’s movement 
against the SEZ. The few prominent people to raise the issue at first were Upender Reddy, the 
Deputy Sarpanch34 of Polepally, Madhu Kagula, an individual activist and Sujatha Surepally, 
women’s and Dalit’s rights activist.  
  
Upender Reddy came to know in 2006 that the land acquired for GIP was being converted into 
a SEZ. He was a resident of Polepally and did not lose land towards the SEZ. Yet, as a 
committed citizen and a political representative, he explained to the farmers the negative 
consequences of setting up a pharma SEZ in their village. The government officials thought he 
was creating hurdles for the upcoming pharma projects and filed cases against him. He was 
arrested and had to attend Court at Shadnagar in this regard. He died on 17 June 2007. His 
                                                          
34 Sarpanch is the head of the village Panchayat, a local self-governing institution at village level. Deputy Sarpanch 
assists the Sarpanch of the village in various political, administrative, financial and welfare activities.  
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mother said that he always fought for the sake of the farming community of his village, whose 
lands were forcibly acquired by the government. He never had any health-related problems and 
his death shocked her. On one Sunday, he attended a meeting on land-related issues in 
Polepally. Next day, he died. He died under ‘mysterious conditions’ fighting for the people 
affected by the SEZ (Eenadu 26 April 2008).  
  
Madhu Kagula, an activist associated with people’s organisations and NGOs, has been working 
for the cause of social, political and human rights of the Dalits, Tribals and socially 
disadvantaged groups. He is a postgraduate in social work and was the co-convenor for 
Telangana Vidyavnthula Vedika (TVV) in Mahabubnagar District35. He came to know about 
the plight of the Polepally farmers turning into labourers in their own lands in December 2006. 
He actively associated himself with the displaced farmers in their struggle against the Polepally 
SEZ and helped them throughout their struggle. Sujatha Surepally joined the movement in early 
2008 and stood with the Polepally farmers in their struggle against the SEZ.  
  
The Department Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce in its 83rd Report,  
(2007) ‘on the functioning of Special Economic Zones (SEZs)’ took note of ‘the unrest among 
farmers on the issue of acquisition of agricultural land’.38 It constituted a sub-committee to 
discuss with the farmers on the same issue. The sub-committee visited the State of AP from 11 
to 16 February 2007 and held discussions with the representatives of the farmers and State 
government officials. The sub-committee also visited the Polepally site on 12 February 2007 
and interacted with the farmers (Department Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on 
Commerce 2007).  
                                                          
35 Telangana Vidyavanthula Vedika or TVV reads in English as Telangana Scholars Forum. This forum organised 
meetings for creating awareness among the Telangana people on the importance of separate Statehood for 
Telangana.  
38 Seventeen Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committees such as ‘Committee on Commerce’, and 
‘Committee on Agriculture’, were created in 1993. Seven more such Committees were added in 2004. Out of the 
existing 24, eight Committees function under the jurisdiction of the Chairman, Rajya Sabha and 16 under the 
jurisdiction of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha. Each committee has 10 members from the Rajya Sabha and 21 
members from Lok Sabha. These Committees are constituted every year and are entrusted to submit reports on 




The villagers told the members of the sub-committee that the AP government coerced them to 
part with their land 7-8 years previously for the creation of a GIP comprising of green industrial 
units. The compensation was paid much lower than the market rates prevailing at that time. 
The villagers argued, before the committee members, that the proposal to set up a SEZ in the 
place of a GIP led to a huge hike in the land rates. They were not able to purchase land given 
the real estate speculation. Hence in the present conditions, they should be given compensation 
at the present market rates uniformly, irrespective of whether land was adjacent to the main 
road or away from it. The farmers informed the sub-committee that the assigned land possessed 
by the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) of Polepally village was also 
acquired by the government by paying just ₹18,000 per acre as compensation. They requested 
the committee to compensate the assignees adequately for loss of their livelihood and shelter. 
The committee members assured the farmers that they would place it before the Prime Minister 
(PM). They would suggest and recommend to the PM to devise measures for the enhancement 
of compensation to the SEZ victims of Polepally (Department Related Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on Commerce 2007).  
  
Even before the villagers’ plea to enhance compensation and offer proper rehabilitation 
measures reached the PM, the pharma companies in Polepally started construction activities in 
a big way. Farmers began to question the APIIC authorities as to how the land acquired to set 
up a GIP was allotted to polluting pharma companies at much higher rates than what was paid 
to the farmers. They collectively decided to obstruct the construction activities until justice was 
done to them. This led the police to enter the scene and file cases against the protestors. After 
few days, these people were also sent to the police station (Andhra Jyothi 21 April 2007). The 
Parliamentary Committee’s visit to Polepally made it clear to the world as to what type of 
companies were going to come into the GIP.  
  
A fact-finding committee of Telangana Vidyavantula Vedika (TVV) visited Polepally on 25 
March 2007. The members of the committee included Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties 
Committee (APCLC) State leaders Prof. G. Haragopal, Prof. Vanamala, Telangana Journalist 
Forum (TJF) leaders Palle Ravi Kumar and K. Prasad, TVV State convenor Sridhar Deshpande, 
TVV Mahabubnagar District Convenor Maddileti, Co-convenor Madhu Kagula, TVV member 
Yadagiri, Polepally Sarpanch – Balaswamy Goud, and Mudireddypally Sarpanch, Buchha 
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Reddy. Farmers and villagers from Polepally expressed their concerns before the committee. 
The main grievances of the land losers were forcible land acquisition, meagre compensation, 
categorisation of land based on its location, and only ₹18,000 ex-gratia towards assigned land. 
They said the decision to set up a SEZ resulted in their dispossession from land, livelihood, 
familial ties, and ultimately life itself. The committee led by Prof. Haragopal observed that the 
State acted like a realtor as it procured land from farmers paying very little compensation and 
sold to the companies at much higher prices. Prof Haragopal demanded that government should 
realise its mistakes and provide ‘land for land’ in compensation to the dispossessed people of 
Polepally (Andhra Jyothi 26 March 2007).  
  
Based on the committee’s suggestions, the TVV submitted a memorandum to the District 
Collector pointing out the gross violation of policies in the acquisition of land and pleaded to 
rectify it by providing proper compensation and rehabilitation measures (Andhra Jyothi 30 
March 2007). TVV organized a seminar with the theme ‘Scrapping of SEZs’ on the eve of 
Ambedkar’s 117th birthday in Mahabubnagar. Prof Haragopal, Prof Vanamala, Prof. Kodanda 
Ram and Dr. Y.B. Sathyanarayana were the main speakers at the seminar. Farmers who lost 
their fertile land from Polepally and also other parts of the District attended the seminar. The 
seminar questioned the dubious nature of the government that promised, on the one hand, land 
distribution to the poor and on the other hand displaced them of their land through the SEZ 
model of development. Prof G. Haragopal argued that land is one’s own rightful possession 
and main source of subsistence. Hence displaced farmers should be compensated with land for 
land (Andhra Jyothi 15 April 2007).  
  
The above were the initial events organised by TVV involving intellectuals, academia, civil 
society groups and human rights forums. Meanwhile, farmers supported by TVV and human 
rights activists began to organise themselves and started obstructing the construction activities 
at the Polepally SEZ site. Madhu Kagula went along with farmers and submitted petitions to 
the Collector detailing the grievances of farmers. He involved Gram Panchayat leaders and 
held meetings on a regular basis involving the SEZ victims.36 As most of the villagers were not 
                                                          
36 Gram Panchayat is a basic institution of governance at the village level of the three-tier local self-government 
structure in India and AP. The other two levels of the three-tier administrative system (Panchayati Raj System) 
are Mandal Parishad at the Mandal (intermediary) level and Zilla Parishad at the District level in AP. Gram 
Panchayat consists of 5-21 members depending on the population of the village. These members are elected from 
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educated, they did not know how to write letters and whom they should address. This caused 
the villagers to emphasise Madhu’s presence in the whole movement. Madhu Kagula, a law 
postgraduate in Social Work, worked in several Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) as a 
District Coordinator in Mahabubnagar. He organised the affected farmers and the concerned 
villagers under the banner, ‘Polepally SEZ Vyathireka Aikya Sanghatana’ (Polepally Anti-SEZ 
United Forum [PASUF]). The main demands of PASUF and the farmers were the cessation of 
the Polepally pharma SEZ; giving back the acquired land to the farmers; compensation for the 
loss of crops since the time of land notification; a judicial enquiry into the illegal land 
acquisition by a Supreme Court Judge; and to repeal the SEZ Act (polepallywordpress.com).  
  
With the rehabilitation and resettlement packages becoming merely a mirage, farmers under 
the banner of PASUF intensified their struggle. As part of the struggle, they organised several 
meetings, demonstrations and protests.  
  
On 20 April 2008, a meeting was organised to express solidarity to the Polepally anti-SEZ 
struggle in Sundarayya Vignana Kendram37. Displaced farmers from Polepally attended the 
meet. Several people from human rights and people’s organisations heard the plight of the 
farmers and vowed to help them in their struggle against the state. The farmers announced here 
their next move of ‘contesting elections’ in the May 2008 Assembly by-elections. The convenor 
of the PASUF, Madhu Kagula, announced that farmers had taken this decision to explain to the 
world about the deprivation caused by the SEZ model of development. Madhu Kagula also 
informed the participants that a large meeting in Polepally would be organised on 15 May 2008 
to express solidarity to the farmers contesting the upcoming by-elections. Social activist, 
Medha Patkar, revolutionary singer, Gaddar and Kakinada anti-SEZ leaders were expected to 
take part in the meeting (Eenadu 21 April 2008).  
                                                          
the wards of a village. These members in turn elect their head, ‘Sarpanch’. Reservation of seats for the SCs, STs, 
women and marginalised sections has been provided. A Gram Panchayat is constituted when a village has a 
population of 500 with the age to exercise their franchise. The Panchayat is accountable to ‘Gram Sabha’, which 
is a general body of villagers consisting of all the adult citizens. Convening of Gram Sabhas at least twice a year 
has been legally mandated.  
37 Sundarayya Vignana Kendram (SVK), translated as Sundarayya Knowledge Centre, is a famous library 
managed by Sundarayya Vignana Kendra Trust in Hyderabad. This library was established in the year 1988 in 
memory of the late Shri Putchalapalli Sundarayya, a great freedom fighter and a well-known Communist. The 
library has a seminar hall and an air-conditioned auditorium to hold seminars and conferences.  
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A fact-finding panel of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee (APCLC) visited 
Polepally on 27 April 2008. The eight-member fact-finding panel was led by the APCLC joint 
secretary, D. Suresh Kumar. The committee asked the farmers why they were agitating six 
years after their lands were acquired. To this the villagers replied that the agitation began in 
2002. But, the Revenue authorities coerced villagers to part with their lands. They refused the 
compensation, but officials threatened them with dire consequences. When farmers protested, 
cases were filed against them. The displaced farmers pointed out that all the Political Parties 
were coming to the village in order to secure votes in the coming by-election to the Jadcherla 
constituency. They firmly held that since political leaders destroyed their livelihood, lives and 
habitat, they decided not to allow these leaders to enter their village. In the coming elections, 
they would not vote for any Party (Eenadu 28 April 2008; The Hindu 28 April 2008).  
  
Aggrieved farmers stated that they were bereft of a place to bury their dead as even their burial 
grounds were acquired for the SEZ. The committee held that the Polepally SEZ establishment 
process indicated that the government is anti-poor and did not stick to the policy provisions of 
employment guarantees, proper rehabilitation measures and the like. The panel confirmed that 
42 farmers died in Polepally due to loss of the land which was the source of their self-respect 
and dignity in the society, besides being the only source of subsistence. The panel demanded 
scrapping of the pharma SEZ (Eenadu 28 April 2008; The Hindu 28 April 2008).  
  
Polepally farmers under the leadership of BJP Kisan Morcha (BJP Farmers Front) seized the  
Collector’s chamber on 28 April 2008 demanding that their lands be given back to them. 
Misleading the police, they encircled the Collector’s chamber. Soon the police arrived and 
exchanged words with the agitating farmers and the BJP Kisan Morcha leaders. As the situation 
became tense, Collector Usha Rani came out to control the situation. She informed the agitating 
members that the compensation was given considering the market rates prevalent at the time 
of acquisition. In 2003, she pointed out, the land prices in the Polepally village were very low. 
However, she promised to come to Polepally after the completion of by-elections and take 
necessary steps. With this assurance, farmers called off the agitation and submitted a 
memorandum with their demands: land resumption to the Polepally victims, enhanced 
compensation, and compensation to the families of people who died due to the frustration 
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created by SEZ. The National level Kisan Morcha Member, Dr. Shouri, and the District level 
president, Yadigiri, participated in this agitation (Eenadu 29 April 2008).  
  
On 28 April 2008, the SEZ affected farmers demonstrated before the Tahsildar’s38 office in 
Jadcherla. Mr. Vidya Bhushan Rawat, member, Social Development Foundation (SDF), 
Sujatha Surepally, Dalit Bahujan Women Leader and Madhu Kagula joined the protesting 
farmers. V.B. Rawat, who came to represent SDF, led the demonstration. He told the press that 
SEZs loot the same way as the East India trading company did in colonial India. He stressed 
the necessity to form anti SEZ alliances across the country and start a movement against SEZs. 
Sujatha Surepally said that they would organise a state-wide movement starting from Polepally 
with mainly women participants to teach a lesson to the political leaders. Madhu Kagula 
demanded the scrapping of polluting pharma industries as they have the potential to pollute the 
entire Palamooru (Mahabubnagar) District. He, along with the farmers, submitted a 
memorandum to scrap the SEZ project. He also said that they would submit petitions to the 
Central Environmental Ministry, Union Commerce Ministry and various concerned ministries 
seeking justice for the Polepally displaced farmers (Eenadu 29 April 2008).  
  
Bandaru Dattatreya, BJP’s senior leader from the State of AP, wrote a letter dated 28 April 
2008 to the Union Commerce Minster, Kamal Nath, explaining the misuse of the purpose for 
which the land was originally acquired in Polepally. He highlighted the indictment of the 
Comptroller and Auditor General’s (CAG) 2007 report on the performance of government 
companies, with particular reference to Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation 
(APIIC), in AP. He demanded that either the same land should be given back to the people or 
the same amount of land be provided elsewhere. If these measures were not possible, then the 
government should pay them compensation taking into consideration the existing market rates 
(Eenadu 29 April 2008).  
  
                                                          
38 A Tahsildar is an administrative officer of Gazetted rank and heads the Mandal (intermediary level in the three-
tier administrative structure in AP). He deals with the land administration and looks after the various welfare 
measures at the Mandal level. He assists the District Collector.  
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Mysoora Reddy, Rajya Sabha39 Member from the TDP, raised the issue of violations of rules 
in setting up of SEZs in AP. He alleged that the allotment process of SEZs lack transparency. 
SEZs are being used for converting black money into white and for real-estate purposes by a 
few political and business elites. He raised these issues in a discussion held on the workings of 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry on 29 April 2008. He made quid-pro-quo allegations 
against the CM of AP, YS Rajasekhara Reddy. He said the CM allotted SEZs to Hetero, 
Aurobindo, Ramky and Trident in Polepally, Vizag and other places, violating the rules. In 
return, these firms together invested in Jagan’s (YSR’s son) Jagati Publications. In fact, they 
purchased Jagati Publications’ share worth ₹10 at ₹350 each (Eenadu 30 April 2008).  
  
5.4 Seeking recourse to formal democracy: The 2008 by-election  
Led by the convenor of PASUF, ten Polepally farmers filed their nominations on 9 April 2008 
to the Jadcherla Assembly constituency by-election to be held on 29 and 30 May 2008. As most 
of the candidates were from SC and ST castes, the returning officer asked them to submit caste 
certificates. To this the farmers said they did not possess these certificates as of then and paid 
Rs.5000 towards the nomination fee. They later held a protest before the Mandal Praja 
Development Office (MPDO) at Jadcherla. They said the main intention was to explain to the 
people about the ways in which this government behaved towards the poor and marginalised. 
Three more people filed nominations later and by 19 May the nominations were completed. 
The main aim of the ‘Polepally 13’ was not to win the elections but to draw the attention of the 
people in the State to their problems created by SEZ (Eenadu 10 May 2008).  
  
The SEZ victims wanted to make the world realise that the government had created their plight 
by forcibly acquiring their lands to set up a pharma SEZ. They contested for and not against 
one another to make people cognizant of the losses they incurred due to the displacement. They 
held a common manifesto of defeating the major political parties in fray. They agreed with 
each other on the trauma created by the SEZ. They intended to showcase, to the world beyond 
Polepally, their problems caused by the ruling Congress government’s embrace of SEZ-type 
development policies. (Sainath 2008a).  
                                                          
39 Rajya Sabha is the upper house of the Indian Parliament.  
129 
 
The farmers launched their campaign together formally on 17 May 2008 with begging bowls 
in their hands from Koverammapet village cattle market. They begged the people to vote for 
them as well as provide money to meet their electoral expenses. The initial plan was to file 200 
nominations but many of them, being poor, could not pay the ‘security deposit’, Rs.5000. While 
10 were the affected farmers, another three from neighbouring villages joined to support the 
cause. All thirteen of them contested the elections under the auspices of PASUF. Two oustees, 
Mudavati Chandi from Gundlagadda Thanda and Udandapoor Pentaiah from Polepally, entered 
the electoral fray on behalf of Bharatiya Kisan Morcha (BKS) (The Hindu 19 May 2008). The 
list of the 13 Polepally SEZ victim candidates along with their poll symbols is as follows:  
  
Table 5.1: Candidates and Symbols, 2008 by-election to the Jadcherla Assembly constituency  
Name of the Candidate  Symbol  
Mogulamma  Brick  
Satyamma  Almirah  
Mala Jangilamma  Torch Light  
Yetti China Venkaiah  Black Board  
Yetti Lingaiah  Gas Cylinder  
Kandoori Kurmaiah  Bread  
Bachamgari Seenaiah Goud  Fan  
Depally Yadaiah  Banana  
Kandoori Narasaiah  Bangles  
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Yetti Srinivaslu  Basket  
Harijan Danakaiah  Camera  
G. Gopal Krishna  Axe  
Ravula Kistaiah  Bat  
Source: Polepally Anti-SEZ United Forum [PASUF] 2008  
  
The ‘Swadeshi Jagaran Manch (SJM)’ team visited Polepally on 17 May 2008.40 Polepally 
farmers, talking to the members of SJM stated that they wanted the CM of AP come to their 
village and check whether the lands acquired for SEZ were fertile or dry/barren lands. The SJM 
team comprised mainly of the SJM AP State Co-convenor, Srinath, SJM State Secretary, 
Ramakrishna Kulkarni, and twin-cities Convenor, K. Venkataswamy. The SEZ victims in the 
electoral fray stated that the finance minister Rosaiah, Congress senior leader Keshava Rao and 
the District Collector came to the village and made several promises. They alleged that the 
Political Parties, irrespective of their ideology, are the one and the same. None of these parties 
bothered about the problems of the farmers. Hence, they decided to contest the election and 
campaigned with the slogan to ‘give them food and also vote’. Later, the SJM leaders, speaking 
to the news media, gave assurances that they intended to launch a legal battle against the State 
government. They also campaigned for the Polepally contestants in the by-election (Eenadu 18 
May 2008).  
  
Addressing a press conference in the Progressive Media Centre at Hyderabad, Mr. Varavara 
Rao, member of the Viplava Rachayutula Sangham (VIRASAM), translated into English as 
Revolutionary Writers Association, demanded that the TRS Party make its stand clear on SEZs. 
                                                          
40 Swadeshi Jagaran Manch (SJM) is an economic outfit of the Hindu nationalist right-wing organisation, 
Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS). It came into existence on 22 November 1991. SJM promotes the culture 
of indigenous forms of industrialisation. It fights against the liberalisation and globalisation policies aimed at 
bringing foreign goods and companies into India.  
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He alleged that the Polepally pharmaceutical SEZ was facilitated by the TRS and its Party 
leaders. VIRASAM demanded that the SEZ Act should be abolished. The affected farmers in  
Polepally should be given ‘land for land’, pucca houses to live in and a job to one person from 
every SEZ victim family (Saakshi 24 May 2008).  
  
Meanwhile elections were held as per schedule. The Jadcherla by-election result was 
announced on 1 June 2008. Although farmers could not win, they achieved their objective of 
defeating sitting TRS MLA, Lakshma Reddy. Farmers together secured 13,500 votes 
(Prashanth Reddy 2009). Mala Jangilamma secured the highest votes among the Polepally 
contestants (Sainath 2008a). The farmers together spent ₹1.58 lakh including the security 
deposit of ₹65,000. According to the convenor of the PASUF, the farmers who contested the 
elections were left with loans of about ₹78,500. While TDP initiated the process of land 
acquisition, Congress government passed the compensation award and transformed the land 
into a SEZ. The local MLA during the process of formalisation of SEZ was from TRS. Thus, 
Polepally contestants were against all these parties. Even TDP lost the polls in the region, 
despite making headways in other regions. Mallu Ravi of the Congress Party won from 
Jadcherla Assembly segment. The farmers were happy with their decision, despite losing their 
security deposits, for they succeeded in their intention to draw the attention of the people 
toward their struggle against Polepally SEZ (Sukumar 2008).  
  
5.5 The political and civil struggle intensifies  
The farmers, despite losing the electoral battle in the 2008 by-election, did not give up their 
hopes. They further intensified their agitation. They organised several meetings, rallies and 
protests involving the political parties, human rights activists, journalists, lawyers and scholars 
to make the world aware of the dispossession caused by the Polepally SEZ.  
  
On 7 July 2008, about 200 Polepally farmers came to the city of Hyderabad and expressed their 
resentment against the APIIC. The farmers adopted the Gandhian means of Satyagraha (non-
violent protest or passive political resistance) to express their anguish. They all gathered before 
the APIIC office and agitated holding placards with the slogan ‘SEZ Hatao, Zameen Bachao’, 
meaning, ‘remove the SEZ and save the land’. Farmers demanded for the resumption of their 
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lands. Devender Goud, the ex-home minister and Telangana leader, who left the TDP in June, 
joined the protest and expressed his solidarity with the SEZ victims. He made it clear that the 
SEZs established by the government seizing lands of the Telangana people should be 
denotified. He was aggrieved that APIIC primarily acted as a land broker. He submitted a 
memorandum to the Executive Director (ED) of APIIC to stop the construction of Aurobindo 
and Hetero pharma companies at Polepally SEZ (Andhra Jyothi 8 July 2008; The Hindu 8 July 
2008; Vaartha 8 July 2008).  
  
The displaced farmers protested with placards and singing songs. They complained in front of 
the media that the Congress government used force to displace them from their lands. Several 
people’s and voluntary organisations expressed their support by participating in the protest. 
The protest was jointly organized by PASUF, Telangana Alliance against SEZs and Telangana 
Joint Action Committee (TJAC). Key social and human rights activists took part in the 
nonviolent resistance movement, including P. Yadagiri, Madhu Kagula, Geetanjali and Sujata 
Surepally (Andhra Jyothi 8 July 2008; The Hindu 8 July 2008; Vaartha 8 July 2008).  
  
Devender Goud came out of TDP in June 2008 owing to differences of opinion with the TDP 
President, N. Chadrababu Naidu. He floated a new Party called Nava Telangana Praja Party 
(NTPP) to fight for the separate Statehood for Telangana. Goud launched his Party officially 
on 11 July 2008 (The Hindustan Times 12 July 2008). He extended support to Polepally SEZ 
farmers by joining them in their satyagraha before the APIIC office at Hyderabad prior to the 
official launch of his new Party, NTPP. The Party in its manifesto declared to fight against the 
forcible acquisition of land from marginalised and small Telangana farmers to set up SEZs. 
Goud began his fight against SEZs from Polepally. He visited the SEZ victims on 24 July 2008. 
PASUF organised an NTPP meeting in support of the displaced farmers’ movement against 
SEZ in Polepally. Addressing the victims of the Polepally SEZ, the NTTP chief, Goud, said 
that the YSR government introduced the ‘new zamindari system’ (feudal landlord system) in 
the form of Special Economic Zones (The Hindu 25 July 2008). Goud expressed concern that 
the YSR government behaved worse than the British colonial rulers as the former did not even 




A public hearing was held in Polepally on 7 August 2008. The venue was the main entrance 
leading to the Polepally SEZ. Members from Telangana Journalist Forum (TJF), VIRASAM, 
Bhumika, Human Rights Forum (HRF) and students attended the public hearing. They all 
visited Gundlagadda Thanda and Polepally village and spoke to the affected farmers. The major 
demand of the farmers was to get back their land and denotification of the Polepally polluting 
pharma SEZ.  
  
HRF convenor and noted lawyer, K. Balagopal, was the main speaker in the public hearing 
meeting. He informed the media that the entire process of setting up of a SEZ was done against 
the law and assured a legal battle against the SEZ. A Court ruling in 2004 ordered that the 
assigned land should be paid compensation on par with private Patta land. But the government 
overruled the Court order in the case of land acquisition in Polepally. Moreover, a committee 
involving State, District and local level judicial, executive and political authorities should be 
constituted to acquire land. But this was also not done. The compensation for the private land 
was also not calculated properly. Above all, if the purpose for which land originally acquired 
gets altered, then the whole process should be restarted and compensation should be paid afresh 
(Eenadu 8 August 2008; Saakshi 8 August 2008). Farmers said that their lands were acquired 
without their consent. Many activists who attended the public hearing meeting vowed to fight 
against the YSR government and expressed their solidarity with the farmers.  
  
The popular Telugu film star, Chiranjeevi launched a new Political party Praja Rajyam Party 
(PRP) on 26 August 2008. The major aims of the party, among others, were to distribute land 
to the landless and strengthen the land reforms, fight for a ‘Telangana’ based on social equity 
and justice, and improve power supply in the State of AP. As part of the land reforms, SEZs 
automatically occupied the centre stage in PRP’s programme. Chiranjeevi invited the Polepally 
farmers to his office at Hyderabad on 24 September 2008. He enquired about their lives after 
being dispossessed of their lands by the Congress government. He assured them that he would 
visit Polepally on 26 September (Saakshi 25 September 2008).  
Chiranjeevi fulfilled his promise by visiting Polepally on the said date. He spoke to the affected 
farmers to know about the injustices done to them by the ruling elite. After hearing the people, 
he issued an ultimatum to the Congress government that ‘either you solve the problems of 
Polepally farmers, if not, they will vote for us and we will look after their woes’ (Andhra Jyothi 
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27 September 2008). He agreed that SEZs are an essential part of industrialisation. But he 
expressed concern over the execution of the SEZs and the deprivation and displacement of the 
farmers of their lands and livelihood. He opposed the government for forcible acquisition of 
large tracts of fertile land in Polepally for setting up a pharma SEZ. He alleged that, on the 
pretext of development, the ruling government acted like a real estate broker. The SEZ model 
of development in AP dispossessed poor farmers to benefit the ruling elite. In the name of 
development, the Congress government that came to power on the promise of ensuring pro-
farmer and pro-poor policies deprived the people of their means of subsistence (Andhra Jyothi 
27 September 2008; Krishnamoorthy 2008).  
  
The Polepally farmers held a Bhu-satyagraham (non-violent resistance against forcible land 
acquisition) from 25 September to 2 October 2008 before the Aurobindo and Hetero 
pharmaceutical construction sites in Polepally. This protest was organised by the PASUF. 
Initially it was difficult for the organisers of PASUF to get permission to hold a 
Bhusatyagraham. However, they convinced the Deputy Superintendent of Police of Jadcherla 
region that the protest would be peaceful. Almost all the political parties and their leaders 
expressed their support for the peaceful protest at Polepally. Several activists and scholars from 
across the country participated. Noted revolutionary singer Gaddar, addressing the participants 
at the site, blamed the TDP and the Congress for the plight of Polepally farmers. He said 
Polepally SEZ was a product of the American imperialist designs. He demanded the repeal of 
assigned land legislation. He stated that government must formulate policies capable of 
providing permanent ownership rights to the poor people over land (Andhra Jyothi 1 October 
2008; Eenadu 1 October 2008).  
  
K. Balagopal, the HRF Convenor, said Polepally SEZ was notified violating the established 
legal canons. He demanded that land be resumed back to the people as the purpose for which 
it originally acquired was not fulfilled. A fresh notification should be issued legally if the land 
was acquired for some purpose and used for some other purpose. He said, if a case is filed in 
the court on the Polepally case, a stay order can be obtained (Andhra Jyothi 2 October 2008). 
PRP leader Nagababu, Laxma Reddy of TRS, and K. Narayana of CPI paid a visit to the site 
on Gandhi Jayanti, the concluding day of the Satyagraha. CPI State Secretary, K. Narayana 
labelled the government as a real estate broker. He said YSR was behaving akin to Nizam 
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Nawab41 for the latter gave lands to the Jagirdars (landlords), while the former gave it to the 
SEZ developers. Nagababu of PRP demanded that cultivable farmland should be provided for 
the displaced people (Andhra Jyothi 3 October 2008).  
  
Polepally SEZ victims under the auspices of Madiga Reservation Porata Samithi (MRPS) held 
a rally on foot from Polepally to Mahabubnagar on 13 October 200842. Other Dalit and people’s 
organisations joined the protest at Mahabubnagar. The SEZ victims and their supporters 
shouted the slogans ‘hand back our lands’ and ‘we will not rest until we regain our lands’. As 
the District Collector was not available, they held protests before the Zilla Parishad office until 
the late hours43. Here also the agitators shouted slogans against the government and its 
agencies. They submitted a memorandum to Shri Gangaram, the Chairman of the AP 
Legislative Assembly Committee on Welfare of Scheduled Castes. They stayed until the 
collector came back and submitted a memorandum to her also. Meanwhile three of the 
protestors who fell ill were shifted to hospital by the police (Andhra Jyothi 14 October 2008; 
Eenadu 14 October 2008).  
  
A roundtable conference of all the political parties, sans the ruling Congress, was held on 19 
October 2008 in Hyderabad. The conference was organised by the CPI. Political leaders from 
other parties; TDP, CPM, TRS and PRP, attended the conference. The political parties that 
participated in the conference decided to launch a joint struggle against the government’s 
dubious and forcible land acquisition policies for SEZs and Coastal Corridor Development 
Project. The conference viewed SEZs as the biggest-ever state-led real-estate scam in the 
country. All the parties jointly adopted certain resolutions and the first one was to visit 
Polepally and other SEZ sites in AP during November 2008. Among others, the key resolution 
                                                          
41 Nizam was the title meant to denote the monarch of the Hyderabad state. Nizams ruled Hyderabad from 1724 
to 1948. Nawab is an Urdu language term used in India as an honorary designation for a ruler or an administrator.  
  
42 MRPS is an organisation fighting for the rights of Dalits and particularly the ‘Madiga caste’, categorised as 
Scheduled Caste (SC) people in AP.  
43 Zilla Parishad is the third tier of the three tier Panchayat Raj (local government) system in India. It operates at 
the District level.  
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about Polepally was to reinvestigate the land acquisition process, particularly that of the 
assigned land (Andhra Jyothi 20 October 2008; Saakshi 20 October 2008).  
  
The major opposition political parties together participated in a huge rally in Polepally on 4 
November 2008. This was the first time that all parties, cutting across their ideological strands, 
collectively came to Polepally village. TRS and the left parties warned the government that 
they would hinder the production activities at pharma units of Aurobindo and Hetero firms, if 
the government failed to meet the legitimate demands of proper compensation and 
rehabilitation measures to the displaced farmers. TDP accused the ruling Congress government 
of granting undue favours to their close associates (The Hindu 5 November 2008). 
  
The Communist Party of India (CPI) dubbed the role of the State industrial corporation (APIIC) 
as a real-estate broker. Praja Rajyam Party (PRP) stated that people need a government from 
which they can seek help when they are in trouble. But the case is reversed in Polepally where 
people were trying to secure themselves from the actions of the government. The Communist 
Party of India (Marxist) abbreviated as CPI(M) or CPM demanded for the revision of the 
compensation offered to the displaced farmers and a job for at least one person from each 
affected family in the upcoming industrial units. The following represented all the parties who 
attended the meeting held at Polepally – KCR (TRS President), K. Yerram Naidu (TDP 
Parliamentary Party leader), Parakala Prabhakar (Praja Rajyam spokesperson), B.V. Raghavulu 
(CPI (M) State Secretary), and K. Narayana (CPI State Secretary). They all joined hands to 
fight against the injustices, and to support the struggle organised by the people of Polepally in 
their fight to annul the pharma SEZ (The Hindu 5 November 2008).  
  
A farmer by name of Palem Ramulu Goud died on 19 November 2008 due to a heart attack. 
The deceased father, Agamaiah, owned Ac.6.20gts. in Survey No. 420. His land was taken for 
GIP in 2003 and the compensation was paid. However, in the context of recent struggles by the 
Polepally farmers against the SEZ, the government announced a resettlement compensation of 
₹70,000 and a 200 sq. yards house site to each of the displaced farmers. Ramulu Goud went 
several times to the officials and political representatives to obtain the recently announced 
compensation, but to no avail. This created huge mental stress due to which he suffered a heart 
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attack and died. Madhu Kagula demanded that the government should, in all humanity, 
compensate the families who have lost their loved ones due to displacement from their lands 
for setting up of SEZ (Andhra Jyothi 21 November 2008).  
  
Mahabubnagar District Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) visited Polepally on 21 November 2008. 
They were assisted by Madhu Kagula and Sujatha Surepally. The NRI team met the displaced 
people and enquired about their problems. They later spoke to the media and stated that they 
were not against the SEZ model of development. But they did oppose the inadequate 
compensation paid by the government. They held that the case of Polepally SEZ was an 
indication of nepotism and crony capitalist practices of the YSR led Congress government. The 
land doles in Polepally and similar type development projects favoured the relatives and friends 
of the YSR ignoring the interests of the farmers (Andhra Jyothi 22 November 2008).  
 
A workshop to address SEZ related land displacement issues was held by the ‘Bhu Nirvasitula 
Porata Sanghatan’ (BNPS) in Hyderabad on 27 and 28 December 2008.44 Madhu Kagula and 
Sujatha Surepalli took active part in the conference and explained in detail about the Polepally 
issue. The BNPS decided to launch a joint struggle against SEZs in the State. It demanded the 
state instantly repeal the SEZ law (Eenadu 29 December 2008). 
  
The government, owing to the people’s struggle, allotted Rs.1.15 crores through APIIC as a 
relief fund to the SEZ victims. However, the District government authorities dubbed it as the 
fund for village development and not for SEZ victims alone. Accordingly, on 6 January 2009, 
Tahsildar, Sri Krishna Swamy, came to the Polepally village to seek villagers’ consent for 
starting the development of the village through the APIIC fund. The SEZ victims vehemently 
opposed this. They argued they did not want any development of their village. They said either 
the funds should be used towards their house construction in the allotted site or distributed to 
them. They questioned as to how far it was reasonable on the part of the government to utilise 
                                                          
44 BNPS can be translated in English as Displaced Farmers United Forum. This association fights for the rights of 
the displaced farmers in AP.  
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funds allotted for their relief and rehabilitation toward village development. They appealed to 
the government to sanction a separate fund for village development (Eenadu 7 January 2009).  
  
On 21 January 2009, the L&T company initiated construction activities in the GIP site to start 
a new firm. The farmers occupied the site to stop them from starting a new company. On seeing 
the agitated farmers, the company staff fled the scene, leaving the tent put up for initiating the 
religious prayers for the construction activities. Usually a ‘Bhoomi puja’ (a Hindu religious 
ceremony offering prayers to the land goddess) is performed before starting any construction 
activities. The farmers destroyed the tent put up for pooja and threw away all the items brought 
for the same. Later, the PASUF convenor spoke to the media, and warned that any company 
that tried to start its activities without solving the problems of the farmers would meet the same 
fate. (Eenadu 22 January 2009).  
  
The PASUF members held a meeting in a mango orchard near the SEZ site on 28 January 2009. 
The meeting was chaired by Sujatha Surepally. The villagers who gathered for the meet were 
happy to hear that construction activities by any new company were being halted by the SEZ 
victims. The PASUF members decided to hold a continuous dharna in front of the company till 
the May 2009 assembly and parliamentary elections (Surepally 2009).  
  
A textile firm began surveying for construction activities at the Polepally GIP site. The part of 
the site was previously marked as a burial ground for the SEZ victims. The burial ground was 
granted after serious struggle by the farmers. However, in February 2009, the APIIC began to 
lay stones to demarcate the land for a textile park. The SEZ victims requested on several 
occasions the authorities not to initiate any industrial activity on the burial ground allotted to 
them. But officials did not heed this request. On 4 February, when officials were trying to 
formalise the boundaries, farmers entered there and a serious discussion between them and the 
APIIC authorities began. However, the APIIC authorities, fearing severe backlash from the 
farmers, fled the scene. Farmers warned that this was allotted to them to bury their family 





5.6 The 2009 elections  
From March 2009 onwards, the Polepally farmers were busy planning to contest the Lok Sabha 
elections. While they had contested the 2008 by-election to spread the message of 
development-led disaster at the State level, their decision to contest the Lok Sabha polls was 
to demonstrate their plight and consequential distrust against the political parties, particularly 
the Congress, to the nation. SEZ victims planned to field as many candidates as possible to the 
Mahabubnagar Parliamentary seat in 2009 general elections. Led by Madhu Kagula 20 SEZ 
victims came to the District Election Commission Office in Mahabubnagar on 26 March 2009 
and procured nomination papers. Among them, 15 were SCs, two were from minority sections 
and three from Backward Castes. Eight candidates from these had already contested the by-
election to the Jadcherla Assembly constituency in 2008 (Andhra Jyothi 27 March 2009).  
  
Seenaiah Goud was the first to file his nomination on 28 March 2009. He stated that to know 
about the procedure involved filling out nomination papers for the election. He filed his 
nomination first and the rest would follow him (Andhra Jyothi 29 March 2009). Later 14 
candidates led by the convenor of the PASUF, filed their nominations to the Mahabubnagar 
Parliamentary constituency on 30 March 2009. Even KCR, the chief of the TRS Party, filed his 
nomination from the same constituency. The sitting MP, Vittal Rao, from Congress was 
another key contestant. The affected farmers said they were cheated by the Congress 
government in the name of dubious industrialisation and were left to begging, hunting and work 
as daily wage labourers in their own lands. The farmers contested the election at a national 
level to make people of this nation understand their plight, created by the SEZ model of 
development under the Congress regime (Andhra Jyothi 31 March 2009). One of the 
contestants pointed out that the displaced farmers’ electoral fray marked a protest against 
parties which did nothing to save the farmers from being dispossessed of their livelihoods and 
homes. We are ‘using democratic means accessible to us to make our resentment known to 
them’ (Akhileshwari 2009).  
  
Contesting in elections was a difficult task for farmers as a majority of them were poor and 
lacked human and financial resources needed to meet the electoral campaigning. Since they 
were in electoral fray for a common cause, they used one vehicle and together campaigned with 
begging bowls in their hands. They begged the voters to provide for votes and food. However, 
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election authorities objected to their common campaigning. According to the election 
authorities, the common campaigning amounts to the violation of the electoral code. The 
Polepally farmers then visited bus stands and railway stations to campaign individually along 
with their respective supporters. They used public transport facilities to campaign and 
requested the people to acknowledge their sufferings. They asked voters to be wary of having 
their own lands forcibly seized for similar causes in the future (The Hindu 10 April 2009).  
  
The Polepally contestants campaigned rigorously in the villages. They said the Congress 
government formulated the SEZ Act which led to their displacement, leaving them to beg on 
the streets. They warned people that if Congress was voted back to power, there would be SEZs 
set up across the length and breadth of Mahabubnagar. They requested people not to vote for 
Congress as it may lead them to meet the same fate akin to them. They successfully distributed 
their election pamphlets which detailed their stories of distress created by the ruling 
government in the name of development (Suryaa 9 May 2009). Madhu Kagula viewed the 
contest as being fought with the intention to draw the attention of the nation over the Polepally 
SEZ injustice (Srinivas Rao 2009).  
  
Amidst the electoral campaigning, Varavara Rao, the leader of VIRASAM (revolutionary 
writers’ association) released a book, Nenu Polepally Peenugunu Matladuthunnanu (I the 
Polepally Corpse Speaking) authored by Geetanjali on 13 April 2009 in a meeting held at 
Polepally village. This book contained the stories narrated by the Polepally SEZ farmers 
detailed in a literary fashion. After the book’s release, Varavara Rao spoke to the affected 
farmers to learn about their problems. This was his first visit to the village. (Eenadu 14 April 
2009). The stories in the book narrate how even the farmers’ souls were deprived of resting in 
peace after leaving their bodies. Many farmers died owing to their forcible separation from 
land. Generally, there has been a tradition to bury the farmers in their own lands and or in the 
common burial ground. The villagers of Polepally were deprived of both the private and 
common resources including their graveyards. When farmers died due to mental agony, the 
question was where they would be buried. This book was written in this context and brought 




Meanwhile, election to the Mahabubnagar Lok Sabha seat was held on 16 April 2009. The 
results were announced on 16 May 2009. The following is the list of the 15 SEZ victims along 
with their poll symbols and number of votes secured:  
  
Table 5.2: Candidates, Symbols and Votes, 2009 election to the Mahabubnagar Lok 
Sabha constituency 
Name of the Candidate  Symbol  No. of votes polled  
Usain Rangamma  Carrot  2000  
Ushan Sathyamma  Almirah  2996  
Yetti Chinna Yenkaiah  Candle  2426  
Yetti Lingaiah  Banana  2977  
Kandur Kurmaiah  Comb  2947  
Gangapuri Ravindar Goud  Fan  13,996  
Gajja Narsimulu  Torch light  3,740  
M.A. Jabbar  Brush  2084  
Depalle Sayanna  Diesel Pump  1937  
K. Narsimulu  Coat  2663  
Pandu  Cot  2718  
Budiga Janagam Laxmamma  Suitcase  9814  
Mala Jangilamma  Bat  1854  
B. Seenaiah Goud  Black Board  6351  
V. Venkateshwarlu  Bread  4071  




Two others, Maisaiah and Jangaiah, although did not lose any land, were supportive of the 
Polepally struggle and contested the elections on their own. Dapally Maisaiah received 4064 
votes and Karre Jangaiah secured 11,268 votes. Altogether Polepally SEZ victims polled more 
than 70,000 votes which marred the chances of victory of the congress candidate, Mr. Vittal 
Rao. KCR also won only by 20,000 votes. Thus, they achieved their purpose of defeating the 
ruling congress MP and made the TRS leader tense over his chances of victory in the election 
(Venkateshwarlu 2009).  
  
YSR, the CM of AP, never explicitly commented on Polepally SEZ. But he had a very clear 
stand about SEZs and was instrumental in promoting SEZs across the State. He believed land 
acquisition was mandatory for the setting up of factories or SEZs in the State. Farmers, he 
stated, were paid better compensation in AP compared to any other State in India. The land 
was acquired only after ensuring proper rehabilitation and resettlement measures to the affected 
people. This is the reason that neither a Nandigram nor a Singur type resistance took place in 
AP (Saakshi 6 August 2008). He asserted that SEZs were the only way to solve the 
unemployment problem in the State. His government would provide all the necessary logistical 
and infrastructural support to the entrepreneurs interested in setting up SEZs (Andhra Jyothi 9 
August 2008).  
  
Geeta Reddy, the Major Industries Minister, justified the land acquisition for SEZs in general 
and Polepally in particular. In the wake of growing criticism from the opposition parties on 
Polepally SEZ, the Minister said Congress government gave the best relief and rehabilitation 
package to the displaced Polepally farmers. The farmers were content with the package but the 
agitation by the few displaced was motivated by opposition political forces (The Hindu 28 
September 2008). The government allotted 26.83 acres for the development of a housing 
colony for displaced farmers within the GIP. Each displaced farmer was sanctioned 200 sq. 
yards plot in the proposed housing colony. An amount of ₹70,000 was also proposed towards 
the construction charges of their houses. A works inspector was appointed to speedily construct 
the housing colony. APIIC released ₹1.3 crores towards a community fund to develop the 
religious places belonging to different communities, to construct a fencing wall around the 
school in the village and provide more classrooms, to construct an overhead drinking water 
tank for the Polepally village, and to provide 24 hours uninterrupted power supply. The 
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government, she said, directed the pharma firms to provide jobs for both skilled and unskilled 
local labour force in the SEZ (Saakshi 1 October 2008).  
  
Owing to the pressures from the people’s movement and the repeated probing of human rights 
forum members, the Collector of Mahabubnagar, Usha Rani, submitted a report on Polepally 
SEZ land details to the Human Rights Commission of AP on 29 November 2007. In her report, 
the Collector mentioned the details of the acquired land. She claimed that the land was acquired 
as per law. She accepted that the assigned land was earlier distributed to the poor but justified 
the acquisition on the grounds of an ex-gratia of ₹18,000 paid to the assigned landholders 
(Eenadu 26 April 2008).  
  
The Collector also mentioned in the report that when farmers obstructed the construction 
activities, the APIIC manager complained to the police. Acting on the manager’s complaint, 
police arrested the protestors and presented them before the Court. In this context, in the 
presence of local political leaders she held a meeting with Polepally farmers and arrived at an 
agreement. As per the agreement, a rehabilitation package was announced. Accordingly, pucca 
houses by January 2008 for 352 families, drinking water facilities, roads, a school and jobs for 
eligible candidates were promised. About 30 acres of land was earmarked for the construction 
of houses to the affected families. The withdrawal of criminal cases filed against the farmers 
was assured. As per the agreement farmers would not meddle with the construction activities 
in the Polepally SEZ. On 11 October 2007, a petition withdrawing the cases was submitted to 
the concerned authorities (Eenadu 27 April 2008).  
  
The Collector issued a press note on 26 April 2008. She provided details about the extra 
compensation package provisions and other measures favourable to farmers brought out 
through her intervention in the negotiations between the farmers, APIIC and the pharma 
companies. She stated that the land was acquired for a Growth Centre with the willing consent 
of the people. As far as the SEZ induced deaths were concerned, she said no information was 
available and no investigation was made as to how they died. The Collector justified the 
compensation paid to acquire the lands during 2003. The market land value per acre was 
₹12,000 but the government paid 30 percent more. Both Hetero and Aurobindo pharma 
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companies have taken up measures to redress the farmers. They wrote a letter to the police to 
withdraw the cases filed against the agitating farmers. Employment was provided to 145 people 
as watchmen, clerks and other related occupations. The companies also issued 106 job cards 
(Eenadu 27 April 2008).  
  
According to Jones (2008), the Polepally case indicates a flourishing of formal democracy. 
Whether the Polepally case does, in fact, represent ways in which ‘formal, effective, and 
substantive’ dimensions of democracy come into play, and whether it also serves as an example 
of ‘democratic deepening’ is debatable (Heller 2000). If one pays attention to the substantive 
outcomes, then certainly the case does not stand out in terms of deepening of democracy. It can 
be argued that the Polepally case successfully passes the test of a procedural democracy, 
viewed in terms of a set of institutions such as universal adult franchise, the rule of law, set of 
constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and right to association, separation of powers (legislative, 
executive and judiciary), formation of governments through regular elections at central and 
State levels and so on and so forth. These institutions are the rules and regulations that enable 
the citizens to exercise their choice, theoretically at least, in order to shape their lives. But in 
terms of the provision of opportunities for the farmers (including the ordinary and subordinate 
citizenry) of Polepally, or more broadly the majority in India, to influence or reverse a set of 
policy decisions (particularly those concerning the economic development) that considerably 
affect their lives (a substantive dimension of democracy), the Polepally case seems to be a 
failure. 
 
Again, this thesis does not set out to argue that the movement can be understood with reference 
to a procedural view of democracy alone. There are several substantive elements, like the 
farmers understanding the key issues surrounding their displacement, the active role of civil 
society organisations and media, the formation of PASUF under which the struggle took shape 
and the like. A discourse on development issues in Polepally certainly hails a substantive notion 
of democracy. But the way dissent was managed politically, giving few concessions to the 
farmers, and YSR’s broad welfare regime to reverse the development induced distress is a point 
not to be missed. Moreover, the lack of resources for farmers struggling to carry on after losing 
their means of subsistence, is another concern that inspires this thesis to view the success of 
democracy beyond the institutional and formal view of democracy. The case of the 
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dispossessed farmers illustrates how ‘the exercise of citizenship is subverted’ (Heller 2000, p. 
489) by social and economic inequalities.  
  
5.7 The political management of the dissent  
The State of AP witnessed considerable social and political mobilisation encompassing 
caste/class struggles, tribal movements, regional protests, issue-based sporadic strife, 
environmental and gender-based activism. In fact, it was one of the prominent States that led 
the communist movement. In the immediate aftermath of independence, the Communist Party 
exercised its strong influence both in the electoral and non-electoral arena in the State (Harrison 
1956; Windmiller 1955; Ram Reddy 1976). However, their influence was offset by the 
‘catchall’ Congress Party that came to rule the State from its inception until 1983. Realising 
the power of the subaltern demands and the strong presence of the Communist Party, Congress 
began to practice a ‘politics of accommodation’ whereby ‘the distribution of patronage and 
rewards’ was offered to select and influential local leaders of Backward Castes to effectively 
contain discontent among them (Ram Reddy 1989).  
  
The ‘politics of accommodation’ did not allow the popular discontent to grow into a situation 
capable of destabilising the prevailing social and political order. Over a period of time, the 
politicisation of larger sections of the population from backward Castes and Classes resulted 
in the failure of the accommodative politics. In this context, the Congress government in the 
State, guided by the central leadership of Indira Gandhi, resorted to populism. This 
subsequently led to competitive populism (Srinivasulu 2011) in AP whereby parties began to 
race against each other in announcing populist welfare measures, in particular, at the time of 
elections. The political management of the dissent through welfare populism came increasingly 
into conflict with the market-led development models adopted in the postliberal era. It is 
premised that liberal economic reforms go against the interests of the poor, the electoral 
majorities. While in the pre-liberal era, both welfare and development were conceived as one 
and the same, they became antithetical in the context of AP’s transformation to a liberal 
economic mode. The apex leadership at subnational-level increasingly faced new challenges to 




In the above context, how the leadership dealt with the growing public ire, specifically the rural 
distress, became a matter of crucial importance. An important caveat to note here is that 
whether citizens were cognizant about economic reforms to the extent that they could make an 
electoral choice or campaign against the government (Suri 2004; Srinivasulu 2007) has been a 
contentious issue, particularly in AP. But, this thesis contends that whenever the reform-
oriented policies made the living conditions of the poor more difficult, for example taking away 
their lands forcefully, withdrawing the farm and food subsidies, enhancing the costs of daily 
utilities like power, water and transport, food grains, education, health and so on, the Party in 
power experienced the popular anguish.  
  
The popular discontent at times led to the defeat of the incumbent government, a citizens’ 
prerogative of a constitutional democracy such as seen from the title ‘fall of the CEO in arena 
of democracy’ in AP (Suri 2004). Hence the leaders in the post-reform period devised strategies 
in ways that made the otherwise incompatible economic policies apparently compatible with 
several demands arising out of a procedural and deepening democratic society. In short, the 
leaders channelled their abilities and skills to reconcile development and welfare, which are 
incongruent given their distinct priorities in a neoliberal economic order.  
  
The apex leadership strategies to balance welfare and development in fact legitimised 
dispossession. In the pre-liberal era, there was not much resistance to dispossession for large-
scale development projects. This is because the Nehruvian leadership sought the people’s 
compliance with such development projects invoking larger national interests of generating 
power and providing water to the fields. The targeted developmental goals were achieved and 
to some extent contributed to the larger public good (Levien 2013).  
  
The leaders in the post-reform period in AP resorted to the act of delicate balancing of 
development and welfare to appease the restive citizenry, albeit following different political 
strategies in balancing these two antithetical forces. For instance, leaders like Chandrababu 
Naidu have adhered to the development agenda openly and continued with welfare measures 
in hidden ways. Whereas YSR embraced and advocated welfare measures openly and loudly 
and continued his development agenda in hidden ways. YSR’s government adopted welfare 
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measures on a saturation basis marking a transformation in AP’s political history, as Carolyn 
Elliott writes, ‘from clientelist politics toward welfare regime’ (Elliott 2011). But now large-
scale development projects and industrialisation are controlled by the private sector. So, here 
the state needs a justification to seek the compliance of people for private-led development 
models. The success or failure of the Polepally resistance to the SEZ model of development 
should be read in the above context, of an inherited legacy of the AP State to devise measures 
aimed to contain the political discontent of different sections.  
  
The Chandrababu Naidu government’s liberal economic strategy impacted the agricultural 
sector negatively. As the agricultural sector was in crisis and the public sector employment 
declined, the farmers and ordinary citizens were in distress across the State, including in 
Polepally. At this juncture, GIP was floated with the conception that farmers provide their land 
and in return government will provide them with alternative means to livelihood and overall 
development of their region. Nowhere was it said that development means the acquisition of 
the land of the farmers at cheaper rates to set up a SEZ to shelter corporate pharmaceutical 
companies and thereby facilitate capital accumulation. Now farmers imagining a secured 
livelihood and happy life for themselves and their families parted with their lands, 
notwithstanding the meagre compensation paid to them. Four years since the identification of 
land, no industry appeared on their lands.  
  
The new government led by YSR that came to power on a pro-rural and anti-reform stance 
created some hope in the displaced farmers. The YSR government began to devise innovative 
welfare measures and fulfilled poll promises of free power and agricultural loan waivers. But, 
the plan to set up a SEZ by YSR government tested the farmers’ patience and they took to the 
path of resistance. The efforts of the displaced to stall the SEZ did not come to fruition. This is 
because farmers used democratic means, albeit in organised ways, to fight against injustice 
done to them and could not withstand the mighty state backed by its coercive apparatus. For 
instance, farmers organised several events and meetings as detailed above and fought two 
elections as a mark of protest against dispossession. But they only eroded even the little 
deposits they had and incurred debts. Although it is a novel way on part of the displaced farmers 
to launch a joint electoral struggle with common manifesto, the fact remains that the farmers 
were from Polepally and adjoining villages and both the Assembly Constituency of Jadcherla 
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or the Parliamentary Constituency of Mahabubnagar are too big. What affects the Polepally 
farmers may not be the issue for people residing outside of their village.  
  
Moreover, centralising leaders like YSR have always managed to win the elections once in 
power. Further loss or gain in elections is determined by the money factor. Even today money 
distribution by the parties to seek votes during the time of elections is a well-recognised fact 
(Elliott 2011). The farmers, already having lost their means of subsistence, faced a shortage of 
resources to further continue their resistance against the SEZ project. They had to contend with 
little extra compensation, a housing site and a graveyard provided by the government to soothe 
their restive temper.  
 
One question that needs to be addressed is whether the Polepally movement or similar 
movements may be understood as being aimed at civilising the present trajectory of neoliberal 
development models. If so, is it possible to read this as an initiation of a ‘double movement’ 
according to Karl Polanyi’s formulation discussed in the first chapter of this thesis. The self-
regulated market, argued Polanyi, would result in the commodification of land, labour and 
money, and, consequently, a movement against this commodification of the historically 
uncommodified assets (Polanyi 2001 [1944]).  
 
Polanyi held that the foundation of a counter movement against the market forces need not 
come from the point of production alone. The source of conflict in a capitalist society is 
attributed to the capitalist mode of production, wherein labour stood antagonistically in relation 
to the capitalist. This was essentially the case with Marx’s formulation of class struggle in a 
capitalist society. Marx thought and believed that a revolutionary social transformation through 
class (essentially proletarian) struggle is inevitable to usher in a society which is free of all 
forms of exploitation. This includes free from the market-based exploitation of labour. Polanyi 
argued that interests of different classes are at stake in a market society and not just the workers 
alone (Polanyi 2001 [1944]).  
 
Polanyi asserted that any success of a class action is ‘determined by the breadth and variety of 
class interests, other than its own, which it is able to serve’ (Polanyi 2001 [1944], p 163). Herein 
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lies Polanyi’s idea of coalescing of different classes (labour, landed elite, farmers and 
industrialists as well) to protect society as a whole from the ills of the self-regulating market. 
These different groups made demands on the state to intervene and design social protection 
measures. The main thesis of Polanyi’s counter movement was to halt or reverse the 
commodification of land, labour and money. There are two aspects of Polanyi’s idea of a 
counter-revolution: one is how commodification of land, labour and money leads to a counter-
revolution and the other is how different social classes together put pressure on the state to 
provide social protection against the whims of the market. John Harriss (2013) assesses the 
strength of this second aspect of the counter movement of Polanyi with reference to 
contemporary India’s move toward the commodification of labour and land. He argues that the 
counter movement on the part of urban and rural workers is ‘muted and fragmented’. However, 
‘resistance to land displacement and dispossession, on the other hand, has been at least 
somewhat effective, causing the government to introduce new legislation on land acquisition 
that at least acknowledges the need to consider its implications for livelihoods’ (Hariss 2013, 
p. 189).  
  
In terms of the application of Polanyi’s thesis of a fight against the commodification of land, a 
counter movement against the land alienation for market-led development models (say SEZs) 
has certainly gained momentum in Polepally, AP or India. All the SEZs in Goa and the Singur 
(Tata Nano Car project) and Nandigram (Indonesia’s Salim group’s chemical hub SEZ project) 
in West Bengal came to a halt due to popular resistance. But this is not the case across India 
and especially in AP. Land dispossession for big business continues. The transfer of land to the 
corporate pharmaceutical firms in Polepally and several other such projects is a fact. Obviously, 
there is new land legislation in the form of the ‘Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency 
in Land Acquisition, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Act 2013 (LARR 2013). This new law 
replaced the colonial era Land Acquisition Act of 1894. But the new LARR only 
institutionalised the transfer of land for the big industrial projects. The state itself facilitates 
land acquisition for private capital and it has thereby assumed the status of a ‘land broker’. This 
thesis therefore casts doubt on an important aspect of Polanyi’s argument – the coalescing of 
different classes to counter the market, and questions its generalisability across India, even 




The evidence from the Polepally case, this thesis argues, also calls into question David 
Harvey’s analysis, which also argued the necessity of a broad coalition of classes (proletarian 
and non-proletarian). Harvey acknowledges that ABD in contemporary times resulted in 
resistance movements across the globe. He wrote about the necessity of launching a joint 
struggle against various forms of dispossession. He holds that struggles centred on expanded 
reproduction (labour struggles in a factory site) and ABD are in fact organically linked under 
the dimensions of ‘historical geography of capitalism’. Hence, different movements against 
ABD and labour movements within expanded reproduction should join hands. Different classes 
should join in their struggle and address environmental and feminist movements, urban 
movements, movements against neoliberal austerity programmes, labour movements and 
ABD.  
  
Harvey argued that ‘the connectivity between struggles within expanded reproduction and 
against accumulation by dispossession must assiduously be cultivated (Harvey 2003, p. 179). 
In simple terms, Harvey, like Polanyi, is suggesting that both proletarian (labour) and non-
proletarian (agrarian, environmental, ABD) struggles must together fight capitalist forms of 
exploitation and to this extent left parties need to play a vital role in developing links between 
the two forms of struggles. He is also of the view that neoliberal institutions like the IMF and 
the World Bank make the connection between the two forms of struggle easy to see and hence 
it is easy to develop the links. Now, the question is to assess here the compatibility of the 
Polepally movement vis-à-vis Harvey’s notion of linking various forms of socio-economic and 
political resistance.  
  
The displaced Polepally farmers never formed part of expanded reproduction in the sense of 
offering their labour for subsistence wage in a factory, mine or agricultural estate. They owned 
small pieces of fertile farmland and made their subsistence through cultivation of food grains. 
Perhaps they never knew about the proletarian struggles Harvey is talking about. Even if some 
of them had earned their livelihood from other means, that was from an informal economy 
wherein they were employed for few days or weeks as manual labourers or similar. The left 
playing an active role to develop a link between the proletarian and non-proletarian struggles 
is outdated in India and more so in AP. The left hardly has any electoral presence in AP. The 
State of AP was home to some of the key communist movements and leaders with strong 
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electoral and non-electoral salience of the left during and in the immediate aftermath of the 
independence. This is no longer the case here.  
  
In AP, Communism was embraced by a peasant community, namely the dominant caste of 
Kammas in AP during the Indian national struggle against British colonial rule. But, today the 
leaders from the same caste embrace neoliberal economic ideology. The caste is today known 
for its entrepreneurial abilities and extraction of surplus from both agrarian and industrial forms 
of production. The business elite, in alliance with the aspiring political elite from this caste, 
played a key role in toppling the pro-poor government of TDP led by NTR with a popular 
mandate in AP in 1995. The popularly elected CM was dethroned as the growing business elite 
of Kamma community saw in him a barrier to further their capital accumulation. Added to this, 
all parties including the left embrace one and the same ideology in the post-reform period. This 
is evident from the West Bengal left government’s alienation of fertile farmland to the private 
corporate industrial houses leading to the dispossession of the farmers in the post-reform 
period.  
  
Another barrier to the development of linkages between the struggles over dispossession and 
expanded reproduction in Polepally arise from the empirical fact that a large section of the 
displaced lacked resources, mainly financial. The farmers in Polepally were dispossessed over 
a long period and this aggravated their financial condition. Now these farmers, as part of their 
resistance, contested the elections twice in 2008 and 2009 as noted above. They could not 
mobilise their funds to meet their electoral expenses and literally begged the people with 
begging bowls to fund them to meet electoral expenses as well as vote for them.  
  
In the above context, it was difficult for the agitating farmers to travel to other parts of the 
country where similar kind of resistance movements were underway or to the places where 
such resistance movements succeeded in denotifying the SEZs such as in Goa or halting the 
SEZ project in Nandigram of West Bengal. If they had visited these sites of resistance, it would 
have enabled them to express their solidarity as well as learn from the success stories as to how 
to carry on the movement. Due to the shortage of resources, the Polepally farmers could not 
even visit similar sites of resistance in their own State of AP.  
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The different resistance movements and their success or failure reveal that not all movements 
yield the same results. This is because, ‘in different parts of the country, the “Indian state” takes 
varied form’ (Manor 2016, p. 9) particularly in the context of the shift of political and economic 
power from the centre to the State-level leaders and parties since 1989. With this redistribution 
of power, a sort of centralised control was procured by the State-level CMs such as Naidu and 
YSR. This allowed them to control party and policies in authoritarian manner. For instance, 
YSR never followed the World Bank directive of reforming the power sector and the 
withdrawal of free supply of power to the farmers. This measure earned him the name of a 
good politician among the rural populace ensuring his successive electoral victories. But in the 
meantime, he also stubbornly pursued specific market-led land-based development projects 
without paying attention to the fact of dispossession of the people. But certainly, he pacified 
the contending groups resorting to the mechanism of balancing welfare and development; 
wherein, as noted in Chapter 3 of this thesis, growth, welfare, dispossession and corruption co-
existed.  
  
Moreover, the SEZ resistance, as expected by its legislators, was ‘localised in nature’. This 
means ‘those opposed to a given SEZ would be isolated within a contained area, where the 
political fallout could be minimised. Protestors from different SEZ sites within a state would 
face distinct local circumstances, while those from different states would encounter barriers of 
distance, language and political priorities’ (Jenkins 2011, p. 54). The idea of localised 
resistance was well adhered to by the political managers of the State of AP. YSR never allowed 
the broad coalescing of these movements over SEZs to culminate into a force to threaten and 
destabilise the political-economic order of the day. The localised nature of the resistance 
movements in AP contravene Harvey’s and of course Polanyi’s notion of broad coalescing of 
different movements pertaining to ABD and expanded reproduction. Political bosses in AP did 
not allow even the struggles against dispossession to come together.  
  
Further, whether the struggle over the dispossession of land for neoliberal models of 
development in AP should be seen, even from the perspective of those directly dispossessed as 
an outright rejection of neoliberal model of development or not is not clear. This is because 
farmers resisted the deceit, fraud and non-transparent mechanism of executing the project and 
also argued for better compensation, proper rehabilitation and resettlement measures. As seen 
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in the case of Polepally, prima facie farmers were not against new development models. But 
when they came to know the changes to the projects in which they did not see any employment 
prospects and their lands being sold to companies at much higher prices than they received as 
compensation, they began to negotiate with the state.  
  
Akin to the arguments put forward by Nielsen (2010, p. 147) about the Singur controversy in 
West Bengal, whether the case of Polepally and several other such controversial development 
sites in AP should also be viewed as a ‘concerted effort by a heterogeneous group of actors to 
civilise contemporary forms of development to ensure that some of the benefits are socially 
distributed and made to trickle down’ is a case in point. The State level leadership is responsible 
for dealing with the claims of the various actors.  
  
The varied character of resistance movements and their outcomes in different parts of India can 
be linked to the management skills of the centralising leadership at State level as these policies 
get executed here. AP under YSR was a fitting case wherein one leader dominated State politics 
(Manor 2015). He used available non-coercive means to contain resistance. But when those 
displaced did not yield to his soft tactics, he directed the government to use force to seek their 
compliance to his vision of development. This shows that the extra-economic character is 
intrinsic to dispossession. This also means that the art of political leadership and economic 
conditions (at the subnational-level in this case) determines the nature and character of 
dispossession and even resistance to it and not the abstraction of surplus capital dynamics.  
  
5.8 Conclusion  
This chapter has demonstrated that Polepally SEZ became a contested arena as propounded by 
Karl Polanyi’s counter movement thesis. The State level policy elite projections about SEZ 
model of development became increasingly untenable with the people’s experiences at the 
ground level. The developmental plans claimed Polepally SEZ to be a panacea for 
unemployment, economic underdevelopment and infrastructural deficiencies. They projected 
that SEZ would act as a catalyst to spur regional growth. However, the peoples’ experience 
with SEZ was that of loss of land, livelihood, environment and ecological degradation. In fact, 
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the Polepally SEZ, from the perspective of displaced farmers, became a symbol of retarded 
growth and development.  
  
This chapter, drawing upon the people’s debates and discourse expressed through their protests, 
has highlighted the key issues of contestation. While doing so, it identified the key actors 
associated with the Polepally SEZ and portrayed their actions, debates, positions and discourse. 
The ruling regime, including the ruling party and supporting bureaucracy, viewed SEZs as a 
positive instrument to foster development. The opposition political parties took a shifting stand 
as per the context. The affected farmers totally opposed the SEZ in Polepally and demanded 
scrapping of it. The individual activists, civil society and human rights groups, NGO’s and 
scholars supported the farmers’ stand and provided rational arguments against the SEZ model 
of development. The activities and positions of the ruling and opposition political parties, civil 
society and human rights groups, academicians, individual activists, affected farmers, 
bureaucrats, and SEZ developers were discussed in this chapter in order to narrate the story of 
Polepally SEZ in its diversity. 
  
The chapter explained how farmers used a combination of formal and substantive democratic 
means to counter dispossession. The chapter has shown that Harvey’s notion of merger of 
different struggles is not a tenable proposition when seen in the light of the empirics of 
dispossession in Polepally. The chapter indicated relevance of Karl Polanyi’s conception of a 
counter movement need to be qualified from case to case and region to region in the Indian 
context.  
  
This and the previous chapter on Polepally enabled an understanding of dispossession from 
‘what’ and ‘how’ perspectives. But the story of ‘why’ YSR government unleashed 
dispossession is a matter of concern. YSR knowingly/unknowingly imbibed the Machiavellian 
realist traits of managing the affairs of the state. Being such a shrewd politician, one might ask 
why YSR, notwithstanding the fact that it may harm his electoral and political fortunes, 
aggressively pursued the idea of setting up a SEZ in Polepally and of course various other 
places in AP. The next chapter on Polepally SEZ provides a sense of the ‘why’ part of the SEZ 
story through a detailed analysis of state-capital alliance during YSR’s tenure.   
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Chapter 6: The Polepally SEZ: The policy process unveiled 
  
On 31 March 2012, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) filed a charge sheet against the 
Kadapa MP and YSR Congress Party (YSRCP) Chief, Jagan Mohan Reddy. The 68-page 
charge sheet was the first one, subsequently followed by several others, pertaining to Jagan’s 
illegal assets case. The charge sheet named Jagan as the accused number one and listed 12 other 
individuals and business firms in the case. The 12 others mainly included Jagan’s auditor and 
financial advisor, V. Vijay Sai Reddy, government officials including APIIC Vice Chairman 
and Managing Director, B.P. Acharya and three leading corporate pharmaceutical firms – 
Aurobindo, Hetero and Trident Life Sciences (Rahul 2012a).  
  
The CBI primarily alleged that ‘Kadapa M P Y.S. Jaganmohan Reddy prevailed upon his late 
father and former Chief Minister Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy to ensure “nefarious deals” of 
allotting large amounts of land to at least three major companies as a quid-pro-quo for 
investments made into entities owned by him’ (Rahul 2012a). What were these nefarious deals 
CBI was talking about? Who were the key players involved in the deals? What type of quid-
pro-quo arrangements were made? How was the land allotted to the companies mentioned in 
the CBI charge sheet by the then YSR government? Were any other related policies flouted in 
the process of setting up of Polepally SEZ? These are the questions that arise as we read the 
news that made headlines often in national as well as regional media from early 2011. These 
questions, in part, can be directly answered through an analysis of various policies used to set 
up the Polepally SEZ.  
  
This chapter begins by describing how the policies related to the establishment of Polepally 
SEZ were administered (section 1). The CBI allegations against Jagan and his associates are 
detailed in section 2. In section 3, I argue, following Atul Kohli’s pro-business approach, that 
the State of AP in the post-reform period achieved economic growth through a close alliance 
with capital but this also led to inequalities. But what led to inequalities and dispossession of 
the farmers (particularly the marginal and small land-holders) can be understood not just in 
terms of state embracing capital as its main ally, but the collusive relations with capital arrived 
at by senior political leaders for personal gains.  
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6.1 Policy implementation  
The State government used the AP Land Acquisition Act (LAA) of 1894 as amended in 1984 
and acquired land in Polepally. As per the LAA (1894), the government can acquire land for 
‘public purpose’ or for a ‘company’. The APIIC was authorised by the government as the 
developer for the Green Industrial Park (GIP) and accordingly the former submitted proposals 
to the concerned authorities for land acquisition. The Mahabubnagar District Collectorate and 
Revenue Department jointly acquired about 960 acres of land and handed over it to the APIIC 
in January 2003.  
  
There were several flaws in the acquisition of land. Starting from 2001 May until 2003 January, 
the State government officials in charge of land acquisition in Polepally informed the farmers 
that their lands were needed to set up a ‘GIP’ to house green industrial units. However, the land 
acquisition notifications in 2003 were issued to set up a ‘Growth Centre’, a central government 
scheme to attract industrialisation in the backward Districts. Further to this, 250 acres within 
the GIP was allotted for pharmaceutical SEZ in 2006.  
  
The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India in its commercial audit report (2006-07) 
for the State of AP pointed out certain anomalies about the APIIC’s misuse of funds as a 
developer of various projects, including the case of Polepally. The CAG report stated that 
government of AP identified an extent of 1,000.16 acres of land at Jadcherla to establish a 
Growth Centre. The government submitted an estimation of approximately ₹3005 lakhs 
(₹30.05 crores) towards the cost of the entire project. Between 2003 and 2006, APIIC spent 
₹7.11 crore towards the project. As the Growth Centre scheme was a joint scheme of the central 
and State government, APIIC received funds amounting to ₹6.45 crore from the union 
government, ₹45 lakhs from State government and itself contributed ₹21 lakhs. But it 
transformed the Growth Centre scheme into a GIP in 2005 (Comptroller and Auditor General 
of India [CAG] 2007). 
  
The irony is APIIC neither established the Growth Centre nor the GIP as proposed earlier. 
Rather it converted the said project into a SEZ comprising of various pharmaceutical firms. 
The setting up of SEZ in place of a Growth Centre was a deviation from the guidelines of the 
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government of India. This is because the Growth Centre is ‘meant for promotion of 
industrialization in backward areas by allotting land to small and medium scale industries’ and 
whereas the SEZ ‘is a specially delineated enclave treated as foreign territory for the purpose 
of industrial service and trade operations’ (Comptroller and Auditor General of India [CAG] 
2007, p. 33). Moreover, the Government of India (GoI) provided subsidies and grants to 
establish a Growth Centre.  
  
The government of AP in Polepally altered the intended purpose of land acquisition through 
the establishment of a pharmaceutical SEZ in a GIP. The displaced farmers were not informed 
about the change in the project. Legal experts and activists argued, had the government 
communicated its intention to establish a pharma SEZ in Polepally, farmers would have raised 
objections to it. The pharma companies’ operations involve pollution of the surrounding 
environment (Balagopal 2009). These companies have the potential to pollute entire ground 
water, making the remaining land unfit for cultivation. There is also inevitable danger of the 
pharma SEZ polluting the nearby Dundibi River, which flows into the Krishna River, making 
the whole region unfit for agriculture and of course making the whole area unsuitable for living 
purposes (Polepally Anti SEZ United Forum 2008).  
  
In the case of Polepally SEZ, there is no reference to the project clearance from Andhra Pradesh 
Pollution Control Board (APPCB). However, the government claims that the pharma 
companies were authorised in Polepally to set up only formulation units and not bulk drug and 
Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API) manufacturing units. While the API manufacturing 
activities result in polluting the environment, formulation units do not cause damage to the 
natural habitat.  
  
The government stated that the land was acquired through the passing of a ‘consent award’. 
This implies that government authorities discussed with the land losers the price and other 
technical issues before taking possession of their lands. As per the APIIC records, the price of 
the land and other benefits were negotiated with the farmers and then a consent award was 
passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO) of Mahabubnagar District in 2005. As noted 
in table 4.2, the compensation paid per acre in Polepally for the best Patta (title deed) land was 
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₹75,000. This amount included the MV+ Solatium of 30%+Additional MV of 12 %+ 50% of 
the sum of these components. The government claimed, as a rule, the calculation of the said 
compensation amount in Polepally was based on the sale of the land for the preceding three 
years in the same area. However, the land in Shamshabad for setting up the Rajiv Gandhi 
International Airport was acquired in 2003 paying 4 lakhs per acre for the best category of land 
(Sunil Reddy 2005). Shamshabad is not very far from Polepally and there is no justification as 
to why the compensation was paid less in the case of the latter.  
  
The AP Land Acquisition (Negotiation Committee) Rules, 1992, mentioned that in cases of 
land acquisition, a District level committee should be constituted. Such a committee consists 
of a District Collector, Judge of the District concerned, special Collector of the project 
concerned, the land acquisition officer (RDO or MRO), the executive engineer from roads and 
buildings, panchayat and so on (wherever structures are involved), and a nominee of the 
requisition department. The committee, thus constituted, should elaborately discuss with the 
people whose land is being acquired and then decide on the consent award (Government of 
Andhra Pradesh [GoAP] 1992). In case the committee does not arrive at a consensus, then the 
same should be referred to a State level committee constituted as per AP Land Acquisition 
(Negotiations Committee) Rules, 1998. The State level committee comprises of the 
Commissioner of Land Revenue, Secretary to Land Revenue and a retired Judge (Government 
of Andhra Pradesh [GoAP] 1998a; Government of Andhra Pradesh [GoAP] 1998b).  
  
However, in Polepally, no such committee was constituted to discuss land acquisition on a 
democratic basis involving all the concerned stakeholders. Documents from the APIIC, which 
the author of this thesis acquired under the Right to Information Act, reveal that 
‘Meetings/Gram Sabhas have been convened to explain the land acquisition process and 
convince the pattedars about the benefits involved to receive the compensation on consent 
basis’. But why did revenue officials convince the farmers to part with their lands? The answer 
is simple. The government had to convince the farmers because they refused to part with their 
lands. When farmers refused, the concerned State authorities threatened them with dire 
consequences. The farmers were given to understand that the consequence of their refusal 
would result in not only the forceful acquisition of their lands but even foregoing the offered 
compensation amount. This dilemma created by the State bureaucracy led many farmers to 
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accept the monetary compensation offered to them (Eenadu 28 April 2008). This means it was 
a one-sided affair and the refusal of accepting such an award would result in hardships to the 
landowners.  
  
The convenor of the Human Rights Forum (HRF), K. Balagopal, argued that the consent was 
no consent at all. RDO called the few ruling elite of the village community and explained the 
whole process of passing the award. These ruling elite accepted the ‘structured’ consent award 
and, as per the instructions of the Revenue authorities, persuaded other farmers to accept this. 
Most of these elders were pro-government and hence not only gave their consent but pressured 
the remaining farmers to accept the award on a consent basis. Further, farmers unwilling to part 
with their land were threatened that if they did not accept the consent award, they would have 
to face bureaucratic and legal hurdles. They were told that, even if they did not give their 
consent, the government could use the clause of ‘eminent domain’ under LAA to acquire land 
for the company (Human Rights Bulletin 10, 2009, p. 115-116).  
  
The Government of AP issued G.O.Ms. No.68 in 2005. This Government Order (G.O.) 
provided measures for proper resettlement and rehabilitation of the people displaced through 
development projects. The G.O. stated that a ‘Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administrator’ 
(R&R Administrator) has to be appointed to discuss with affected people about the least 
displacing alternative. The R&R administrator has to explain to the concerned stakeholders 
about the facts and figures of land needed for the project and, taking their views into account, 
decide whether the identified area is the right place for the proposed project. Based on the 
report of the land administrator, the land acquisition proposal is finalised.  
  
But no such administrator was appointed in the case of Polepally. The location and other related 
provisions of the rehabilitation and resettlement must be decided by the administrator in 
consultation with the displaced persons as per the G.O. contents. Thus, it is clear that 
democratic process is sine qua non for deciding the R&R measures. Moreover, the worth of 
this Government Order (GO) is found in its relief measures for not just Project Displaced 
Persons but also for Project Affected Persons or, in short, for PAPs (Government of Andhra 
Pradesh [GoAP] 2005a). There were several such poor people who did not own any land but 
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used to work as agricultural labourers in Polepally to earn their livelihood. But PAPs to date 
were not identified in Polepally.  
  
The ex-gratia paid to the assignees was only ₹18,000 per acre. As per the G.O.Ms. No. 1307 
issued by the Revenue Department of AP, the assigned landholders whose lands were resumed 
for the projects are entitled to the ex-gratia equivalent to the market value and an additional 30 
percent Solatium. Assignees as per this G.O. cannot claim additional market value and are 
barred from approaching a Court of law for enhancement of compensation (Government of 
Andhra Pradesh [GoAP] 1993). However, the High Court of AP ruled in one of the cases in 
2004 that an assignee in possession of government land should be given compensation on par 
with any private landowner (AP High Court 2004, p. 21). The Government of AP filed a 
‘special leave petition’ against this judgment in the Supreme Court and obtained a stay order 
making the decision of the High Court inapplicable (Seethalakshmi 2009, p. 46).  
  
Even if G.O.Ms. No. 1307 is taken into consideration, the compensation offered to the 
displaced assigned landholders of Polepally cannot be justified. The market value for the last 
category of land, dry interior lands, was fixed as ₹24,000 per acre in Polepally. As per 1307 
G.O., 30% Solatium has to be added to this and accordingly the amount would total to ₹31, 
200. Thereafter the same GO entitled the assignees to claim amount towards structural 
developments made on their lands. But government paid only ₹18,000 to the Polepally 
displaced farmers and how they arrived at this still remains a question. Moreover, many 
assignees alleged that half of the amount was siphoned off by middlemen. Most of them got 
only between ₹8,000 and ₹10,000 per acre (Andhra Jyothi 26 March 2007). The government 
of AP in this case thus overruled its own laws and regulations.  
  
The Mahabubnagar District Collector in a press note stated that the land was acquired in 
Polepally through the willing consent of the farmers. In 2002, she stated, the market value of 
the land around Jadcherla was quite low. While the market value was only ₹12,000 the 
government paid 30 percent more than that. She asserted that farmers were never coerced to 
part with their lands. She stated farmers began to agitate as the land was sold to the pharma 
units at the rate of ₹0.7 lakhs per acre. She accepted that the land was sold at much higher 
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prices to the private firms. But the enhanced selling rate was a consequence of the sudden 
upsurge in land prices owing to the inauguration of the international airport in Shamshabad, 
which is close to Polepally. As the land was acquired legally, it cannot be given back to the 
farmers (Eenadu 27 April 2008).  
  
The policy implementation, as discussed above, was quite erroneous, particularly with regard 
to land acquisition, resettlement and rehabilitation. This revealed how government can flout 
several of its own policies to act in favour of implementing a market-led industrial model. 
Displaced farmers did not even know that a pharma SEZ was being set up on their lands. The 
change in the project without the consent of the people indicates that in the present model of 
development, people, particularly the marginalised, do not matter. The behaviour of the ruling 
elite can be understood, if one considers the methods adopted by the government to set up 
Polepally SEZ. The following pages detail how YSR, doled out favours to the companies in 
Polepally SEZ to benefit his only son.  
  
6.2 Jagan’s disproportionate assets connection  
The APIIC allotted land to seven pharma companies in the Polepally SEZ. These include 
Aurobindo Pharma, Hetero Drugs, Glochem Industries, Epsilon Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., 
MSN Laboratories, Smilax Laboratories and Raichem Pharma Ltd. While Smilax, MSN, 
Epsilon, and Glochem units were granted about 5 acres of land each, Raichem was provided 
with about 10 acres of land. The major chunk of the land was allotted to Aurobindo and Hetero 
companies. These two firms were given 75 acres of land each. The first company to begin its 
operations, making the SEZ functional, was Aurobindo pharma. It began its operations on 21 
November 2009. Hetero inaugurated its formulation unit in Polepally SEZ in April 2010.  
  
In July 2006, the Aurobindo and Hetero firms wrote separately to the APIIC asking to grant 75 
acres of land each in the Polepally SEZ for setting up their units. The companies requested the 
APIIC authorities to grant the land at ₹0.7 lakhs per acre and accordingly land was allotted to 
them (Janyala 2012). Many opposition parties, particularly the TDP, in the wake of Polepally 
SEZ becoming controversial, alleged YSR of extending undue favours to these two and other 
private corporate business entities for their investments in his son’s businesses (Eenadu 26 
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April 2008; Eenadu 30 April 2008). Despite these allegations against YSR, no probe was 
ordered by the Congress-led UPA government due to the electoral considerations. India was 
about to go to polls in 2009 and AP was an important State for the UPA government to win its 
second term. In this context, the charges of corruption against YSR government were not taken 
seriously by the central government.  
  
YSR played a key role in leading Congress to win the 2004 and 2009 Assembly and 
Parliamentary elections. After the untimely demise of YSR, the central as well as the State 
Congress leadership developed differences with Jagan as the latter aspired for CM’s position.45 
As the Congress high command did not concede to Jagan’s demand, differences erupted 
between them. Subsequently, Jagan floated his own Party, YSRCP in May 2011.  
  
The differences between Jagan and the Congress high command grew over time. Senior 
congress leader and Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) from Secunderabad Cantonment, 
P. Shankar Rao, wrote a letter to the High Court of AP on 22 November 2010 requesting it to 
order a CBI enquiry into the alleged misappropriation of public property and criminal 
conspiracy by Jagan Mohan Reddy. He alleged Jagan of earning assets in an illegal manner 
when his father was the CM of AP. He stated that Jagan had ₹0.11 lakhs worth of assets in 
2004. However, in a very short time Jagan amassed 43,000 crore worth of assets, particularly 
during the period in which YSR was the CM. Shankar Rao’s letter was taken up as a ‘writ 
petition’ by the apex Court of AP (Dharur 2011). On 14 March 2011, three senior Telugu 
Desam Party (TDP) leaders – K. Yerramnaidu, P. Ashok Gajapathi Raju and Byreddy 
Rajasekhara Reddy – also filed a petition which supported Shankar Rao’s petition. The TDP 
leaders alleged in their petition that Jagan earned enormous wealth through illegal means using 
the influence of his CM father between 2004 and 2009 at the expense of the public exchequer 
(The Times of India 15 March 2011). 
                                                          
45 Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy (known as Jagan) is the only son of late Chief Minister of AP, YSR. He campaigned 
for the Congress Party in 2004 AP Assembly and Parliamentary elections. He contested for the Parliamentary seat 
of Cuddapah from Congress Party and became a Member of Parliament in May 2009 Lok Sabha Polls. He broke 
relationship with the Congress Party’s central high command six months after the untimely demise of his father, 
YSR in a helicopter crash. The differences owed to his aspiration of becoming the CM of the AP State. He floated 
his own Party, Yuvajana, Shramika, Rythu Congress Party (YSRCP) in March 2011. He resigned as MP from 
Congress and got re-elected with a significant majority contesting as YSRCP candidate in the May 2011 by- 
election to Cuddapah constituency of AP.  
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Acting on the petitions of Congress and TDP leaders, the High Court of AP issued an order on 
12 July 2011 directing the CBI to conduct a preliminary investigation into the illegal assets of 
Jagan and submit a report within two weeks. The Court sought such an enquiry only to ascertain 
the necessity to conduct a full CBI probe into the matter (The Times of India 13 July 2011; The 
Hindu 13 July 2011). Following this, Jagan filed a petition in the Supreme Court of India to 
quash the High Court order for a preliminary investigation by CBI. He submitted in the petition 
that the AP High Court’s 12 July 2011 interim order pertaining to his case was based on 
‘politically motivated’ petitions filed by his political rivals to settle political scores. However, 
on 22 July 2011, the Apex Court of India rejected Jagan’s request to stop the CBI inquiry into 
his alleged misappropriation assets case (The Times of India 23 July 2011). This led the CBI to 
probe the case unhindered. CBI submitted a preliminary confidential report on Jagan’s alleged 
illegal assets case to the AP High Court on 26 July 2011. The CBI team, headed by its Joint 
Director, V. Lakshminarayana, probed 23 companies that invested in Jagan’s business entities. 
The team also investigated the irregularities pertaining to EMAAR Company that entered into 
an agreement with APIIC for housing projects (The Hindu 27 July 2011; The Times of India 27 
July 2011).  
  
On 10 August 2011, the High Court of AP delivered its verdict on Jagan’s illegal assets case. 
Through its judgement, it ordered the CBI to conduct a full probe into Jagan’s disproportionate 
assets case (AP High Court 2011). The CBI, following the Court orders, filed a First 
Information Report (FIR) against Jagan and 73 others on 17 August 2011. The CBI’s FIR listed 
Jagan as accused number one. The investigation into the disproportionate case including the 
alleged irregularities in the Polepally and similar projects sanctioned by the YSR government 
revealed the following: Jagan amassed illegal wealth causing great losses to the public 
exchequer; YSR, the former CM, used his office to the benefit of his son, Jagan; Jagan floated 
several companies, notably, Jagati publications and Janani Infrastructure, in the period between 
2004 and 2009; and leading corporate firms such as Aurobindo and Hetero invested in Jagan’s 
companies and in return received benefits from the decisions of the YSR regime in the form of 
land allotments for SEZs, contracts for irrigation projects, special relaxations, permissions and 
industrial licenses for real estate ventures, hotels, mining and other projects (Supreme Court of 
India 2013, p. 1-3). CBI through its probe filed several cases against Jagan and his business 
associates. On 27 May 2012, the CBI arrested Jagan.  
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The CBI considered the issue of investments made by several companies into the businesses of 
Jagan. It alleged that such investments were made on a ‘quid-pro-quo’ basis. Based on seven 
months of investigation, CBI submitted its first charge sheet on 31 March 2012. The charge 
sheet stated that 75 acres of land to Aurobindo and 75 acres of land to Hetero companies in the 
Polepally pharma SEZ were allotted by the YSR government and in return these companies 
invested in Jagan’s Jagati Publications and Janani Infrastructure. YSR, persuaded by his son, 
misused his CM’s position and pressured B.P. Acharya, the MD of APIIC, to allot land to these 
two companies. The charge sheet held that the MD of APIIC, without taking cognizance of the 
rules, allotted the land at ₹0.7 lakhs per acre to the companies in Polepally pharma SEZ while 
the Price Fixation Committee (PFC) of the APIIC fixed 15-20 lakhs per acre. B.P. Acharya, 
the then MD of APIIC, cleared the file in haste on the grounds that the CM had decided the 
amount of land and price at which it should be sanctioned to these companies. The land was 
allotted in November 2006. The transaction, according to the charge sheet, resulted in a loss of 
12.26 crore to the government (Rahul 2012a). Besides these two companies, the CBI also 
named Trident Life Services Pharma Company as accused.  
  
The Enforcement Directorate (ED) of India initiated a probe against Jagan in 2012.46 Since 
then, it has been investigating several cases of ‘money laundering’ against Jagan.47 The ED 
alleged that Jagan laundered the illegally obtained money, routing it through several companies 
and individuals. He also influenced his father to dole out favours to the companies which 
purchased shares in his business entities at a high premium. The ED announced provisional 
attachment of the properties of Jagan and of the firms invested in his company for violation of 
provisions of ‘Prevention of Money Laundering Act’ (PMLA).48 These properties included 
movable as well as immovable assets. The ED attached 35 acres of land and fixed deposit of 
₹3 crores of Hetero Drugs, 96 acres of land and fixed deposit of ₹3 crores of Aurobindo 
                                                          
46 The ED deals with the economic offenses in India. It came into existence on 1 June 2000. It is authorised to 
investigate and enforce, inter alia, provisions of Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002 and provisions of the 
Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999. Enforcement directorate of India website, 
<http://www.enforcementdirectorate.gov.in/index.html>.  
47 ‘Money laundering involves disguising financial assets so that they can be used without detection of the illegal 
activity that produced them. Through money laundering, the launderer transforms the monetary proceeds derived 
from criminal activity into funds with an apparently legal source’. Ministry of Finance, GoI website, 
<http://fiuindia.gov.in/faq-moneylaundering.htm>.  
48 The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA 2002) is the legal framework to prevent money 
laundering in India. The act along with its rules came into existence on 1 July 2005.  
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pharma, 13 acres of land of Janani Infrastructure and fixed deposit of ₹14.5 crores of Jagati 
Publications. The ED alleged that allotment of 150 acres of land to Aurobindo and Hetero at 
lower rates than fixed by the PFC of APIIC led to gains of 8.60 crore to each of the two 
companies. In return for the gains accrued from the land deal, these two companies invested in 
Jagan’s businesses. The ED stated that the form of equity contribution by the companies were 
in fact ‘kickbacks’ for the favours done by the YSR government. Subsequent to the provisional 
attachment orders, the ED filed complaints against these companies before the ED adjudicating 
authority under PMLA (Rahul 2012b).  
  
The ED adjudicating authority confirmed the attachment of ₹122 crore worth of properties of 
Jagan and his business associates on 20 February 2013. The adjudicating authority 
confirmation implies that the movable and immovable assets as mentioned by the ED in its 
announcement on 4 October 2012 will also be transferred to the ED, besides 71 crores of Emaar 
properties. These properties which include the part of the assets of the Polepally pharma 
companies would now be owned by the ED (The Times of India 21 February 2013; Deccan 
Chronicle 21 February 2013). 
  
The CBI filed a supplementary charge sheet to its first charge sheet on 2 April 2013. The first 
charge sheet, besides others, mentioned three pharma companies – Aurobindo, Hetero and 
Trident – as accused in Jagan’s illegal assets case. The 26-page supplementary charge sheet 
made charges against the three pharma companies deviating from the Companies Act and 
thereby receiving undue favours from the government on a quid pro quo basis. These three 
companies invested ₹35 crores in Jagati publications albeit the fact that the shares were 
overvalued. While each share cost only ₹10, these companies bought them at ₹350 each. The 
CBI gathered strong evidence against the investment of the Hetero and Aurobindo companies 
which sought benefits from the YSR government for land allotments in Polepally SEZ. While 
Aurobindo invested ₹3 crores in Jagati publications, Hetero had invested ₹14.5 crores in Jagati 
and ₹15 crore in Janani infrastructure. Both Jagati and Janani are owned and promoted by Jagan 
Mohan Reddy (Srinivas Rao 2013). The supplementary charge sheet has gathered oral and 
documentary evidences and also based its allegations on the reports of the Registrar of 




These gross violations of established legal canons can be explained in the context of state 
capital alliance in AP. This alliance, in the case of YSR can be traced to the fact of his misusing 
the office under the influence of his son, Jagan. So, the question which needs to be addressed 
is whether the ‘state-capital’ alliance resulted in the dispossession of Polepally farmers or 
‘collusive state-capital deals’ propelled by the dynasty of the apex political leadership in AP. 
This also tends to build on Harvey’s theory of global capital circuits leading to Polepally-type 
dispossession explained in the previous chapters of the thesis. The following section details the 
pro-business perspective of Atul Kohli which explains the exclusion and deprivation of the 
bottom half of the society, the majority poor, from cherishing the fruits of economic growth 
because of narrow state-capital alliance. I agree with what Kohli says. But I take his argument 
further to explain that how collusive state-capital alliance emanating from dynastic 
compulsions of the apex political leadership of AP were responsible for the dispossession and 
deprivation of the farmers in Polepally.  
  
6.3 Intertwined interests  
Kohli (2006a; 2006b; 2012) argues that the pro-business tilt of the Indian state since the 1980s 
transformed India’s economic growth49. This pro-business drift is reflected in the Indian state’s 
prioritising economic growth through its emphasis on production by commercial and business 
groups, embracing private capital as its main ally, and abandoning its anti-capitalist stance and 
consequently any commitment to economic re-distribution. Kohli asserts that while state-
business alliance has been responsible for rapid economic growth, it also led to the exclusion 
of the majority of the poor in India from sharing the benefits of such growth.  
  
Kohli’s argument focuses on the basic realignment of state and class forces in India’s new 
political economy. He argues against the scholars adhering to pro-market growth narratives 
(Das 2000; Ahluwalia 2002; Srinivasan and Tendulkar 2003) for the latter’s assertion that 
India’s transition to high growth began with its adoption of macro-economic reforms in the 
                                                          
49 The GDP growth rate in India from 1950 until 1980 grew at 3.5 percent annually. However, the policy and 
attitudinal shift on part of the state towards private capital starting since the 1980s led to a transformation of the 
Indian economic performance. India, between 1980 and 1990, grew at 5.8 percent annually. Between 1991 and 
2008, it grew at the rate of nearly 7 percent annually. On an average, between 1980 and the present, it grew more 
than 6 percent per annum.  
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1990s. The pro-market orientation holds that India’s integration into the global economy and 
the emergence of a less interventionist state, which allowed the free flow of market forces to 
operate in the 1990s, was responsible for the sustenance of high levels of growth. 
  
Pro-business and pro-market orientation  
Although both pro-business and pro-market strands differ with respect to the actual date of 
reforms, they converge on the existence of the issue of income inequalities and distributional 
conflict. Kohli, who takes the 1980s as a starting point of reform, argues that the rising 
inequalities and distributional conflicts in India owed to the narrow state-producer alliance 
which prioritised economic growth above ‘economic redistribution or to a broad-based polity’ 
(Kohli 2012, p. 3). Scholars, particularly Srinivasan (2001) and Bhagwati and Panagariya 
(2013), who take the 1990s as the real period of economic transformation, assert that the state’s 
lack of commitment to expedite economic reforms perpetuated poverty and wealth disparities.  
  
The central concern of Kohli’s thesis (2006a; 2012) is the changing role of the state vis-à-vis 
the economy in India. The quintessence of his argument is whether the present high growth 
rates, accompanied by growing inequalities, are a result of the ‘state’s embrace of neoliberal 
policies, or from some more complex but identifiable pattern of state intervention’ (Kohli 
2006a, p. 1251). To answer this question, he draws a distinction between pro-business and pro-
market developmental strategies. He argues that India’s growth acceleration began in the 1980s 
through a pro-business shift of the Indian state and not due to the opening of the economy in 
the 1990s. Kohli (2006; 2012) explains the pro-market and pro-business strategies in this 
context in the following way.  
  
A pro-market strategy draws on the neoclassical economic theory of laissez faire and free 
market economy. This strategy views that free play of market forces results in an efficient 
allocation of resources and promotes a competitive economy, which in turn increases industrial 
production and growth. A minimalist state and an open economy are essential conditions for 
augmenting growth. This developmental strategy is critical of import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) strategies and protected economy models, as they lead to repeated fiscal 
and trade imbalances. The adoption of policies such as a reduction of governmental 
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expenditures, withdrawal of public subsidies, privatisation of public sector enterprises, 
devaluation of currency, reduced tariffs, foreign investment, and more importantly strategies 
aimed at export-led growth, are a sine qua non to usher in economic growth and development. 
The pro-market strategy rests on the idea that an efficient, open and competitive economy 
boosts growth, which would, over a period, reduce poverty and various kinds of inequalities in 
the society (Kohli 2012). The pro-market strategy aimed at privatisation, deregulation and 
liberalisation of trade and investment in a broader sense conforms to Harvey’s perspective of 
ABD under the conditions of neoliberalism (Harvey 2005).  
  
A pro-business orientation draws on the real-world experiences, particularly from the success 
growth stories of the East Asian nations such as South Korea. The success and failure in growth 
rates is determined by the ‘quality’ of state intervention. The way a state is organised and its 
institutionalised relationship with the private sector plays an essential role in understanding the 
effectiveness of state intervention in the economy. Effective and proper use of state power leads 
to economic growth. The state’s commitment to achieving high growth rates coincides with the 
profit-maximising needs of the entrepreneurial class. A narrow state-producer coalition based 
on subjugation of labour and gains for private capital with the sole objective of promoting 
economic growth in the name of the nation is a pre-condition of this strategy (Kohli 2012).  
  
Pro-business orientation: the case of AP  
The pro-business orientation of Kohli has potential to explain the developmental strategies 
adopted in AP since the 1980s. The pro-business argument is important to this study in two 
ways. Firstly, the newly emerging regional capitalist class with agrarian origins influenced 
political changes in the AP in the early 1980s paving way for the smooth conduct of the private 
sector in the State. Secondly, the narrow alliance between state and business in the name of 
economic reforms improved growth rates but led to inequalities and dispossession of people.  
  
The pro-business argument holds here as there was a shift on the part of the State’s attitude 
towards business. Kohli himself, writing on the NTR phenomenon in AP, stated that NTR’s 
advent in the 1980s needs to be viewed in the context of the support of the emerging 
entrepreneurial class from one of the dominant socio-economic groups, namely, the Kamma 
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community in the State. The Congress Party lost the financial and political support of this 
community owing to its inability to allow leaders from this community to occupy the top 
political position in the State (Kohli 1988, p. 968). Upadhya (1988a; 1988b) explains how the 
dominant and rich peasant caste of Kammas of Coastal Andhra diverted surplus accrued from 
cultivation of their lands to other commercial business activities such as rice milling, sugar 
production, tobacco processing, film industry, news media and so on, utilising their community 
networks and thereby becoming rich agrarian capitalists of the region.  
  
While Upadhya explained the rise of regional entrepreneurs from one community, Baru (2000) 
extends this argument to demonstrate that it is also true of other castes who diverted their 
surpluses from agriculture into various other businesses, for example, Nagarjuna group of 
industries, GVK group and Dr. Reddy’s laboratories. One of the important observations of Baru 
is that these regional capitalists emerged at a time when the central government of India unduly 
favoured big national business groups (e.g. those own by the Tata and Birla families) through 
the mechanism of the ‘license permit-raj’ and did not provide a congenial environment for 
regional capitalists to grow. In this context, the regional capitalists sought to increase the 
leverage of the State-based regional governments and parties. This, they thought, would 
provide scope for their business expansion. No wonder Baru argued that political parties like 
TDP and its leaders, like Chandrababu Naidu, not only hail from Kamma community but also 
are politically and economically financed by the dynamic regional entrepreneurs from the same 
community (Baru 2000). The important point here is that the regional capitalist class sought 
political clout and the politicians sought the financial and other support of the regional 
entrepreneurial class notwithstanding the fact of their origins. So, a close state-business 
collaboration characterised the political economy of AP in the post-independent era extending 
itself even into the post-reform period.  
  
By the 1980s, AP witnessed the rise of a dynamic regional capitalist class able to take on 
national and even international level business firms in such diverse sectors as pharmaceuticals, 
fertilisers, biotechnology, tobacco, food processing, construction, textiles, leather, real estate, 
films, education, healthcare, tourism, electronics and the software industry (Mooij 2007). But 
the licensing system still posed obstacles to their progress. Fortunately, the emergence of a 
‘federal market economy’ (Rudolph 2001) alongside the rise of the coalition era in the 1990s 
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provided both economic and political autonomy to the State level leaders and parties. This 
became a boon for the regional entrepreneurs in AP to show their potential. At this juncture, 
they supported Chandrababu Naidu of TDP to dislodge the populist government of NTR from 
the same party in 1995. 
  
The efforts to dethrone NTR initially came to be seen as a family matter. But the real reason 
behind this was that the regional capitalists saw NTR’s populist welfare regime as a hindrance 
to their growing business aspirations. They found in NTR’s son-in-law and the then finance 
minister, Chandrababu Naidu, a dynamic leader able to devise policies that would circumvent 
barriers to their accumulation designs. Thus, removing the popularly elected leader was neither 
an intraparty power struggle nor a family drama but ‘a contestation that involved different 
social classes, especially the entrepreneurial class which successfully directed the crisis to a 
finale; one of the dramatis persona being the owner of Eenadu newspaper’ (Alivelu, Srinivasulu 
and Gopinath Reddy 2013, p. 204). The subsequent reform agenda and a pro-business attitude 
of Naidu’s government could be seen as a testimony to see whether it was a family drama or a 
well calculated move on part of the rising entrepreneur class to put in place a leader with 
experience in entrepreneurship. Naidu ‘began life as a small farmer who later diversified into 
poultry and diary products’ (Baru 2000, p. 219). He also had the political experience of working 
under Congress and TDP as well.  
  
Chandrababu Naidu became the CM of the State in 1995. He continued in office for about a 
decade. He proved an astute leader as could be seen from his political acumen in designing 
policies encompassing welfare and development such as Janmabhoomi and supporting central 
coalition government led by NDA. He sought private investments to augment economic 
growth. His vision was aimed at improving growth rates and this he thought could be achieved 
only by providing a congenial business environment in the State. His pro-business measures 
included: industrial development by providing a single window clearance system to speed up 
and facilitate business approvals; tax and various other concessions to business entities and to 
thereby attract investments (mainly private); promotion of information technology (IT); cuts to 
subsidies and public expenditure through raising the price of rice supplied under the public 
distribution scheme; reducing the number of government employees; closing down or 
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privatising the public enterprises; and promoting self-financing initiatives even in the key 
social sectors such as health and education.  
  
Naidu’s government adopted governance and administrative reforms such as e-seva, an e-
government based citizen friendly initiative to facilitate payment of utility bills like electricity, 
tax, telephone and also to procure government licenses and permits; the Computer-aided 
Administration of Registrations Department (CARD), to ease and regularise land and tenancy 
transactions in transparent ways without any corruption; and people’s participatory 
developmental initiatives through the formation of stakeholder committees in irrigation, 
education and village level planning. This does not mean he only implemented neoliberal 
measures alone. He also floated populist welfare policies on the eve of elections appealing to 
the vote bank (Kennedy 2004; Mooij 2007). However, his development policy focussed mainly 
on urban hi-tech service sector growth and neglected the countryside. This, coupled with severe 
drought from 2001 to 2004, led to an agrarian crisis causing the people to dethrone him in the 
2004 elections. The people, unable to bear the distress any longer, voted YSR to power.  
  
Soon after coming to power, YSR met his poll promises of free power and farm loan waiver. 
But he did not deviate from the pro-business policy framework of the previous government. 
The only difference was found in the strategies opted toward selling reforms and not in the 
reform packaging. Mooij (2013, p. 413) aptly states that ‘reforms were not hyped by YSR as 
essential parts of modernization, development and globalisation as Naidu had done earlier’. 
Yet, YSR continued almost all pro-business measures and in fact pursued them more seriously 
as could be seen from the proliferation of SEZs, promotion of industrial corridors, IT sector, 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical hubs.  
  
YSR’s government heavily invested in the areas of large-scale irrigation projects and urban 
development where contracts were awarded to private contractors. Thus ‘in terms of class 
orientation too, the economic policies pursued by the new government did not differ much from 
those of Naidu’s TDP. It also continued to favour a class of industrialists, builders, real estate 
developers, and contractors’ (Mooij 2013, p. 413). One of the key pro-business policies of YSR 
was his aggressive pursuit of SEZ policy. It needs to be noted that the efforts of YSR in this 
172 
 
regard led the State of AP to top the list of both notified and operational SEZs in the country. 
The point is that a growth fetish pro-business approach, understood in terms of a close alliance 
between the state and capital (mainly private), gained credence in the official policy arena of 
AP in the post-liberalisation period. The state-capital alliance also enhanced growth rates, as 
could be seen from AP surpassing the national growth average during YSR’s tenure as CM. 
But, as argued by Kohli, this also led to a wide range of inequalities ‘along several dimensions: 
city versus countryside; across regions; and along class lines’ (Kohli 2012, p. 13).  
  
More importantly, during YSR’s tenure the state-capital alliance led to dispossession and 
deprivation of the farmers, as could be noted from the government’s pro-SEZ policy. But the 
point is whether this dispossession can be attributed to just the state-capital alliance or to a 
more identifiable political-economic pattern. While Kohli clearly argued that this is more due 
to a close state-business alliance, the above case of quid-pro-quo state-business deals during 
YSR’s tenure go beyond this line of thinking. This study provides ample empirical evidence, 
including the Polepally SEZ, to show that it is not just the state-business alliance but collusive 
state-business deals that are responsible for the dispossession.  
  
Dispossession: the dynastic roots  
The point is not that the state embracing capital led to dispossession or inequalities but how 
and why it embraced capital in specific cases and circumstances. YSR misused his official 
position to grant land to pharmaceutical industries in the Polepally pharma SEZ. He violated 
established legal canons in doing so. He could do so because he had firm control over the party 
and the government. His centralising leadership enabled him to bypass all the legal norms 
including the violation of the policy autonomy of the bureaucrats in granting land and other 
necessary permits for SEZ-type industrial, mining and infrastructure projects.  
  
While YSR controlled the party and State affairs in economic matters, the policy choice to 
award the industrial and other relevant permits was in the hands of Jagan. The decision to 
favour select industries in the form of awarding SEZ and other developmental contracts came 
from the dynastic pressures. Jagan floated new business ventures in cement, media and power 
soon after YSR became the CM of the State. He wanted to expand and accumulate using, or 
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rather misusing, his father’s CM position. This he thought could be done through enhancing 
his share price which was just ₹10 at that time.  
  
The understanding between the state and capital was that the firms that sought land, mining 
and license permits to expand further were asked to invest in Jagan’s businesses in the form of 
purchasing shares at an inflated rate. The top corporates housed in the State, like Aurobindo 
and Hetero in this case and several others in similar cases, readily agreed as they thought state 
patronage necessary for further accumulation and expansion of their capital. The state-capital 
alliance was not motivated by an objective vision of development but rather was propelled by 
the dynastic compulsions of the apex political leadership. This study encourages a rethinking 
of Harvey’s theory of ABD, focusing instead on the significance of the subjective state-capital 
alliance, which emanated from the dynastic politics as demonstrated through the empirics of 
the case.  
  
The theoretical arguments of pro-business orientation and the empirical evidences of collusive 
state-business deals in Polepally suggest that both are determined by the ‘quality’ of state 
intervention. It is the subnational apex political leadership’s (read YSR here) decision to 
augment his son’s business prospects which led to the dispossession of the farmers in Polepally. 
The dispossession for capital accumulation in Polepally and AP cannot be comprehended from 
the structural global capitalist dimension. Rather, one can make sense of it only from a bottom 
up perspective in the context of the changed notion of political and economic autonomy at 
subnational-level.  
  
The dispossessed Polepally farmers, unable to bear the injustice thrust upon them by the state, 
switched to the mode of political resistance and questioned the legality of the SEZ project. This 
was also true of several other SEZ-type industrial cases in AP and India. Several of these 
projects were mired in legal controversies and, being opposed at grassroots level, this led to a 
situation of a ‘development deadlock’ (Osksarsson and Nielsen 2014) wherein neither 
industrialisation occurred, nor land was given back to the original claimants. This and other 
implications of the Polepally SEZ-type development projects are detailed in the conclusion of 
this thesis.  
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6.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has demonstrated that rules and regulations were deliberately ignored by the AP 
government to set up the Polepally SEZ. Although the government repeatedly stated that the 
SEZ was created to provide jobs and develop the Polepally village, the real intentions were 
different. The Congress government in AP led by YSR doled out favours to the corporate 
pharmaceutical industries in the form of land allotments in Polepally SEZ at the expense of the 
farmers’ loss of land and livelihood. The Green Industrial Park remained a distant reality, the 
Growth Centre never came and scope for employment in the pharma industry cannot be 
fulfilled as people with farming skills are of no use here.  
  
As propounded by Kohli, the post-reform state in India embraced capital as its main ally. It 
prioritised growth over redistribution. This was also the case with the State of AP. Nikita Sud’s 
(2009, p. 663), remarks on land alienation for industry in the liberalisation era are apt here. She 
argues that the business-friendly state ‘ideationally, institutionally and politically legitimates, 
buffers, negotiates and facilitates a contested and complex liberalising landscape’ to meet the 
needs of private capital. While Kohli and Sud argue that state-capital alliance leads to class and 
rural/urban inequalities, the above empirics of the Polepally case demonstrate that it is not the 
state-capital alliance, but rather their intertwined interests, that result in dispossession. The 
agency responsible for this dispossession is rooted more in the subnational-level apex political 





Chapter 7: Conclusion 
  
The thesis narrated the story of land dispossession, and in doing so attempted to provide 
answers to a set of empirically grounded interrelated questions. These questions were answered 
through a close study of the events pertaining to the operationalisation of Polepally SEZ in the 
South Indian State of Andhra Pradesh (AP). In the process, the study aimed to trace the agency 
responsible for dispossession of farmers from their land in Polepally for the establishment of a 
pharmaceutical SEZ. These questions included the political-economic factors that led the 
political leadership in AP to embrace SEZ policy and the way this programme was 
implemented in Polepally SEZ; the rationale for embracing the SEZ model of development by 
the AP government led by Yeduguri Sandinti Rajasekhara Reddy (YSR) of the Congress Party; 
and the devices used to contain political discontent. This concluding chapter summarises the 
findings on these interrelated questions and draws the broad inferences concerning the SEZ 
model of development. 
 
7.1 The context and the case  
The federal democratic republic of India adopted a state-led developmental model wherein the 
public sector occupied a commanding position in key sectors of the economy. The private 
sector functioned under the centrally controlled stringent regulatory framework. This political 
economic strategy, firstly, led to large-scale public sector investments in industrial and 
infrastructural projects (steel factories, irrigation, power, roads, railways and communication). 
Secondly, the state played a key role in the redistribution of the wealth generated from this 
model of economic development to balance inequalities and tackle poverty. In short, the state 
played a vital role in allowing the poor to share the fruits of the development (Kohli 2012).  
  
Since the 1980s, India has initiated liberal economic reforms in a phased manner. While in the 
1980s the Indian government adopted industry and trade liberalisation to some extent, it 
integrated with the world economy in the 1990s and thereby accelerated the reform process 
(Bardhan 2010). The liberalisation of the Indian economy created a business-friendly 
environment wherein rules and regulations for doing trade and business (domestic and foreign) 
were simplified. Market, with private capital control over development projects, became the 
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key determinant of economic growth. India took radical measures in the reform of its trade and 
investment policies. But it adopted a gradual approach toward the privatisation of the public 
sector, withdrawal of subsidies and agricultural reforms for the fear of a popular backlash 
(Varshney 1998).  
  
Several socio-political and economic changes either just preceded or have accompanied the 
liberalisation of the Indian economy. Among these, the study took stock of the three significant 
interrelated changes and their influence on the State of AP. These included subnational political 
autonomy, federal market economy and the upsurge of mass politics both in electoral and non-
electoral arenas (Rudolph and Rudolph 2002; Menon and Nigam 2007). The thesis claimed 
that AP’s senior political leaders, particularly the centralising CMs (Manor 2015), using the 
subnational political-economic autonomy, devised market-led growth strategies to usher in 
economic growth, overcoming the challenges from subaltern sections expected in times of 
transition in a political democracy. The decision of the government to embrace development 
models such as SEZs led to the dispossession of the farmers from their land. To assess its 
claims, the thesis focussed on the YSR government’s land-allotments for the establishment of 
SEZ-type development projects in Polepally and AP.  
  
Theoretically, the study is based on Harvey’s theory of Accumulation by Dispossession (ABD). 
It refines and improves upon Harvey’s capital flows logic which attributed dispossession of the 
poor, farmers and marginalised in developing societies to the redeployment of the 
overaccumulated capital in the global economy; and, more importantly, the idea that neoliberal 
financial and credit institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank dictate the developing 
nations to design policies aimed at surplus capital absorption (Harvey 2003). The study 
demonstrates how the political-economic dynamics in a federal market economy (with specific 
reference to the State of AP here) can be a theoretical vantage point to comprehend 
dispossession for capital accumulation. 
  
The thesis specifically focusses on the SEZ model of development through a detailed study of 
a single case, the Polepally SEZ, located in the Polepally village of Jadcherla Mandal in the 
Mahabubnagar District of AP. It locates this study in the context of liberalisation of the Indian 
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economy and consequential reforms adopted by its subnational entities. The YSR 
government’s (2004-2009) pro-active response to SEZ, and other similar development projects 
developed and operated mainly by private capital, formed the regional context in which the 
story of dispossession in Polepally SEZ is narrated. The thesis argues that the Polepally SEZ-
type developmental models can be better comprehended in the context of a growing state-
business nexus in AP. The data is obtained through newspaper clippings, policy documents, 
media reports, NGO reports, web-blogs, Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and 
Enforcement Directorate (ED) reports, Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) audit reports 
and secondary sources.  
  
SEZs are not new to India. They have existed in the form of Export Processing Zones (EPZs) 
since the 1960s. At the turn of the millennium, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA) adopted the SEZ model of development replacing the earlier EPZ 
regime. The inspiration for India’s reformulation of its export zone policy came from China’s 
SEZ model of development. The Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government 
institutionalised SEZ policy in 2005 through the adoption of the SEZ Law. SEZs are expected 
to promote exports, attract investments, create employment opportunities and foster regional 
development with active involvement of private capital for both their development and 
operations (Aggarwal 2012; Jenkins 2011). The Indian SEZ experience indicates that the 
developmental goals as enshrined in its policy have not been realised. Moreover, SEZs became 
a potential source of discontent as they lead to displacement of the farmers from their land 
(Levien 2011; Srinivasulu 2014).  
  
Ignoring the fact that SEZs have failed to achieve the set policy objectives and also that their 
establishment is not without social and political costs, several State governments across the 
length and breadth of India embraced SEZ policy. Harvey’s theory of ABD explains the zealous 
pursuit of SEZ policy from the perspective of structural dimensions of capital. While Harvey 
conceived ABD as an economic process, the thesis has demonstrated that it is also an extra-
economic process. The thesis, drawing on the empirics of the AP government’s role in land 
alienation for SEZs and other developmental projects accounted for the dispossession of the 




The State of AP embarked upon economic reforms following the liberalisation of the Indian 
economy. The State, since the mid-1990s, made headlines for the pro-reform leadership of 
Chandrababu Naidu of TDP across the States of India and the world over, particularly in the 
eyes of the developed western nations (US and UK) and international financial donor agencies 
and institutions. AP became a favourable investment destination for domestic and global 
investors by the turn of the millennium (Kennedy 2004; Mooij 2007). Irrespective of the party 
in power and their ideological commitments, reforms continued unabated (Mooij 2013). This 
thesis, in this context, details the role and response of the Congress government led by YSR in 
AP to the SEZ-type industrial policies.  
  
YSR won the 2004 elections on the promise of alleviating the distress of the rural populace and 
the poor. But his decision to alienate thousands of acres of farmland for SEZs led to the 
dispossession of people, particularly the marginalised and small farmers from their land. YSR 
government flouted established rules and procedures in allocating land to the private entities. 
This resulted in financial losses to the State’s exchequer. There was popular resistance against 
state-led transfer of land, particularly in rural areas, to SEZs and similar development projects. 
YSR’s factional background and the lack of an alternative party with a viable agenda came in 
handy for him to exercise power in an authoritarian manner to control the popular resistance. 
In addition to this, the enhanced State revenues (Elliott 2011) enabled YSR to fulfil his populist 
electoral promises, besides floating the new ones. The welfare measures also halted the 
growing restiveness to coalesce into a potential force to block the development projects of the 
YSR government. But what led a government elected on a pro-rural plank to dispossess farmers 
can be explained only when answers to it are sought in the context of YSR’s son’s business 
ambitions.  
  
YSR’s only son, Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy, set up businesses in power, cement and media after 
his father became the CM. He influenced his father to grant several concessions to the 
established business houses of the State for their return investments in his businesses. YSR 
misused his official position and provided incentives to select business houses which resulted 
in dispossession of the marginalised sections of the society. Thus, the state-business nexus 
which was set up for promoting the business empire of Jagan was the main cause for the loss 
of assets of the marginalised people. YSR’s rule witnessed the coexistence of growth, 
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corruption and welfare. His art of balancing welfare and development which are antithetical to 
each other in a market economy (Suri 2005) legitimised dispossession. The point made here is 
that the changed dynamics of federal democratic polity made it possible to trace the real agents 
responsible for the implications following the execution of SEZ programme.  
  
The case of Polepally is investigated in the broader context of changes to the political economy 
of AP since the 1990s. The Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (APIIC) 
acquired 954.23 acres of land in Polepally and surrounding villages. The process of land 
acquisition was completed between 2001 and 2005. The land in Polepally was acquired 
originally for setting up a Green Industrial Park (GIP). 
  
A majority of farmers in Polepally were either marginal or small farmers owning less than 2 
hectares (5 acres) of land. The small landholders became a barrier for the private firms to 
acquire land on their own (Levien 2013). Added to this, there was also the problem of assigned 
land granted by the government to the landless poor. Thus, the land records, the legal owner/s 
of the land, the quantity of land owned by individuals and their legal status (Assigned or Patta 
[title deed] land) is known only to the land administration of the State government. Hence the 
state intervention to facilitate land acquisition for several developmental projects like 
irrigation, roads, railways, ports, mining, SEZs and industrial hubs assumes importance in AP 
and of course across the States of India. The mandatory state’s role in the land grants to private 
capital contravenes the celebrated neoliberal doctrine of a limited government or non-
interference of the state in a market economy (Harvey 2005).  
  
The land acquired for setting up a GIP in Polepally was latter allotted by APIIC for SEZ and 
other industrial purposes. The changes made to the project were not explained to the farmers. 
The government acquired land paying compensation to the farmers at less than the prevailing 
market rates. Assignee landholders, mostly belonging to Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled 
Tribe (ST) communities, were hard hit as they were paid a meagre ₹18,000 per acre as 
compensation. The process of land acquisition was non-transparent in nature. No global 
capitalist forces were involved in this entire process, except the provincial State government. 
This stands in contrast to Harvey’s logic of the influence of the global financial agencies.  
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At the time of land acquisition, the AP government created an impression among the farmers 
that their and their family lives would be secured in the GIP. The government assured the 
farmers that the GIP would employ people with farming and allied skills. But YSR’s decision 
in 2006 to earmark 250 acres of the land within the GIP for a pharmaceutical SEZ belied the 
aspirations and dreams of farmers to a secured life. The news of a pharma company frustrated 
the displaced farmers who were already bereft of their basic means of subsistence for more 
than five years. They resisted against the government’s decision to set up pharma SEZ on their 
lands. Civil society groups, legal and human right activists and opposition political parties 
supported them in their fight against the YSR government. The protests were carried out in 
democratic ways.  
  
The YSR government filed cases against protestors and resorted to violence to stop the agitation 
at the construction site of the SEZ units of Aurobindo and Hetero pharma firms on several 
occasions. Yielding to the protests, the government sanctioned 200 sq. yards of plot to each 
displaced farmer, ₹70,000 more compensation and a burial ground to bury their dead ones. The 
displaced farmers wanting their land back even contested the elections in 2008 and 2009 to 
show the world about the state-led forceful dispossession at the behest of private capital. This 
act of contesting elections reinforced the democratic character of their protest. 
  
Karl Polanyi, writing in 1944 on the implications of a market society, argues that a ‘self-
adjusting’ market is a utopia. A market society requires that land, labour and money be treated 
as commodities. These three components (land, labour and money), Polanyi asserts, were 
historically uncommodified. For Polanyi, market throughout history was subordinated to 
society. But in a market economy, the economy becomes autonomous and is no longer under 
the control of polity, religion, tradition, culture and social relations. The separation of the 
economy from society implies the commodification of land, labour and money which , in fact, 
are not and cannot be commodities in the sense of goods produced for sale in the market. This 
type of commodification of land, labour and money gives rise to counter-movements from 
society. Different classes join hands to fight against the commodification of these three 
elements and seek social protection to save human society from the ravages of the market. As 
noted in Chapters 1 and 5 of this thesis, Polanyi argued that the ill consequences of counter 
movements against the market witnessed between the two world wars illustrated the 
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implausibility of a self-regulating market. However, Polanyi’s prediction that market 
fundamentalism would not be revived proved wrong with the global turn to neoliberal ideology 
since the 1970s. 
  
True to Polanyi’s thesis, the case of Polepally indicated a counter-movement. This was also the 
case with several other such development projects in AP and India. But the Polepally 
movement could not halt the commodification of land and nor could the other movements in 
AP. Further, Polanyi’s vision of a coalition of different classes (such as labour, landed elite and 
artisans) to fight against the market forces remains to be qualified from case to case and place 
to place. Nevertheless, Polanyi’s ideas have been used as a diagnostic tool for this thesis. But 
this thesis places more emphasis on the political management of the counter-movements and 
is concerned with the impetus for the commodification of land (driven by market forces or 
something/someone else). 
  
David Harvey, like Karl Polanyi, suggested a need for the fusion of struggles over expanded 
reproduction and ABD (proletarian and non-proletarian) to fight capitalist powers. He 
advocated a strong role for the left parties in the project of coalescing these different struggles 
against capital. However, the empirical data pertaining to Polepally and such similar cases in 
AP do not indicate any such coalition of these two forms of struggles. Furthermore, the left 
parties have hardly any political salience in AP in the contemporary period, even though they 
occupied centre stage during the national struggle. Added to this, even States like West Bengal 
with its left ideology and left party in power itself has alienated thousands of acres of farmland 
for SEZs in the recent times.  
  
Moreover, the struggle by the displaced farmers in Polepally left them with debts. They 
incurred electoral expenses for their decision to contest elections as a mark of protest. They 
exhausted all their resources and could not carry the movement further. Amid all this, YSR’s 
sudden demise in a helicopter crash in September 2009 diverted the attention from 
dispossession to that of the political race for the next CM and the long pending regional issue 
of grant of separate Statehood for Telangana. The SEZ was unveiled in November 2009 by the 
newly appointed CM, K. Rosaiah, marking the end of protests. The YSR government 
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suppressed the movement by adopting a carrot-and-stick approach. This shows that the 
dispossession in Polepally was an extra-economic matter. Fraud, deceit, non-transparency, and 
ultimately, force, all had their role in dispossessing the farmers of Polepally. 
  
YSR’s government carried out the execution of Polepally SEZ flouting the established legal 
canons. In 2006, the two leading pharmaceutical companies from the State of AP, namely, 
Aurobindo and Hetero, requested the APIIC to allot 75 acres of land to each of them for setting 
up their units in the upcoming pharma SEZ in Polepally. They also sought the land at the cost 
of 7 lakhs per acre. The Managing Director (MD) of APIIC allotted the land as per the request 
of these two companies. The actual price of land in Polepally was officially fixed as 15-20 
lakhs per acre. But BP Acharya, the then MD of APIIC, cleared the file stating that YSR 
decided the quantum of land to be granted and the price of the land as well. 
  
After the demise of YSR, the highest investigative agency of the country, the Central Bureau 
of Investigation (CBI), probed as to why YSR granted land at concessional rates to the two 
pharma companies. The CBI alleged that the official favours in the form of land allotment were 
for the investments made by these pharma units into YSR’s son’s newly floated business firms, 
Jagati publications and Janani infrastructure. The two pharma firms purchased shares of 
Jagan’s companies at an overvalued price. While the actual cost of each share was worth only 
₹10, the pharma firms purchased each share paying ₹350. Thus, the state-capital alliance was 
on a quid-pro-quo basis. The state-business transaction resulted in the losses amounting to 
₹12.26 crore to the government in Polepally case. 
  
Kohli (2012) argued that the pro-business attitude of the Indian state since the 1980s led to 
inequalities across several dimensions in India. The state prioritised economic growth over 
redistribution and allied closely with the private capital. This resulted in higher growth rates. 
But the fruits of the economic growth were not equally distributed leaving the bottom half of 
the people in distress. Now this is true even in the case of the AP as it moved close to the capital 
since the 1980s, and more so in the post-liberalisation period. But the evidences by the 
investigative and auditing agencies in Polepally and other such similar development projects 
reveal that it is not the state moving closer to the capital which led to inequalities but the 
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dishonest state-business relations. As noted above, these relations were on a quid-pro-quo 
basis. The collusive state-capital deals led to inequalities and dispossession. Given the empirics 
of the Polepally case, a strong case has also been made against locating dispossession under 
the logic of the global capital circuit theory. 
  
The state-business deals arrived at during YSR’s tenure as CM demonstrated that centralising 
leaders can devise the strategies to control and regulate capital to foster personal interests. 
Political power came in handy to serve the economic interests of a dynasty. In the process, 
people were dispossessed. YSR effectively managed the restive temper of the citizens against 
dispossession through the execution of welfare programmes on a post-clientelist basis (Manor 
2015). The dispossession here makes sense as a direct consequence of the collusive state-
business deals conspired by the centralising leadership of YSR, which were not for any 
productive developmental activity other than to promote his son’s business empire.  
  
The question raised in the thesis is how a pro-poor and pro-rural YSR government parcelled 
huge tracts of farmland to the private corporations. The answer was initially sought in a 
dominant theory, namely, Harvey’s Accumulation by Dispossession (ABD). However, as 
demonstrated above, the empirical evidence surrounding Polepally SEZ and similar 
development projects in AP is found incompatible with the explanatory framework of ABD. 
The following section details the theoretical contention of the thesis.  
  
7.2 A theory contested  
As noted in the first and second chapters of this thesis, several scholars rely on David Harvey’s 
theory of ABD to examine and explain various forms of dispossessions occurring in the 
developing nations across the globe. ABD has been often used to understand land-related 
dispossession. It simply holds that dispossession of the farmers in the developing nations is a 
result of a deliberate strategy employed by the powerful developed nations to avert the crisis 
associated with overaccumulated capital in the global economy.  
  
Harvey wrote that the problem of overaccumulation of capital began since the 1970s in the 
global north. He refers to such capital accumulation as problematic because of its inability to 
184 
 
find profitable outlets for its reinvestment. To avoid surplus accumulation crises, the big 
business corporations of the developed nations rely on spatio-temporal fixes of the capital. This 
implies geographical expansion of the capital into new locations and temporal investments into 
sectors with long-term returns. In sum, the overaccumulated capital moves to other locations 
(new markets) and would be invested in long-term capital projects (transport, communication, 
education, research, infrastructure and industrial projects). To invest their capital profitably, 
the developed capitalist nations devise plans to penetrate neoliberal ideology deep down into 
the political-economic landscape of the developing nations. This form of ideological 
penetration seeks a minimal role for the state in the economy meaning the opening of those 
hitherto socialist or planned economies (mainly developing ones) of the world to the market 
forces. This will enable the idle capital to find profitable investment outlets and one such 
instance was the proliferation of SEZs in nations like India. 
  
Harvey argues that the spatial and temporal fixes of the capital is accompanied by the process 
of ABD. ABD, a reformulation of Marx’s primitive accumulation, refers to various forms of 
dispossession under the conditions of advanced capitalism. Marx viewed primitive 
accumulation as an historically confined process that sets preconditions for capitalism in the 
form of converting the primary producers into wage labour and the land into capital. Harvey’s 
ABD is an integral part of capitalism present at all times. Dispossession takes a variety of forms 
which include expropriation of land and natural resources, conversion of common or public 
property into exclusive private property and the privatisation of basic social amenities such as 
healthcare, education, pensions etc. and more importantly the predations of finance capital. 
Several development projects such as SEZs, industrial corridors, mining, ports and real estate 
projects are a by-product of a surplus global capital lying idle (Harvey 2003).  
  
The contention of this thesis is that while Harvey’s theory of ABD is resilient in explaining 
capital accumulation and concomitant dispossession in the present conditions, the agency 
responsible for ABD is not dealt adequately. The empirical data pertained to the case of 
Polepally SEZ, other related development projects in AP and across India indicate that extra-
economic means (legal, illegal, fraudulent means backed by coercive apparatus of the state) 
were employed by the concerned governments to dispossess people. This means the farmers 
were displaced from their lands by the political-legal powers and the consent of the farmers did 
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not matter. Wherever farmers resisted parting with their lands, the state used force. This has 
been the case with several of the ongoing land acquisitions for several development projects 
across AP and India. In other words, market sales of land wherein the landowner would 
voluntarily sell land, if the need arose, for clearing a debt or incurring the expenses of a 
marriage in the Indian context, was not the case. However, Harvey explicitly rejects the role of 
extra-economic means in unleashing ABD as is evident from his reply to one of the critiques 
that ‘if some states have been reduced to supine adjuncts of capital, then perhaps structural 
adjustment by the IMF has had something to do with it’ (Harvey 2006, p. 160).  
  
This study does not deny the context (a liberal market economy) in which the dispossession 
occurred. The Indian state, as argued by Kohli (2012) began to liberalise its economy since the 
1980s and to this extent it adopted more pro (indigenous) business policies. India could not 
formally transform to an open economy in the 1980s as its powerful business groups were not 
ready to withstand the competition from international markets. It formally integrated with the 
world economy starting since the 1990s and successfully sustained reforms as its capital 
became mature enough to face the competition from the established players in the global 
market. The thesis concurs with Kohli that over the past three and half decades ‘the Indian state 
has shifted from a reluctant pro-capitalist state with a socialist ideology to an enthusiastic pro-
capitalist state with neoliberal ideology’ (2013, p. 9). The impetus for this shift came from 
within and was not directed by the global neoliberal capitalist actors. India’s embrace of a 
market economy, prioritising economic growth, was partly facilitated by the balance of 
payment crisis of the 1990s. But even after recovering from that crisis, India continued with 
the reforms. This is because its big business corporates and urban middle classes began to 
cherish the fruits of economic growth with the demise of a corrupt industrial licensing system.  
  
The contention of Kohli that the impetus toward a state-capital alliance prioritising economic 
growth came from within supports this thesis. This is particularly so as this study refines 
Harvey’s theory which asserts that the dispossession for capital accumulation in the developing 
states is determined by the IMF, World Bank and other dominant global financial actors 
relegating the status of the state to a night watchman. The study narrated the story of the 
implementation of one of India’s key development policies aimed at private capital 
accumulation from a subnational perspective wherein the State government played a proactive 
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role in the economy. The rationale for a subnational perspective emerged from the fact that 
States in India have emerged since the 1980s as the key players which shared and shaped the 
political and economic power at a national level (Rudolph and Rudolph 2001). 
  
The decentralisation of political-economic power from centre to States strangely led to the 
centralisation of power with the apex political leadership at state level (Manor 2015). States, 
particularly the industrially better-off States (Maharashtra, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu) or States 
with leaders who demonstrated a strong commitment to reforms (Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh 
and AP) gained more from the economic autonomy as seen from the surge in their economic 
growth rates.  
  
Moreover, the aspirations of regional entrepreneurs also played a role in altering the political-
economic terrain of several Indian States. The leaders at the State level assumed a lot of 
importance in the post-liberalisation period as they were to implement the reform policies 
overcoming the expected backlash from various sections of the society, particularly the poor 
people. The regional leadership faced the task of balancing welfare and development which 
have increasingly become antagonistic to each other due to India’s transformation from a 
centrally planned economy to a federal market economy. One of the important consequences 
of economic reforms at State level was the rise in their growth rates. At times, they even 
surpassed the national averages in growth rates as was the case with AP. Consequently, there 
was also a surge in the revenues of the State which provided further impetus for the State 
leadership to become much more authoritarian.  
  
The key idea that binds this thesis is that the changed dynamics of federal democratic polity 
enable a tracing of the real agents responsible for the implications following the decisions to 
adopt particular models of development. The empirics of this study call for rethinking of the 
structural dimensions of capital as a determining factor for embracing market-oriented 
development models for capital accumulation by the developing nations. The thesis 
demonstrates that the state’s select regulation of the capital at subnational-level, let alone the 
global imperatives of capital, led to the adoption of SEZ policy and subsequent dispossession 
of the farmers.  
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7.3 Scope for further research 
On 31 August 2016, the Supreme Court of India gave a verdict dealing with the Singur (West 
Bengal) land-acquisition case. In 2006, the Communist government in West Bengal acquired 
997 acres of fertile farmland and allotted it to Tata industry for manufacturing the cheapest car, 
Nano. Following the stiff resistance from the farmers against the West Bengal government’s 
forceful acquisition of their main source of livelihood, Tata shifted the project to Gujarat State 
in 2008. But the matter of land restitution to farmers was pending in Supreme Court. The Apex 
Court, after a decade, quashed the left government’s acquisition of land for the Tata automobile 
industry. The judgement held that the State government flouted the rules of the land-acquisition 
law to favour Tata industry. The Court observed that the costs of development should not be 
borne by the poor farmers who have no resources to fight the powerful government. 
Accordingly, the Court directed the government to return the land back to the original owners 
notwithstanding the fact that some of them have received compensation. In fact, the Court 
ordered the government to provide compensation also to those who did not receive it yet to 
compensate the loss of their livelihood for a decade (Rajagopal 2016; The New Indian Express 
1 September 2016).  
  
On 9 January 2017, the Apex Court of India, acting on the petition filed by a Hyderabad based 
NGO, ‘SEZ Farmers Protection and Welfare Association’ demonstrated its concern for 
farmers. The advocates representing the NGO pleaded with the Court to return the unused land 
acquired for SEZs to the farmers. Taking cognizance of the matter, the Court issued notices to 
the centre and seven States (including AP and TS) to respond to the petitioner’s plea. The main 
claim of the petition was that the 80 percent of the total land acquired for SEZs was lying 
unused. The SEZ policy goals of industrialisation, employment generation and export 
promotion are defied as no productive economic activity is taking place there. Further, the 
private SEZ developers/units who procured land at concessional prices mortgaged it to secure 
bank loans. The non-utilisation of land led to unemployment, wastage of natural resources and 
caused loss to food security (Venkatesan 2017).  
  
The Farmers NGO is making an argument that in the SEZ developmental sites, there is no 
industrialisation and consequently no development as proclaimed in the SEZ policy. But it is 
certainly a gain to the corporates as they received lands at concessional rates and further 
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secured loans on these lands in the name of developing SEZs. While SEZ policy is beneficial 
to the private investors, it severely affected the livelihood concerns of those displaced.  
  
The above judgements reinforce the broad arguments of this thesis. The empirics of this study 
(Chapters 3 and 6) revealed that land was allotted in more quantum for SEZs and related 
developmental projects than was needed. Several of these development projects did not start as 
per the schedule. Business entities in possession of land availed loans and other incentives 
showing the land as a security in the name of developing SEZs. Further, the flawed land 
acquisition led to resistance from the displaced farmers, opposition parties and civil society 
groups. Consequently, some of these projects landed in legal controversies. This led to a 
situation theorised as ‘development deadlock’ (Oskarsson and Nielsen 2014) wherein ‘forced 
displacement, aborted industrialisation and blocked land restitution’ became the hallmark of 
SEZ-type industrialisation. This study demonstrated that this deadlock in liberalising AP arose 
because of a state-business nexus nurtured by personal business interests of the political elite 
operating from the apex of the State government.  
  
The thesis of ‘development deadlock’ represents a situation wherein neither the restive farmers 
nor the corporate industrialists benefit from the neoliberal model of development. Contrary to 
this, the thesis found that in AP, the new development projects accrued benefits to corporates 
and the political elite. For instance, the APIIC, under the tutelage of YSR, allotted the land to 
SEZ units providing a concession of about 8-13 lakhs per acre as noted in case of Aurobindo 
and Hetero in Polepally SEZ. These land doles by YSR government were also true of several 
other SEZs. The actual industrialisation may not start but the SEZ developers in possession of 
land, in the name of development, secure loans from banks. YSR granted land favours to the 
big business in the State of AP for their return investments into his son’s businesses. The 
beneficiary firms purchased shares in the Jagan’s businesses at an inflated price and this 
accrued gains to Jagan.  
  
On the contrary, the costs of the development projects were borne by the displaced persons. 
For instance, Polepally farmers were dispossessed of their basic means of subsistence for 
several years and there was no sight of any industrial activity as proposed. Even the meagre 
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compensation paid to them was spent on their day-to-day needs. Furthermore, after a gap of 
six years after the identification of land for GIP, the government earmarked 250 acres of land 
for a pharma SEZ project. The pharma SEZ became operational in 2009. The rest of the land 
was vacant for several years after its acquisition. Moreover, pharma companies cannot employ 
the displaced with farming and allied skills. In the process, the villagers lost their peace, 
property and became restive. Their fight against the state to halt the SEZ and get back their 
lands led them to lose the little resources they had. They sold their other assets like their 
livestock to cater to their daily needs in Polepally. It is rightly observed by Levien (2011, p. 
468), that ‘the dispossession of land has forced a disaccumulation of other productive assets 
such as livestock and led to a redenomination of assets such as water, which are being used to 
commercial use’.  
  
The Polepally case demonstrated that SEZ-type development models even impact social life of 
the dispossessed. The prospects of marrying the young girls and boys from Polepally village 
were destroyed as they were dispossessed from their means of subsistence. The possession of 
land and cattle in rural AP is not only a source of livelihood but also accrues an individual or 
family a certain degree of social status and prestige. The state belied the aspirations of the 
displaced in all forms. Thus, the real brunt of development was borne by the displaced.  
  
The capital accumulation in the contemporary development projects, unlike Marx’s primitive 
accumulation, is not concerned with those displaced. The process of dispossession is not with 
the intention of turning the primary producers into wage labour to work in the new capitalist 
firms. The dispossession is taking place in an advanced capitalist system with the prior presence 
of an abundant pool of labour (present in AP and India). Hence the dispossession of the farmers 
is a once and for all matter. The corporate entities are more interested in the land than the 
owner, labour, tenant, and the others relying on agriculture related livelihood (Sassen 2010). 
The state, having dispossessed the farmers from their land with the promise of employment 
didn’t ensure it. So, the innate phenomenon of non-incorporation of rural labour in SEZ-type 




Although the Singur case did lead to a landmark judgement of return of the land to the original 
owners, a decade had lapsed by then. Moreover, not all struggles yield the same results even 
when several States across India resorted to the flawed process of acquisition in their urge to 
alienate land to the corporates. For instance, in the Polepally case, the non-transparent nature 
of land acquisition and the changes to the original project stand as gross violation of rules. The 
fact that pharma SEZ units became operational in Polepally despite stiff resistance, stands as 
testimony to show the subnational variation in resistance. One future research agenda of interest 
could be the differential outcomes in land dispossession movements within and across various 
subnational units of India. While a few States such as West Bengal or Goa succeeded in halting 
the SEZ projects, a State like AP with a historical record of subaltern struggles could not pose 
a considerable challenge to halt the SEZs. Within AP, the Sompeta thermal power project in 
Srikakulam was aborted owing to popular resistance, but the Polepally resistance could not 
yield the same result.  
  
A topic for further research is the role of judiciary after the Singur verdict. For both the capital 
and dispossessed, the decision of the Courts pertaining to the stalled projects is a puzzle. While 
governments will only abide by the Court orders be it in the interests of capital or dispossessed, 
the immediate concerns of dispossession and development are borne by the other key 
stakeholders. So, the research question of importance here is of judicial predictability in 
development politics.  
  
The YSR model of development unleashed considerable political and social mobilisation. But 
YSR employed shrewd strategies that quelled the collective anguish of the dispossessed. He 
balanced welfare and development to localise resistance, or at least not to allow the resistance 
against land dispossession to coalesce into a force to destabilise the existing political-economic 
order. YSR’s continuous balance of the ‘economics of market and politics of democracy’ 
(Nayyar 1998) led to further economic prospects for his son and political fortunes for himself 
while muting the radical challenge posed by those dispossessed.  
  
YSR went on chanting the development mantra as a panacea for unemployment, poverty, and 
distress of the poor people residing in the State. In the hindsight of development and welfare, 
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YSR created a stable and strong set of political and business elite with intertwined interests. 
There was no clear-cut demarcation between the political and business spheres as several of 
the MPs in YSR’s government were business-people turned politicians or politicians 
(Oskarsson and Nielsen 2014) aspiring to set up businesses. Several of the development 
contracts were awarded to these close associates, including Jagan. YSR’s tenure set a political 
practice wherein electoral support is derived from the majorities in post-clientelist ways 
(Manor 2015) but which makes loyalty, in a reciprocal mode, a sine qua non between the 
political and business elite.  
  
Another interesting aspect to study would be the consequences if a leader with the capacity to 
exercise ‘personal domination’ over the government and the party dies or goes out of power. 
One indication here is to see what happened to AP in the wake of YSR’s sudden demise. There 
was a development deadlock as several of his developmental projects were mired in legal 
controversies. Further, regional parties and movements gained currency as was the case with 
the rise of Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) and subsequent issue of bifurcation of AP into AP 
and Telangana. This further deteriorated the prospects for growth. If YSR were to have lived, 
would it have been possible for the rise of the Telangana Movement and, more importantly, 
CBI’s probe into Jagan’s disproportionate assets case to occur? In short, the political and 
economic consequences following the collapse of authoritarian leaders and personal 
dominance of CMs like YSR is a case for further enquiry. 
 
One of the important lessons of the SEZ model of development as executed in Polepally and 
AP suggests that dispossession need not always be a determinant of global neoliberal capitalist 
forces. In this case, given the empirics of this thesis, it can be said that the real impetus for 
embracing such models of development comes from the centralising leaders’ aspirations of 
building a dynastic polity at subnational-level. Right from the NTR’s advent in AP, the kith 
and kin of the ruling class occupied key political positions. Be it NTR’s second wife Lakshmi 
Parvati, NTR’s sons Balakrishna, Harikrishna or his son-in-law Chandrababu Naidu; all 




The dynastic trend saw a continuity during YSR’s rule. YSR’s family members, particularly 
Jagan, made the lead stories in newspapers for the reasons detailed in this thesis. The question 
is whether the present development models at a subnational-level in India are dictated by the 
pressures of dynastic politics as was the case with Jagan’s influence over his CM father, YSR. 
Political power is used as a device to build a dynastic empire comprising people close to the 
ruling elite. Further, as the Polepally case revealed, politics is also used to serve the economic 
interests of the kith and kin of the dynasty. Can a case be made that wielding political power 
in authoritarian ways is enough to carve out a business empire made up of kith and kin? 
 
7.4 Summing up  
The Polepally SEZ and other such land-based development projects in AP are created with 
laudable policy goals. But their implementation and the actual functioning contravened the 
stated policy objectives and produced economically and politically undesirable outcomes. The 
scarcity of land to meet the demand of various sectors and the bias of the subnational State of 
AP toward corporate industrial development projects was detailed in this thesis. Seen in this 
way, the State became a land broker as it catered to the land requirements of the capitalist class. 
This was facilitated by the fact of increased subnational political and economic autonomy. 
States such as AP witnessed the rise of authoritarian CMs like YSR who encashed on the gains 
accrued from the economic growth due to the reform of the economy. 
  
In AP, during YSR’s chief ministership, the State’s role as a land broker was owed to the 
promotion of business interests of the political elite, in particular the CMs son. The state-
business relations were not based on productive investment and developmental purposes but to 
augment personal/political interests. On this basis, the thesis established that dispossession in 
Polepally and similar development sites cannot be explained in terms of a globally driven 
neoliberal project rooted in the capital flows theory of Harvey. Rather, the thesis demonstrated 
that SEZ-type dispossession resulted from the state’s favouring the interests of select political 
and business classes.  
  
The resistance to development projects was countered by the authoritarian leadership of YSR 
through a recourse to the tactical balance of development and welfare policies. YSR’s strategic 
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balance of welfare and development, perhaps, legitimised dispossession. All in all, the thesis 
unravelled the role of the centralising CMs at subnational-level in dispossession for 
development. The thesis argues that the role of the subnational-level political authority, acting 
under dynastic pressures in liberalising India, could be an important theoretical vantage point 
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